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Preface
My interest in doing research started in 2008, when I did my internship at the CPB, The 
Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis. During this internship, which was part of 
my Master thesis in econometrics, I investigated the effect of early cannabis use on edu-
cational attainment. Using a dataset on Australian twins who differed in their use of can-
nabis, I estimated – perhaps not surprisingly – a negative effect. This master thesis made 
me realize that I liked doing research. After finishing my masters, I started working at the 
education department of the CPB in 2009, under the supervision of Dinand Webbink, who 
was program leader at that moment. I couldn’t have had a better supervisor. He introduced 
me to a novel trend in the economics field I wasn’t aware of at that time, and which had 
not been given much attention in my econometrics courses: the (quasi-)experimental lit-
erature, in which treatment evaluations play an important role. This type of research, with 
its focus on finding causal effects, strongly appealed to me, and during my first 2 years 
of employment at the CPB I worked with Dinand on numerous projects, making myself 
comfortable with terms like differences-in-differences, regression discontinuity and coun-
terfactuals. The course economics of education taught by Erik Plug and Hessel Oosterbeek 
further fueled my interest writing a PhD. When Dinand left the CPB in 2011 to become a 
professor at the Erasmus University, and asked whether I was interested in doing a PhD, 
the choice was easy. From April 2011 onwards, I have been working on my thesis. And what 
can I say about writing a thesis? Of course, it is hard work, but also that it is a great learning 
process. I not only learned a great deal about causal impact evaluations, I also learned how 
to make papers suitable for scientific publication. Also, I learned that patience is a virtue: it 
requires hard work and a lot of time to get something published. But I am sure it all will be 
worth it and pay off in the end.
This thesis could not have been written without the help and support of numerous persons. 
First of all, I would like to thank Dinand for having asked me to be his PhD-student, and hav-
ing faith in me. I really enjoyed all the meetings and fruitful discussions we had, the ideas 
we exchanged, his enthusiasm, but most of all his sense of humor. I also would like to thank 
Erik Plug, coauthor of one of my papers. The meetings we had helped to improve the paper 
considerably. Secondly, I am indebted to my employer, the CPB, which gave me the oppor-
tunity to write this thesis. I would like to thank Coen Teulings, Casper van Ewijk, George 
Gelauff and Ruud Okker. A special thanks goes to Debby Lanser and Bas ter Weel for their 
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support and valuable comments on some of my papers. In addition to these colleagues, I 
would like to thank Adam Elbourne and Rob Luginbuhl for checking my English. Also I am 
grateful to other colleagues for the great work atmosphere. In particular I would like to 
thank my old roomy Suzanne Kok and Ryanne van Dalen for having fun during work and 
after. The spinning days on Tuesday evenings kept me in shape. Furthermore I am grateful 
to the members of the PhD committee, Hessel Oosterbeek, Robert Dur, Bas Jacobs and 
Maarten Bosker for their time and effort.
Last but not least I would like to thank family and friends who indirectly contributed 
to this thesis. Special thanks go to Tashi and Benjamin, for being ‘paranimf’. We have had 
many good dinners in the past, and hopefully we will keep having them in the future. Also, 
I would like to thank my father, who has always supported me in whatever I do. Finally, I 
want to express my gratitude and love for Elske. She has been at my side since 2006, when 
we met each other at the radio station Amsterdam FM. Although I am happy I never made 
it as a journalist and instead finished this thesis, I am thankful for this brief side track in my 
career; otherwise I would never have got to know her.
Sander Gerritsen
Amsterdam, July 2014
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‘Human capital is the acquired and useful abilities of all the inhabitants or members 
of society. The acquisition of such talents, by the maintenance of the acquirer dur-
ing his education, study, or apprenticeship, always costs a real expense, which is a 
capital fixed and realized, as it were, in his person. Those talents, as they make a part 
of his fortune, so do they likewise that of the society to which he belongs.’ (Adam 
Smith, 1776)
1.1 Background
Human capital has been shown to be important for economic growth (e.g. Hanushek and 
Woessman, 2008). Countries would not flourish and people would be less happy if individu-
als did not have at least some. Human capital is not fixed, however, as one can increase her 
human capital by investing in it. One way to do so is through education. People go to school 
in order to learn skills that are necessary to produce goods with economic value. Moreover, 
they learn skills that are relevant for later success in life. This might not only be important 
for their own success, but also for that of others. Persons may benefit from someone else’s 
education: people can learn from each other, and may be less likely to become a victim of 
crime if others are higher educated. This is often referred to as positive spillovers or ‘exter-
nal’ effects.
However, people may underinvest in human capital. They may not have the financial 
resources for education, they may be shortsighted, or simply do not see the value of educa-
tion. This may not only harm them in terms of a lower probability to be employed or lower 
wages, it may also harm the society as a whole. External effects, as discussed above, might 
not be internalized if people do not invest enough in their human capital. Moreover, it 
might lead to higher educational inequality if some underinvest while others would not. For 
these reasons, the government interferes with people’s decisions with respect to school-
ing. That is, governments intervene in the market for education. They do so by jurisdiction, 
i.e. setting rules and regulations, and by subsidizing education. But how does a government 
intervene in an effective way? That is one of the main questions that economists of educa-
tion are studying.
To investigate this question, economists look at the so called educational production 
function (see for examples Boardman and Murnane, 1979; Todd and Wolpin, 2003). This 
function describes how human capital is accumulated by individuals. The amount of human 
capital someone accrues is related both to factors outside school such as her inherent abil-
ity (genes), family environment and networks, and to factors inside school such as the time 
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spent in school, class size, and teacher quality. A better understanding of how these edu-
cational factors contribute to human capital can help policymakers with decision making. 
Does a reduction in class size increase student achievement? And if so, by how much? And 
to what extent does an increase in compulsory schooling lead to the acquisition of more 
skills? These are all relevant questions. For a policymaker that can choose from an almost 
undefined number of policy options, it is important to know the answers to these types of 
questions if she wants to devise good policies. After all, bad policies cost the taxpayer a lot.
This thesis looks at four different input factors that may contribute to the production 
of human capital. It investigates the importance of teacher quality, time in school, compul-
sory education, and school facilities for student outcomes, in particular student achieve-
ment. The main challenge in this thesis is identifying the causal effect of each of these 
input  factors. Identifying this effect is difficult because of the complexity of the educational 
production function. Factors outside school often interfere with factors inside schools. For 
example, schools that give additional instruction time to their students may also accommo-
date more pupils that are more motivated to learn. If it turns out that these schools have 
higher student achievement than other schools, it would be difficult to attribute the higher 
achievement to the additional instruction time, since it could just as well be attributed to 
student’s higher motivation. Moreover, it may not only be the motivation in which stu-
dents might differ. They can also differ in many other dimensions. As with motivation, these 
dimensions are often not observable. This means that simple comparisons of students’ 
achievement between schools will not lead to causal estimates of additional instruction 
time, as the students between the schools are not similar. This commonly known problem, 
frequently encountered in evaluations of inputs of the educational production function, is 
called the endogeneity problem. Trying to find ways to deal with this problem has been the 
challenge over the last two decades in economic studies about the impact of educational 
inputs on human capital (Angrist and Pischke, 2010). These studies address the endogene-
ity problem by exploiting randomized experiments or quasi-experiments in which  students 
are exogenously assigned to a control or treatment group. This assignment can be done by 
the researcher herself via a lottery, in which case it is a randomized experiment. The design 
of education policies can also lead to exogenous variation in the treatment of students, in 
which case it is a quasi-experiment or a natural experiment. The exogenous assignment 
ensures that control and treatment groups are similar, which enables a ‘valid’ comparison 
between the two. For estimation of causal effects often instrumental variables, regres-
sion discontinuity, and differences-in-differences techniques are exploited, and the studies 
using these techniques are referred to as the experimental literature.
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This thesis makes a contribution to this literature. In particular, it exploits education 
policies that were implemented in such a way that they created exogenous variation in 
teacher quality, time in school, compulsory education and school facilities. Using this type 
of variation enables an impact evaluation of each of these four inputs on student outcomes 
within a quasi-experimental setting. For the identification of the causal effects for three of 
these four inputs regression discontinuity methods are used (Chapters 3, 4 and 5). In Chap-
ter 2 twins are exploited. Before summarizing the results of the four chapters, the intuition 
behind the methods will be discussed briefly.
1.2 Methods
Twins
Twins are often exploited to cancel out family influences that might confound a relation-
ship between the treatment and the outcome. This is done by taking twin differences. In 
that case, the difference in their treatment is related to the difference in their outcomes. 
For example, in the returns to schooling literature twin differences in income are related 
to their differences in education (see for instance Ashenfelter and Krueger, 1994). That 
is, the income of the twin with more education is compared to that of her sibling with 
less education. Although this approach has appealing features, it often relies on a strong 
assumption: it is assumed that the difference in the treatment condition (educational level) 
between twins is exogenously determined. That is, there are no other differences between 
twins that are correlated with both their differences in educational level and earnings. This 
assumption may not be plausible, since twins that differ in education may also differ in 
other (un)observable characteristics that could contribute to earnings such as motivation 
or talent. The fundamental problem is that, also within pairs of twins, there might be self 
selection into treatment, as individual twins choose the amount of education themselves.
Chapter 2 in this thesis introduces a novel twin strategy in which the difference in treat-
ment condition can be considered exogenous. It examines the effect of teacher quality on 
student achievement by exploiting data on twins who entered the same school but were 
allocated to different classrooms in an exogenous way. In many Dutch primary schools the 
assignment of twins to different classes is the result of an informal policy rule that dictates 
that twins are not allowed to attend the same class. This assignment mechanism might 
induce a random assignment because at school entry neither schools nor parents have 
much information about the ability or behavior of twins and the ability or behavior of their 
class mates. Moreover, because in early childhood twins are more similar than different, it 
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seems not likely that small differences between twins will affect the way they are assigned 
to different classes. By using this identification strategy, it is for the first time that exog-
enous variation in twin differences is exploited. That is, in contrast with previous twin stud-
ies, there is no self-selection of twins into treatment. Neither twins nor their parents have 
much to say about the assignment of the twins to different class rooms, whereas in the 
returns to education literature twins might self select into the level of education.
Regression Discontinuity
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 of this thesis make use of regression discontinuity designs. In contrast 
to randomized experiments in which subjects are randomly assigned to treatment and 
control groups, subjects are assigned to treatment status by thresholds on an underlying 
variable. Subjects with values above a certain threshold value of the underlying variable 
receive treatment, whereas subjects with values below this threshold value do not. The key 
idea behind regression discontinuity is that subjects will be similar in (un)observed charac-
teristics around the cutoff. As such, the effect of the treatment can be determined by com-
paring the outcomes of those subjects above the threshold with those below. For example, 
in Chapters 3 and 41 school entry rules are used to identify the effect of an extra year in 
school. These rules determine which children start school in the current school year and 
which children have to wait another year. For instance, if a country uses a school entry rule 
with a cutoff set at the first of October, this means that children born before October 1 start 
in the current school year, whereas children born after October 1 start in the next school 
year. The school entry rules create variation in time in school for children born close to 
the cut-off date. Students that are almost the same age differ in their time spent in school. 
In that case, birth month is used as underlying variable and October 1 as threshold value. 
Chapter 5 also exploits a regression discontinuity design by making use of a threshold in 
the assignment of a subsidy program targeted at improving facilities for biology, physics, 
and chemistry in secondary schools. The subsidy was assigned to schools based on a prior-
ity score reflecting the ambition level of schools to improve student achievement. Schools 
with scores below a threshold value did not receive subsidy. The assignment procedure is 
exploited to estimate the impact of the subsidy on student outcomes.
1 In Chapter 4 the school entry rule is used in combination with the raising of the minimum 
school leaving age.
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1.3 Summaryoffindings
Chapter 2 examines the effect of teacher quality on student achievement using a novel 
identification strategy that exploits data on twins who entered the same school but were 
allocated to different classrooms in an exogenous way. The assignment of twins to differ-
ent classrooms can be viewed as a natural experiment that exposes very similar individuals 
to different schooling conditions. This quasi-experiment allows investigation of the causal 
effect of classroom quality on student outcomes using observational data. The variation 
in classroom conditions to which the twins are exposed can be considered as exogenous if 
the assignment of twins to different classes is as good as random. This assumption seems 
quite plausible within the institutional context of this study, which is Dutch primary educa-
tion. In many Dutch schools twins are assigned to different classes due to an informal policy 
rule that dictates that twins are not allowed to attend the same class. This assignment 
mechanism might induce a random assignment because at school entry neither schools 
nor parents have much information about the ability or behavior of twins and the ability or 
behavior of their class mates. Moreover, because in early childhood twins are more simi-
lar than different, it seems not likely that small differences between twins will affect the 
way they are assigned to different classes. By using this identification strategy, it is shown 
that class room quality comes down to teacher quality, and that this quality is important. 
Teacher quality can be measured by teacher experience. It is found that (a) the test perfor-
mance of all students improve with teacher experience; (b) teacher experience also matters 
for student performance after the initial years in the profession; (c) the teacher experience 
effect is most prominent in earlier grades; (d) the teacher experience effects are robust to 
the inclusion of other classroom quality measures, such as peer group composition and 
class size, and (e) an increase in teacher experience also matter for career stages with less 
labor market mobility which suggests positive returns to on the job training of teachers.
Chapter 3 uses school entry rules to provide the first estimates of the causal effect of 
time in school on cognitive skills for many countries around the world, for multiple age 
groups and for multiple subjects. These estimates enable a comparison of the performance 
of education systems based on gain scores instead of level scores. Data from international 
cognitive tests are used and variation induced by school entry rules is exploited within a 
regression discontinuity framework. The effect of time in school on cognitive skills differs 
strongly between countries. Remarkably, there is no association between the level of test 
scores and the estimated gains in cognitive skills. As such, a country’s ranking in interna-
tional cognitive tests might misguide its educational policy. Across countries it is found that 
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a year of school time increases performance in cognitive tests by 0.2 to 0.3 standard devia-
tions for 9-year-olds and by 0.1 to 0.2 standard deviations for 13-year-olds.
Chapter 4 evaluates the effects of raising the minimum school leaving age from 14 to 
15 in the Netherlands in 1971. The policy goal was to increase the number of high school 
graduates. The analysis shows that the change led to a decrease in the high school dropout 
rate of approximately 20 percent. However, there were no benefits in terms of employ-
ment or higher wages. Several explanations for this finding have been explored. Suggestive 
evidence is presented in support of a skill-based explanation that no more labor-market 
relevant skills were learned during this extra year of school compared to those skills previ-
ously learned out of school.
Chapter 5 evaluates the effects of a subsidy program targeted at improving facilities for 
biology, physics, and chemistry in secondary schools. The goal of this policy was to increase 
the enrollment rate in science and engineering (S&E) related courses at secondary and 
subsequent education institutions. The subsidy was assigned to schools based on a prior-
ity score reflecting the ambition level of schools to improve student achievement. Schools 
with scores below a threshold value did not receive subsidy. The assignment procedure is 
exploited in a regression discontinuity framework to estimate the impact of the subsidy on 
student outcomes. It is found that the subsidy increased the enrollment rate in S&E-related 
courses in secondary school by 3 percentage points (equivalent to a rise of approximately 
7.5%). In addition, it is found that the enrollment rate in S&E-related courses in tertiary edu-
cation increased by 2.5 percentage points (equivalent to a rise of approximately 11%). The 
increased enrollment did not lead to a deterioration in student achievement as measured 
by students’ biology, physics, and chemistry grades. This suggests that supply side policies 
that make S&E-related courses more attractive – such as the subsidy evaluated in this chap-
ter – are capable of increasing the number of S&E students, while keeping the quality of the 
supply of S&E students constant.
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 Teacher quality and student achievement: 
evidence from a Dutch sample of twins2
2 This is joint work with Erik Plug and Dinand Webbink.
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Abstract
This chapter examines the causal link that runs from classroom quality to student achieve-
ment using data on twin pairs who entered the same school but were allocated to different 
classrooms in an exogenous way. In particular, we apply twin fixed-effects estimation to 
estimate the effect of teacher quality on student test scores from second through eighth 
grade, arguing that a change in teacher quality is probably the most important classroom 
intervention within a twin context. In a series of estimations using measurable teacher 
characteristics, we find that (a) the test performance of all students improve with teacher 
experience; (b) teacher experience also matters for student performance after the ini-
tial years in the profession; (c) the teacher experience effect is most prominent in earlier 
grades; (d) the teacher experience effects are robust to the inclusion of other classroom 
quality measures, such as peer group composition and class size; and (e) an increase in 
teacher experience also matter for career stages with less labor market mobility which sug-
gests positive returns to on the job training of teachers.
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2.1 Introduction
The quality of teachers is considered to be a crucial factor for the production of human 
capital. Understanding the determinants of teacher quality is important for improving the 
quality of education and therefore a key issue for educational policy. A large literature 
has investigated the contribution of teachers to educational achievements of students, 
the heterogeneity between teachers and the aspects of teachers that are important (e.g. 
Hanushek and Rivkin, 2006; Staiger and Rockoff, 2010). A consistent finding in the literature 
is that teachers are important for student performance and that there are large differences 
among teachers in their impacts on achievement. However, little evidence has been found 
that any observable characteristic, save experience, explains the variation between teach-
ers. Teacher experience only seems to matter in the initial years in the profession.3 Hence, 
the literature does not yet provide clear policy advice about the type of teachers that are 
most effective, and therefore should be hired and kept in the education profession based 
on their observed characteristics.
Estimating the effect of teacher characteristics on student performance is complicated 
because students, teachers and resources are almost never randomly allocated among 
schools and classrooms. Unobserved factors correlated with both teacher characteristics 
and student outcomes might bias estimates using non-experimental data. In fact, recent 
studies have provided evidence for non-random sorting of teachers (Clotfelter et al., 2006; 
Feng, 2009).
Researchers have addressed this issue by using panel methods or exploiting random 
assignment of students and teachers into schools and classrooms. The most common 
approach in the literature is to estimate value-added models that focus on gains in student 
achievement and eliminate confounding by past unobserved parental and school inputs 
(Hanushek, 1971, 1992; Aaronson, Barrow and Sander, 2007; Rockoff 2004; Rivkin et al., 
2005; Hanushek et al., 2005). Several recent studies exploit multiple years of informa-
tion for teachers to estimate teacher fixed effects and to link these effects with teacher 
characteristics (Hanushek et al., 2005; Rockoff, 2004; Aaronson, Barrow and Sander, 2003; 
Rivkin et al., 2005). Although the most sophisticated value-added models use a three-way-
fixed effects approach (student, teacher and school fixed effects) concerns remain about 
3 Recent studies find gains from teacher experience beyond the initial years in the career 
( Wiswall, 2013; Harris and Sas 2011). Mueller (2013) finds that teacher experience moderates 
class size effects. He finds a class size effect only for senior teachers.
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non-random assignment of students to teachers and about modeling assumptions. For 
instance, Rothstein (2010) finds evidence for dynamic sorting which biases the estimated 
teacher effects.4 In addition, Wiswall (2013) shows that restrictive modeling assumptions 
generate the common finding that teacher experience beyond the initial years in the pro-
fession is not important.
A second approach in the literature focuses on classes where students are, or appear to 
be, randomly assigned. For instance, Clotfelter et al. (2006) use a subsample of schools that 
feature relatively balanced distributions of students across classrooms, based on observ-
able characteristics. Several studies exploit data from the STAR-experiment in which stu-
dents and teachers were randomly assigned to small and large classes (Krueger, 1999; Dee, 
2004; Nye, Konstantopoulos and Hedges, 2004; Chetty et al., 2012). Teacher experience is 
found to be the only observed teacher characteristic that matters which is consistent with 
studies using value-added models (Staiger and Rockoff, 2010). However, the gains from 
teacher experience are also found after the initial years in the profession.
This chapter examines the effect of teacher quality on student achievement using a 
novel identification strategy that exploits data on twin pairs who entered the same school 
but were allocated to different classrooms in an exogenous way. By exploiting an exog-
enous assignment of individuals to classrooms within the same schools our approach is 
related to the second approach from the literature. Moreover, the longitudinal character 
of the data enables us to take prior achievements of students into account like in the com-
mon value-added models. The assignment of twins to different classrooms can be viewed 
as a natural experiment that exposes very similar individuals to different schooling condi-
tions. This quasi-experiment allows us to investigate the causal effect of classroom quality 
on student outcomes using observational data. The variation in classroom conditions to 
which the twins are exposed can be considered as exogenous if the assignment of twins to 
different classes is as good as random. This assumption seems quite plausible within the 
institutional context of this study; Dutch primary education. In many Dutch schools twins 
are assigned to different classes due to an (informal) policy rule that dictates that twins are 
not allowed to attend the same class. At school entry schools and parents do not yet have 
much information about the ability or behavior of twins and the ability or behavior of their 
4 Rothstein (2010) evaluates the most common value-added specifications used for the assess-
ment of teacher performance. He finds that the assumptions underlying common value-added 
specifications are substantially incorrect and the estimates of teacher effects based on these 
models cannot be interpreted as causal. See also Guarino et al. (2013) on the validity of value-
added measures of teacher performance.
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class mates. Moreover, because in early childhood twins are more similar than different, it 
seems not likely that small differences between twins will affect the way they are assigned 
to different classes. In our empirical analysis we have tested this assumption and did not 
find evidence of the non randomness of the assignment.
Our research design exploits the exogenous assignment of twins to different classrooms. 
The treatment in this design is classroom quality, which is a multi-dimensional concept that 
might include factors such as peer quality, class size and teacher quality. In our empirical 
analysis we especially focus on the effects of observed teacher characteristics on student 
outcomes because, in applying our design, teachers seem the most obvious factor differing 
across classes. Typically, Dutch schools equalize classroom facilities and class composition 
across classes. In schools with many students and few teachers we expect little variation 
within twin pairs in class size and peer composition, and much within twin pair variation 
in teacher quality. Therefore, we will exploit the assignment of twins to different classes 
in particular to estimate the effects of teacher characteristics on student outcomes. For 
doing so, we use longitudinal data of a large representative sample of students from Dutch 
primary education. We have identified twins from the population based sample by using 
information on their date of birth, family name and school.
This chapter makes two important contributions to the current economic literature. 
First, we contribute to the literature on teacher quality by introducing an empirical strategy 
that has never been used to estimate the impact of teacher quality on student outcomes. 
Previous studies have relied on value-added modeling (e.g. Rivkin et al., 2005; Rockhoff, 
2004) or exploited classes where students are, or appear to be, randomly assigned (e.g. 
Krueger, 1999; Chetty, 2005; Clotfelter et al., 2006). Second, we contribute to the economic 
literature that exploits data on twins by combining twins with exogenous treatment assign-
ment. Twin differencing has been applied on various topics such as the returns to school-
ing or the intergenerational effects of schooling (see for instance Ashenfelter and Krueger, 
1994; Behrman and Rosenzweig, 2002). These studies are based on the assumption that 
variation within twin pairs is exogenous but it remains unclear why twins differ.5 As far as 
we know, there are no twin studies that arguably exploit exogenous variation in twin dif-
ferences.
5 Li et al. (2010) exploit a twin design in which parents are forced to send one of their twins to 
the countryside. The treatment assignment might not be random as it is based on a parental 
decision.
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In line with earlier studies on teacher effects we find that teacher experience is the only 
observed teacher characteristic that matters for student performance (Hanushek, 2011; 
Staiger and Rockoff, 2010; Chetty et al., 2011). Twins who are assigned to classes with more 
experienced teachers perform better in reading and math. On average one extra year of 
experience raise test scores by approximately one percent of a standard deviation. The 
effects of teacher experience are most pronounced in kindergarten and early grades. Our 
findings are remarkably consistent with the results found by Krueger (1999) and Chetty 
et al. (2005) using data from the STAR-experiment in which students and teachers were 
randomly assigned to classes. They also report linear effects of teacher experience and 
find that the effects of teacher experience reduce after kindergarten. The linear effects of 
teacher experience contrast ‘the consensus in the literature’ that only initial teacher expe-
rience matters (Staiger and Rockoff, 2010), but are in line with recent findings by Wiswall 
(2013) and Harris and Sas (2011) who also find gains from later experience.
The estimated effects of teacher experience should be interpreted carefully because 
they do not necessarily reflect the effect of training on the job but could be driven by other 
intrinsic characteristics of more experienced teachers.6 For instance, the findings might be 
driven by sample attrition if less effective teachers are more likely to leave the profession.
In the empirical analysis we test for various mechanisms that might explain why experi-
enced teachers are better teachers. We do not find evidence consistent with mechanisms 
that stress the importance of changes over time such as changes in the quality of teacher 
education or changes in outside opportunities in the labor market. However, we also find 
an effect of teacher experience for career stages with less labor market mobility. These 
estimates suggest positive returns to on the job training of teachers as it is less likely that 
these estimates will be biased because of selection into or out of the profession. This find-
ing is consistent with recent studies that also have found positive return to teacher experi-
ence for later career stages (Wiswall, 2013; Harris and Sas, 2011).
Regardless the story, our estimates show that experienced teachers matter (especially 
for reading). More focused policies to maintain experienced teachers in the classroom 
appear beneficial, especially for younger students.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2 we describe our empirical strategy 
and relate this to previous approaches from the literature. Section 2.3 describes the data. 
The main estimation results are presented in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 provides additional 
6 Rockoff (2004), Kane et al. (2006), Chetty et al. (2011) and Harris & Sass (2011) have previously 
noted this issue.
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tests about the key assumption of our empirical strategy about the random assignment 
of twins to classrooms. Section 2.6 explores the possible mechanisms underlying the esti-
mated effects of teacher experience. In Section 2.7 we conclude.
2.2 Empirical strategy
The basic framework in the economic literature that studies the effects of teachers models 
student achievement as a function of family, peer, community, teacher and school inputs 
and student ability (Hanushek and Rivkin, 2006). Student achievement at any point in time 
is seen as a cumulative result of the entire history of all inputs and the individual’s initial 
endowment (e.g. innate ability). A common approach for modeling this so-called educa-
tional production function is to assume that the cumulative achievement function is addi-
tively separable and linear (e.g. Boardman and Murnane, 1979; Todd and Wolpin, 2003; 
Harris and Sas, 2011). Estimating the effect of teachers is complicated because in any actual 
application we will generally not be able to control for all relevant school, family or student 
characteristics. If some omitted variables are correlated with the relevant teacher charac-
teristics, then the estimated parameters will be biased. The major threat to identification is 
the non-random sorting of students among schools and classrooms.
Researchers have used two types of empirical strategies for identifying the effects of 
teacher characteristics. The first, and most common, approach is based on value-added 
modeling. The second approach exploits situations where students are, or appear to be, 
randomly assigned. The most common approach in the literature is to include measures 
of prior achievement and estimate value-added models. These models focus on gains in 
student achievement or the rate of learning over specific time periods. Recent studies 
exploit the availability of multiple years of information for teachers for estimating teacher 
fixed effects which are linked with teacher characteristics (Hanushek, 1992; Hanushek et 
al., 2005; Rockoff, 2004; Aaronson, Barrow and Sander, 2003; Rivkin et al., 2005). A second 
approach in the literature identifies teacher effects by exploiting situations in which stu-
dents are, or appear to be, randomly assigned to classrooms and teachers (e.g. Clotfelter et 
al., 2006; Chetty et al., 2012). It might be expected that unobserved factors will not bias the 
estimates due to the random assignment of students.
In this chapter we exploit the assignment of twins to different classrooms for estimating 
the causal effect of class inputs on student achievement. This assignment can be viewed 
as a natural experiment that exposes very similar individuals to different class room condi-
tions. Our approach is most related to ‘the random assignment studies’ but by  including 
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previous test scores as controls we are also able to estimate value-added models. For 
explaining our empirical strategy we use as a starting point the basic economic framework 
which relates class inputs to measures of educational performance. Consider the following 
specification of a traditional educational production function:
(2.1) 
where indices i, j, c and s stand for pupil i born in family j in classroom c at school s. Observ-
able educational output Y represents the test scores on reading or math. Observable inputs 
of the educational production function contain individual attributes X, family character-
istics Z, and various measures of classroom quality CQ and school quality SQ. For ease of 
notation, we keep the specification very general in the sense that any class attribute could 
be represented by CQ. It could be teacher’s experience for example, but also class size or 
composition. The error term consists of analogous unobservable inputs of the educational 
production function x, z, sq, cq and an idiosyncratic effect  which is uncorrelated with 
all these observable and unobservable determinants. In this chapter we are interested in 
estimating  which represents the structural effect of an observable class input on pupil 
test scores.
If we use conventional cross section data to estimate equation (2.1), least squares esti-
mation might not yield an unbiased estimate of  for multiple reasons. First, there might 
be a non random assignment of pupils to classes, i.e. . This means for exam-
ple that worse performing pupils are more often assigned to classes with better peers or 
better teachers. Second, there might be parental influences on the child’s school and class-
room, i.e. . For instance, higher educated parents may select better schools 
or class rooms because they may be more involved with their children than lower edu-
cated parents. Third, better schools may attract better teachers (and better pupils), i.e. 
, because differences in quality of school management may cause different 
schools to attract different teachers. Fourth, schools may use multiple inputs to manipulate 
classroom environment, i.e. , because schools may decide to compensate 
classes with high fractions of low ability pupils by reductions in class size and/or extra aide. 
To sum up, estimating an equation like (2.1) with non experimental data is likely to induce 
bias due to unobservable characteristics of pupils, parents, and teachers and schools 
(i.e. school management).
Our empirical strategy for identifying  exploits differences within pairs of twins.
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If we suppress subscripts and take twin differences, our empirical model can be rewrit-
ten as
(2.2) 
Identification of  now rests on four assumptions:
(A.1) twins share family background, i.e.  and 
(A.2) twins enter the same school, i.e.  and 
(A.3) twins are exogenously allocated to different classrooms, i.e.  but   
 
(A.4) observable and unobservable class attributes are unrelated, i.e. 
Assumptions (A.1) and (A.2) are satisfied by design. Assumption (A.3) seems also plausible 
because of the assignment procedures in Dutch education. We will discuss the plausibility 
of this assumption shortly. However, assumption (A.4) seems not plausible. If we assume 
that the assumptions (A.1), (A.2) and (A.3) hold we can simplify the empirical model to:
(2.3) 
Twin fixed-effect estimation will therefore give us the following estimator:
 
Hence, this twin fixed effect estimator not only captures the impact of any observable 
classroom characteristic but also the impact of every unobservable characteristic that is 
correlated with it. This can be interpreted as the broad impact of classroom quality.
As in any quasi-experimental design there are deviations from the ideal experimental 
design in which a specific treatment is randomly assigned to an experimental group of stu-
dents. The first, and crucial, issue in this design is whether the assignment of twins is truly 
exogenous (assumption (A.3)). The second issue in our design is about the treatment varia-
ble. What is the treatment considering the fact that classroom quality is multi- dimensional? 
Both issues should be considered within the institutional context of Dutch primary educa-
tion. In Dutch primary education parents and pupils are free to choose their school. All 
schools receive funding from the government based on the number and socioeconomic 
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background of the pupils. Primary school consists of eight grades of which grade 1 and 
grade 2 are equivalent to kindergarten. Children are allowed to enroll in primary education 
on their fourth birth day which induces a rolling admission in grade 1. Compulsory educa-
tion starts at the age of 5. Most schools mix first and second graders. After grade 2 children 
are reassigned to different classes. The composition of these classes remains quite stable 
until the end of primary education in grade 8 in which pupils take a nationwide test.
Is the assignment of twins truly exogenous?
The key identifying assumption of our approach is the random assignment of twins to dif-
ferent classrooms. Many schools in Dutch primary education employ a policy of separating 
twins in different classes.7 This separation already takes place when the twins enroll in 
grade 1. The rolling admission of pupils in grade 1 implies that class size and classroom com-
position are volatile and only partly observed by parents. After finishing the school year in 
which pupils enrolled they spend two complete school years in grade 1 and 2.
Hence, in total most students spend more than two years in grade 1 and 2. During this 
whole ‘kindergarten stage’ pupils keep the same teacher(s) and are not reassigned to other 
classes. This school policy is likely to induce random assignment at school entry since in 
kindergarten there is no (or very little) information on class quality, such as the quality of 
the class mates, that parents can use to determine which type of class suits their twins best. 
In addition, twins in early childhood are more similar than different and it seems unlikely 
that small differences between twins affect the way in which they are assigned to different 
classes. From this we expect that the assignment of newly entering twins, which creates 
the classes of grade 1 and 2, can be considered as exogenous. We will run twin-fixed effect 
regressions and interpret the corresponding estimate as the broad impact of classroom 
quality.
A reassignment of students in Dutch education takes place in the transition from grade 2 
to grade 3. At this stage there will be more information available about the twins and their 
class mates, although it might be expected that the twins are very similar. This implies that 
we are not fully sure whether the assignment is still exogenous for third and higher graders.
To address this concern we will estimate value-added models which include previ-
ous test scores of our twins. We will compare the results of the basic random assignment 
7 The Dutch Society for Parents of Multiples advises parents to follow their own opinion, but 
believes that separation stimulates the individualization of the twins (Geluk & Hol, 2001). Most 
schools explicitly put their twin policy on their website. Many schools assign twins to different 
classes based on the belief that putting them in the same class will harm them, although recent 
research suggest that this is not the case (see for example Webbink et al., 2007).
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 specifications with the results of the value-added specifications. The potential bias due to 
non random assignment of twins is expected to be small if these results are very similar. In 
addition, we will perform several tests on the empirical importance of endogenous class-
room assignment.
What is the treatment?
In our design we compare the performance of twins who are assigned to different classes. 
The treatment in this design is classroom quality, which is a multi-dimensional concept. 
The literature on class quality typically focuses on the impact of peers, teacher quality 
and class size. In the Dutch institutional context we expect that teacher quality will be the 
most important component of this treatment. Due to the rolling admission class size and 
peer composition are volatile in grade 1 and 2, whereas teacher quality is fixed. In addition, 
Dutch schools typically equalize facilities, peer composition and class size across classes. In 
schools with many students and few teachers we expect much within twin pair variation 
in teacher quality and little within twin pair variation in class size and classroom composi-
tion. Therefore, we expect that the assignment of twins to different classes in grade 1 and 
2 can mainly be interpreted as an assignment to different teachers. For grade 3 to 8 we also 
expect that teacher quality is the main component of the treatment. With many students 
and few teachers in schools we expect only little within twin pair variation in class size 
and class composition. Most variation in classroom quality will come from differences in 
teacher quality. A similar interpretation has been used in the literature that investigates the 
effect of school and teacher quality through the estimation of classroom fixed effects on 
achievement gains. The resulting classroom differences in average achievement gain have 
been interpreted as reflecting teacher quality, since the teacher is the most obvious factor 
differing across classrooms (Hanushek, 1992). In this study we will therefore investigate 
teacher quality effects in more detail and focus on components such as experience, gender 
and fulltime or part-time employment of teachers.
2.3 Data
The data come from the longitudinal biannual PRIMA project (Driessen et al., 2004). The 
PRIMA project consists of a panel of approximately 60,000 pupils in 600 schools. The 
participation in the project is voluntary. The main sample, which includes approximately 
420 schools, is called the reference sample, which is representative for the Dutch stu-
dent population in primary education. An additional sample includes 180 schools for the 
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 over-sampling of pupils with a lower socioeconomic background (the low SES sample). After 
each wave of the project some schools drop out and some new schools are included.8 This 
means that the panel structure only holds for a subsample of the dataset.9 We use all six 
waves of the PRIMA survey including data on pupils, parents, teachers and schools from 
the school years 1994-95, 1996-97, 1998-99, 2000-01, 2002-03 and 2004-05. Within each 
school, pupils in grades 2, 4, 6 and 8 (average age: 6, 8, 10, 12 years) are tested in reading 
and math. Information on teachers is also collected but the main focus of the project is to 
follow pupils (and not teachers) during primary education.
Our identification strategy is based on differences within pairs of twins. The PRIMA-
data does not contain direct information on twins versus singletons. We have identified 
twins by matching on family name, date of birth, school and year of the survey. If there are 
two pupils with exactly the same values on these matching variables they are considered 
to be twins. In the total sample of the PRIMA-data we have identified 623 records of twin 
pairs that were assigned to different classrooms and for which (reading) test scores and 
teacher data are available. Because of the longitudinal character of the data some twin 
pairs will be observed more than once; the number of unique twin pairs in our data is 495. 
The total sample of 623 twin pair observations consists of 448 same sex pairs (219 pairs 
of boys, 229 pairs of girls), 173 opposite sex pairs and 2 pairs with unknown gender. More 
twin pairs have been identified in earlier grades than in later grades; 235 pairs in grade 2, 
175 pairs in grade 4, 132 pairs in grade 6 and 81 pairs in grade 8. If one of the twins is 
retained or accelerated we will not observe a pair because of the sampling structure of the 
PRIMA-project (only grade  2, 4, 6 and 8). This might explain the lower number of pairs in 
later grades.
Our main dependent variables are scores on tests for languages and arithmetic which 
were developed as part of the PRIMA-project. The language test for children in second 
grade, which is equivalent to infant school, measures the understanding of words and con-
cepts. The arithmetic test for these children focuses on the sorting of objects. These tests 
are taken in class. The test for children in grades 4, 6 and 8 all come from a system for 
following pupil achievements in primary education developed by the CITO group. The aim 
of these tests is to observe to what extent students master various elements of the cur-
riculum. The tests for the same grade levels are identical each year. This ensures that the 
8 There are no significant differences between the schools that drop out and the schools that 
remain in the project (Roeleveld and Vierke, 2003).
9 Other reasons are pupils changing schools or pupils not being present at the time tests are 
taken. 
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comparison of achievement levels over time is possible. The scores are also comparable 
between grades. The scales of the raw scores for language and arithmetic have no clear 
meaning. We have standardized these test scores by wave and grade with the mean and 
standard error of the reference sample.
The main explanatory variables in this chapter are a set of class input factors. First, we 
have information on teacher characteristics: experience (measured in years) and gender. In 
addition, the data provide information whether the class is taught by one fulltime teacher 
or by two part-time teachers. In case of two teachers we use the experience of the teacher 
that was present at the time of the survey. Class size is reported by the teacher but is also 
available from the PRIMA-register. Moreover, we use two measures of the composition of 
the class: fraction of girls and fraction of native Dutch pupils. The latter is a proxy for the 
socioeconomic status of twin’s class mates.
Table 2.I shows the descriptives for the samples of twins in grade 2, in grade 4-8, and for 
the total sample of twins. In addition, the last columns of table 2.I show the descriptives for 
the total sample of the PRIMA-project.
Table 2.I: Descriptive statistics of estimation samples (for reading)
Twin samples PRIMA-sample
Grade 2 Grades 4, 6 and 8 Total Total
mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd
Twincharacteristics
reading score -0.39 1.07 -0.16 1.07 -0.25 1.08 -0.15 1.02
math score -0.33 0.94 -0.11 1.05 -0.20 1.02 -0.12 1.01
girl 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.50
Teacher & class room
experience in education (years) 15.36 10.43 16.60 11.30 16.13 10.99 18.21 10.58
female 0.98 0.15 0.63 0.48 0.76 0.43 0.66 0.47
multiple classroom teachers 0.52 0.50 0.40 0.49 0.45 0.50 0.50 0.50
split level classroom 0.83 0.38 0.21 0.41 0.44 0.50 0.47 0.50
class size 24.07 4.50 23.54 4.95 23.74 4.79 24.39 5.78
observations 470 776 1246 330350
Previous test scores twins & class 
composition(forsubsamplein
grades 4-8, excluding mixed grades)
reading score T-2 - - -0.28 0.93 - - -0.12 1.01
math score T-2 - - -0.13 0.98 - - -0.05 0.98
girl share in class (%) - - 50.49 10.02 - - 50.06 11.72
native share in class (%) - - 60.63 35.92 - - 64.99 34.17
observations    276      97557  
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The number of observations differs between grades because of the longitudinal structure 
of the data and the sampling strategy of the PRIMA-project. Previous test scores are only 
available for grade 4 and higher, and for pupils (schools) who participated in previous waves 
of the project. The bottom panel of table 2.I shows that we have previous test scores for 
one third of the sample of twins in grade 4 and higher. In addition, information about the 
peers is not available for classrooms with multiple grades, which is often the case in grade 2. 
Teacher characteristics have been measured for most classrooms. This implies that the esti-
mation sample for models that exploit the longitudinal character of the data or models that 
include peer characteristics will be smaller than models that only use cross-sectional data 
and focus on teacher characteristics. The means of the test scores in our twin sample are 
negative which means that twins perform below the average of the student population of 
the reference sample. The means of the test scores for the total PRIMA-sample are also 
negative as we used the reference sample for the standardization and the total sample also 
includes the low-SES sample.
Table 2.II shows the variation of the class inputs within pairs of twins, which is the vari-
ation that is crucial for our identification strategy. The variance in teacher characteristics 
within twin pairs is much larger than the variation in class size. At the 95th percentile the 
difference in teacher experience within a twin pair is 26 years, for class size this difference 
is 4 pupils.
Table 2.II: Distribution of twin differences in class room characteristics in total estimation sample 
for reading (# Twin pairs=623)
Percentiles
 5th 25th 50th 75th 95th mean sd
Δ reading -1.78 -0.64 -0.05 0.56 1.56 -0.07 1.02
Δ math -1.64 -0.60 -0.08 0.50 1.47 -0.08 0.93
Δ girl -1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.02 0.53
Δ experience (in years) -26.00 -10.00 0.00 8.00 24.00 -0.78 14.57
Δ female (teacher) -1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.01 0.46
Δ multiple class room teachers -1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.03 0.67
Δ split level classrooms -1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.02 0.41
Δ class size -4 -1 0 1 4 -0.06 2.81
TXC 20140722 Gerritsen.indd   30 11-8-2014   15:14:14
Teacher quality and student achievement: evidence from a Dutch sample of twins
31
2
2.4 Mainestimationresults
In this section we show the main results of our empirical analysis. We start by presenting 
the results for students in grade 2. For these students we are most confident about the 
assumption that twins are exogenously assigned to classrooms because at school entry 
there is hardly any information about the student and his/her classmates that might lead to 
selection into classrooms. Table 2.III shows the twin-fixed effect estimates of teacher char-
acteristics on student performance in reading and math using different specifications.10 We 
investigate the effect of teacher experience, gender of the teacher and having one fulltime 
or two part-time teachers in the classroom.
Table 2.III: Twin-fixed effect estimates of teacher quality effects on student test scores in grade 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Independent variables: reading math reading math reading math
teacher experience 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.014***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
female teacher -0.174 0.290 -0.106 0.271
(0.314) (0.291) (0.342) (0.281)
two teachers 0.065 0.025 0.065 0.020
(0.098) (0.076) (0.099) (0.076)
split level classroom -0.228 -0.103 -0.231 -0.151
(0.183) (0.180) (0.192) (0.189)
girl (in opposite sex twin pair) 0.162 0.169 0.156 0.160
(0.120) (0.115) (0.119) (0.112)
class size 0.005 0.033 0.004 0.033
(0.032) (0.027) (0.031) (0.028)
% girls in class -0.006 -0.001
(0.004) (0.003)
% natives in class 0.004 -0.004
(0.003) (0.004)
# twin pairs 235 236 235 236 235 236
R-squared 0.035 0.052 0.049 0.074 0.061 0.079
Notes: Each column shows the results of an OLS-regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Covariates have been imputed, see footnote 10.
10 To improve the power of our analysis we have used a sample for which missing values for sev-
eral covariates have been imputed. In case of a missing value on a covariate we have assumed 
that there is no difference within a pair of twins. For reading we have imputed 31 observations, 
for math we have imputed 27 observations. Teacher experience has not been imputed. The 
main estimation results do not change when we use the smaller samples without imputations. 
Estimations results are available upon request.
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The first two columns of table 2.III show the estimated effects of having a more or less expe-
rienced teacher in the classroom in models without controls. The estimates show that one 
additional year of teacher experience in the classroom increases performance in  reading 
or math with 1.4 or 1.5 percent of a standard deviation. The other teacher  characteristics 
are included in the models in column (3) and (4). These models also control for split level 
classrooms, class size and gender of the student. The observed teacher characteristics, 
gender of teacher and the number of teachers in the class room, do not affect student 
performance. We also observe that the inclusion of the new variables does not change 
the estimated effects of teacher experience in the classroom. Column (5) and (6) addition-
ally controls for differences in classroom composition, in particular the proportion of girls 
and the proportion of native students in the classroom. Again, we observe that including 
these controls does not change the effect of teacher experience. Hence, the estimates for 
students in grade 2 suggest that teacher experience in the classroom is an important deter-
minant of student performance and teacher experience seems to be the only observed 
 teacher characteristic that matters. These findings are consistent with previous results 
from the literature on teacher quality (see Section 2.1 and 2.2).
The returns to teacher experience beyond the initial years in the profession
The recent literature is not consistent about the returns to experience during various stages 
of the teaching profession. Many studies have found that experience only matters in the 
initial years in the profession (e.g. Rivkin et al., 2005; Rockoff, 2004) and there seemed to be 
a consensus about this finding in the literature (Staiger and Rockoff, 2010; Wiswall, 2013). 
However, recent studies also find gains from teacher experience in later years of the career 
(Harris and Sas, 2011; Wiswall, 2013). Moreover, Wiswall (2013) shows that restrictive mod-
eling assumption in previous studies have generated the common finding that experience 
only matters in the first years of the profession. Using an experience variable with a lim-
ited number of categories within a panel setup that includes only a few years of informa-
tion on teachers seriously reduces the variance that can be exploited in the estimation. He 
finds high returns to later experience using an unrestricted experience model for student 
performance in math. For student performance in reading he finds low returns to later 
experience. Previous studies based on the data from the STAR-project report linear effects 
of teacher experience (Krueger, 1999; Chetty et al., 2012). Our estimates also suggest a 
linear effect of experience on student achievements (see also figure 2.1A and  figure 2.1B). 
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Figure 2.1A. Student performance in reading by teachers experience within pairs of twins
Figure 2.1B: Student performance in math by teachers experience within pairs of twins 
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We have also experimented with higher order term of experience but we did not find sig-
nificant results for these specifications.11
Results for the full sample of students from grade 2 to 8
In the next step of our analysis we use the full sample of twins from grade 2, 4, 6 and 
8. As noted in Section 2.2, for the full sample of twins we are less confident about the 
assumption that students have been randomly assigned to classrooms because students in 
Dutch primary education are re-assigned to classes after grade 2. It might be expected that 
teachers, parents and students will have more information after grade 2 about themselves 
and other students which might lead to non- random selection into classes. This selection 
might bias the estimated effects for the full sample. To address this issue we not only esti-
mate the ‘random assignment specifications’ from table 2.III but also estimate value-added 
specifications in which we control for previous test scores. By combining a value-added 
specification with our experimental design we aim to mitigate non-random selection into 
classes. We further investigate the empirical importance of endogenous classroom assign-
ment after grade 2 in Section 2.5.
The estimation results for the full sample of twins are shown in table 2.IV. Column (1) 
to (8) shows the estimated effects using the random assignment specifications that are 
also used in table 2.III. Column (1) to (4) use the full sample of twins, in column (5) to (8) 
we only use twins for which previous test scores are available. Column (9) to (12) show the 
estimation results for the value-added specifications. A disadvantage of including previous 
test scores is that we typically loose the first observation (pupils in grade 2) because the 
previous test score is not available. However, since the random assignment of pupils in 
grade 2 ensures that there are no initial differences within the twin pairs we can replace 
the previous test score with a constant, in order to keep the first year of the data.12 For the 
full sample of twins we find that one additional year of teacher experience in the classroom 
increases performance in reading with 0.9 to 1.4 % of a standard deviation and perfor-
mance in math with 0.6 to 0.9 %. A comparison of the results from the ‘random assignment 
specification’ with the results from ‘the value-added specification’ can be considered as an 
important test for the non-random assignment of twins because generally previous test 
scores are important control variables.
11 We did not use a specification with a limited number of experience categories because of the 
restrictive nature of this approach as pointed out by Wiswall (2013).
12 Krueger (1999) and Mueller (2013) use a similar approach.
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We observe in table 2.IV that the estimates based on the ‘random assignment specifica-
tion’ are very similar to the estimates based on the ‘value-added specification’ which sug-
gests that the bias from non-random assignment will be limited. Again, including higher 
order terms of experience does not change the estimated effects. The estimated effect of 
teacher experience is robust to the inclusion of the other teacher characteristics and other 
controls. For the other teacher characteristics we find no systematic effects on student 
performance. Hence, the estimates we have found for the sample of twins in grade 2 are 
consistent with the estimates based on the whole sample of twins.
Teacher experience and grade level
Previous studies have reported different returns to experience by grade level. Krueger 
(1999) and Chetty et al. (2011) find higher effect of teacher experience for kindergarten 
than for higher grades. We have also investigated whether teacher experience is more 
important for younger pupils. Table 2.V shows the estimation results for teacher experi-
ence by grade level;
Panel A shows the results for the random assignment specification based on the total 
sample, Panel B shows the results for the value-added specification based on the sample 
for which we observe previous test scores. The estimates show that the effect of teacher 
experience depends on the grade of the pupil. Teacher experience in class matters most 
in grade 2 (kindergarten): an additional year of experience in class raises test scores by 
approximately 1.5 % of a standard deviation. Teacher experience becomes less important 
in higher grades. In grade 8 we don’t find an effect of teacher experience on performance. 
Hence, teacher experience raises test scores especially for younger pupils. This finding is 
very similar to the results based on data from the STAR-project. Our finding might also be 
explained by the fact that students in grade 2 have the same teacher for two years whereas 
in higher grades this is less likely.
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2.5 Sensitivitytestsaboutnonrandomclassroomassignmentafter
grade 2
To further investigate the empirical importance of endogenous classroom assignment 
after grade 2 we perform several tests. First, we regress test scores in second grade on 
classroom characteristics in fourth grade. If assignment is random, we should not observe 
a relationship between test scores and classroom characteristics. Table 2.VI shows the 
results and provides no evidence for a nonrandom assignment of twins after grade 2. For 
the models in column (8) that include all variables simultaneously we find two statistically 
significant effects but the F-test shows that we cannot reject the hypothesis that there is 
no classroom-effect. Better performing twins in grade 2 are not assigned more often to 
other type of classes in grade 4 than their (worse performing) twin brothers or sisters on 
observed class inputs.
Table 2.V: Twin fixed effect estimates of teacher experience on student test scores by grade
grade 2 grade 4 grade 6 grade 8
 reading math  reading math  reading math  reading math
Panel A: random 
assignmentspecifica-
tion,totalsample
teacher experience 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.009** 0.005 0.011** 0.001 0.004 -0.004
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007)
# twin pairs 235 236 175 173 132 128 81 74
R-squared 0.061 0.079 0.074 0.090 0.077 0.075 0.112 0.120
Panel B: value-added 
specification,sample
with previous test 
scores
teacher experience 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.013** 0.010 0.013** 0.002 0.007 -0.007
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.012) (0.009)
# twin pairs 235 236 82 86 81 77 53 48
R-squared 0.061 0.079  0.180 0.275  0.260 0.262  0.235 0.568
Notes: Each column within a panel shows the results of an OLS-regression. Robust standard errors in parenthe-
ses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Panel A includes all covariates as in column (3) and (4) in table 2.IV. Panel B 
also includes previous test scores. 
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As our second test we regress test scores obtained in second, fourth, sixth and eighth grade 
on class room characteristics that were measured in the second grade. If assignment is ran-
dom at school entry, but assignment in later years is not, reduced form estimates (assum-
ing that classroom characteristics are correlated across grades) are informative about 
class input effects. Panel A of table 2.VII shows the results related to this test. The first 
two columns show the effect of teacher experience for the full sample; these results have 
already been shown in table 2.IV. The next two columns show the results for the sample 
of twins for which we have test scores in grade 2 and in at least one higher grade. The 
estimates effects for this sample imply that one additional year of teacher experience in 
class increases performance with 1.3 percent of a standard deviation. The last two columns 
of panel A show the estimated effect of teacher experience in grade 2 on the test scores 
in grade 2 or in higher grades. Hence, these columns show the reduced form estimates. 
If assignment to classrooms in higher grades is not random but assignment to grade 2 is 
 random the reduced form estimates are informative about the effect of experience in class. 
Table 2.VI: Twin-fixed effect estimates of grade 2 reading scores on grade 4 classroom characteris-
tics
Classroomcharacteristics
in fourth grade: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
teacher experience -0.009 -0.011*
(0.006) (0.006)
female teacher -0.240 -0.174
(0.213) (0.238)
two teachers 0.015 0.053
(0.155) (0.182)
split level classroom 0.248 0.275
(0.176) (0.191)
class size -0.015 -0.017
(0.040) (0.044)
% girls in class -0.006 -0.007
(0.004) (0.006)
% natives in class 0.003 -0.003
(0.008) (0.010)
p-value F-test: no class room 
effect 0.307
# twin pairs 87 87 88 88 87 112 108 79
R-squared 0.018 0.016 0.000 0.012 0.002 0.009 0.001 0.052
Notes: Each column shows the results of an OLS-regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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The reduced form estimates indicate that one year of teacher experience in class increases 
test scores with approximately 1 percent of a standard deviation. These estimates lie in the 
same ball park as the previous estimates. In sum, these tests don’t provide evidence for a 
non random re-assignment after grade 2, which might threaten the identification of the 
estimates in table 2.IV.
Further robustness analyses are shown in panel B of table 2.VII. Students in split level class-
rooms have now been excluded from the estimation sample. For these students we only 
have class composition information from the students in the same grade but not from the 
students in the other grade. Although this strongly reduces the sample size the estimated 
effects of teacher experience remain quite similar to the previous estimates.
Table2.VIcontinued:  Twin-fixed effect estimates of grade 2 math scores on grade 4 classroom char-
acteristics
Classroomcharacteristics
in fourth grade: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
teacher experience -0.008 -0.009
(0.006) (0.006)
female teacher -0.193 -0.108
(0.131) (0.119)
two teachers 0.027 0.035
(0.139) (0.153)
class room that mixes grades -0.165 -0.001
(0.172) (0.165)
class size -0.014 -0.012
(0.037) (0.040)
% girls in class 0.005 -0.000
(0.006) (0.007)
% natives in class -0.008 -0.018**
(0.006) (0.008)
p-value F-test: no class room 
effect 0.177
# twin pairs 92 93 93 93 92 117 113 85
R-squared 0.019 0.012 0.000 0.007 0.002 0.006 0.014 0.072
Notes: Each column shows the results of an OLS-regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.VII: Various twin-fixed effect estimates of teacher experience on student test scores for 
grades 2, 4, 6, 8
Panel A: sample with split level 
 classrooms
Total sample Sample for which 
teacher experience 
in grade 2 is avail-
able
Reduced form
(1) (2) (3)
 reading math  reading math  reading math
teacher experience 0.011*** 0.006** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.011** 0.009**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
# twin pairs 623 611 301 299 301 299
R-squared 0.039 0.022 0.038 0.079 0.030 0.060
Panel B: sample without split level 
classrooms
Total sample:
Random assignment 
specification
Longitudinal sample:
Random assignment 
specification
Longitudinal sample:
Value added 
specification
(4) (5) (6)
 reading math  reading math  reading math
teacher experience 0.013*** 0.005 0.017*** 0.005 0.017*** 0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
# twin pairs 299 289 186 184 186 184
R-squared 0.055 0.072 0.070 0.103 0.128 0.191
Notes: Each column shows the results of an OLS-regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In columns (2) and (3) the sample is used for which teacher experience from grade 2 is avail-
able. In columns (4)-(6) the sample is used that excludes split level classrooms. In column (4) and (5) the full speci-
fication is used as in columns (3) and (4) in table 2.IV. In column (6) also previous test scores have been included.
2.6 Doestheeffectofteacherexperiencereflectonthejobtraining?
The main finding from the previous sections is that students who are allocated to classes 
with more experienced teachers perform better than students who are allocated to classes 
with less experienced teachers. We have observed that the effects of teacher experience 
are not affected by other classroom factors, which suggest that these results come from 
teachers and their qualities. In addition, the teacher experience estimates do not change 
when other teacher characteristics are included, suggesting an important role for teacher 
experience and everything else that is correlated with it. Although we are quite confident 
that this finding is not driven by non-random selection of students to more experienced 
teachers, the interpretation of this result is not immediately clear because the randomi-
zation that we exploit is about classrooms and not about teachers with different quali-
ties. Hence, it is not clear whether the experience effect reflects the effect of training on 
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the job or whether the experience effect is the result of unobserved teacher qualities that 
are correlated with obtaining more experience in teaching. As noted in previous studies 
(Chetty et al., 2011; Rockoff, 2004; Kane et al., 2006; Harris and Sass, 2011), the estimated 
effect of teacher experience might be driven by different mechanisms. First, the estimated 
effects might be the result of training on the job, which we label as the causal effect of 
teacher experience. Second, the results might be driven by positive or negative selection 
of teachers in the education sector. For instance, teachers that are more (less) skilled or 
motivated and committed might be more (less) likely to stay in the education profession. 
In fact, Wiswall (2013) finds evidence for negative selection of teachers in American public 
schools. Third, more experienced teachers might have had a better teaching education and 
therefore might be more skilled (Corcoran, Evans, and Schwab, 2004; Hoxby and Leigh, 
2004; Bacolod 2007). If the quality of teacher education has deteriorated over time teacher 
experience will be correlated with the quality of teacher education. Fourth, selection into 
the teaching profession might have changed over time due to a changing labor market. The 
increasing demand for higher educated workers will probably have increased the number 
of alternatives for working in the teaching profession. Over the years the teaching profes-
sion might have attracted weaker teachers.
The effect of on the job training (the causal effect of teacher experience) can be isolated 
from unobserved quality differences across teachers by using multiple years of informa-
tion of teachers (Rivkin et al., 2005; Wiswall, 2013). Unfortunately, we cannot apply this 
approach because the panel character of our data only relates to students and not to teach-
ers. However, we can empirically explore the plausibility of the various mechanisms by 
looking at changes in the estimated effects over time or changes in the effect of experience 
over the teaching career. We start by looking at changes in the estimated effects over time. 
These changes are informative about the last two mechanisms which both state that older 
cohorts of teachers had more quality than younger cohorts. If we assume that the causal 
effect of experience on student performance does not change over time we expect that 
the estimated effect of teacher experience will decline over time because of older cohorts 
of teachers leaving the teaching profession. We can put these mechanisms to the test by 
exploiting the panel character of our data. We have constructed three time periods from 
the six waves of our panel and included interaction variables between these time peri-
ods and teacher experience in our main model.13 The estimated effects of the interaction 
13 Using all six periods separately would strongly reduce the number of observations for several 
periods.
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 variables show whether the experience effect has changed over time. Table 2.VIII shows 
the estimation results. We do not observe that the estimated effects decline over time as 
might be expected from the last two mechanisms. Hence, the evidence is not consistent 
with these explanations of the teacher experience effect.
Table 2.VIII: Twin-fixed effect estimates of teacher experience on student test scores by PRIMA sur-
vey year (1994-2004)
reading math
Independent variables: (1) (2)  (3) (4)
teacher experience 0.012 0.008 0.009 0.004
(0.008) (0.012) (0.007) (0.008)
teacher experience*year 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
teacher experience*dummy=1 if survey years are 1998  
or 2000 0.003 0.005
(0.012) (0.009)
teacher experience*dummy=1 if survey years are 2002  
or 2004 0.003 0.001
(0.012) (0.009)
# twin pairs 623 623 611 611
R-squared 0.043 0.045  0.031 0.030
Notes: Each column shows the results of an OLS-regression using the random assignment specification. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.In columns (1) and (3), the omitted category of 
teacher experience is survey year 1994 (i.e. year=0 if survey year=1994, year=2 if survey year=1996 and so on). 
In columns (2) and (4) the omitted category of teacher experience is the dummy that equals 1 for survey years 
1994 or 1996. In all columns the full specification is used as in columns (3) and (4) of table 2.IV.
We further attempt to purge the effect of unobserved quality differences from the effect of 
on the job training by looking at the experience effect of teachers that differ in mobility. If 
the effect of teacher experience is driven by unobserved teacher quality that is correlated 
with obtaining experience, then we expect that the bias from unobserved teacher quality 
will be smaller for teachers that are less likely to leave the profession. Because teacher 
mobility is highest in the initial years in the profession we use a model specification that 
can pick up differences in the effect of teacher experience during the career. First, we have 
included an interaction variable between the minimum teacher experience of both teach-
ers of the twin pair and the difference in teacher experience. Second, we have constructed 
three categories for minimum teacher experiences and interacted these variables with the 
difference in teacher experience. The interaction variables measure whether the estimated 
effect of teacher experience changes over the career. We expect that the estimates for 
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later career stages will be less likely to be biased by positive or negative selection. Hence, 
these estimates should be a better approximation of the effect of training on the job than 
estimates for early career stages. Table 2.IX shows the estimated effects for these specifica-
tions. The main result for both subjects is that the estimated effects for these interaction 
variables are all very small and statistically insignificant. This suggests that the teaching 
experience effect is quite constant during the teaching career. Hence, we also find returns 
to teaching experience for career stages in which we expect less bias due to positive or neg-
ative selection. The estimates of teaching experience for later career stages are expected 
to be a better approximation of the effect of on the job training in education. This finding is 
consistent with recent studies that also find evidence for the importance of teacher experi-
ence beyond the initial years in the career (Wiswall, 2013; Harris and Sas, 2011).
2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter we have examined the causal link that runs from classroom quality to stu-
dent achievement by applying a new identification strategy. This strategy is based on an 
exogenous assignment of twins to different classrooms. Teacher quality is expected to be 
Table 2.IX: Twin-fixed effect estimates of teacher experience on student test scores by minimum 
experience of teachers of both twins
reading math
Independent variables: (1) (2)  (3) (4)
teacher experience 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.007** 0.005*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
teacher experience*minimum teacher experience of 
both teachers -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
teacher experience*dummy=1 if minimum teacher experience 
between 5 and 16 years -0.000 0.003
(0.007) (0.006)
teacher experience*dummy=1 if minimum teacher experience 
17 years or more 0.000 -0.007
(0.010) (0.009)
# twin pairs 623 623 611 611
R-squared 0.046 0.046  0.023 0.026
Notes: Each column shows the results of an OLS-regression using the random assignment specification.  Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In columns (2) and (4) the omitted category is the 
dummy that equals 1 if the minimum years of experience of both teachers lie between 0 and 4. In all columns the 
full specification is used as in columns (3) and (4) of table 2.IV.
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the main factor differing across classes. The main findings of this chapter are related to 
teacher quality. We find that teacher experience is the only observed teacher characteristic 
that matters for student performance. This finding is consistent with previous studies on 
teacher effects (Hanushek, 2010; Staiger and Rockoff, 2010, Chetty et al., 2011). Twins who 
are assigned to classes with more experienced teachers perform better and the effects 
are most pronounced in kindergarten and early grades. Krueger (1999) and Chetty et al. 
(2011) report similar results from their analysis using data from the STAR-experiment on 
class size reduction. Our estimates also suggest a linear effect of experience on student 
achievements. Until recently there was a consensus in the literature that teacher experi-
ence only matters in the initial years in the career (e.g. Rivkin et al., 2005; Rockoff, 2004; 
Staiger and Rockoff, 2010). However, recent studies also find gains from teacher experience 
in later years of the career (Harris and Sass, 2011; Wiswall, 2013). Moreover, previous stud-
ies based on the data from the STAR-project report linear effects of teacher experience 
(Krueger, 1999; Chetty et al., 2012). Hence, our estimates corroborate the recent findings 
about later returns to experience.
From our analysis we learn that teacher experience is very important but it is not clear 
how we should interpret this finding because our estimates only show that students do 
better in classes with more experienced teachers. It remains unclear whether this effect 
is caused by training on the job or reflects the effects of unobserved teacher quality cor-
related with attaining more experience in education. We have explored the plausibility 
of various mechanisms that might explain the robust finding that students in classrooms 
with more experienced teachers perform better. We do not find evidence consistent with 
mechanisms that stress the importance of changes over time such as changes in the quality 
of teacher education or changes in outside opportunities in the labor market. However, we 
find that teacher experience also matters for career stages with less labor market mobility. 
As it is less likely that these estimates will be biased by selection into or out of the teaching 
profession this suggests positive returns to on the job training of teachers. This finding is 
consistent with recent studies that also find positive returns to teacher experience for later 
career stages (Wiswall, 2013; Harris and Sas, 2011).
The main finding of this chapter is that experienced teachers are very important for 
student performance. Although we are unable to isolate the effect of on the job training 
from the effect of unobserved teacher quality this finding has important policy implica-
tions. More focused policies that maintain experienced teachers in the classroom appear 
beneficial, especially for younger students.
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14 This is joint work with Dinand Webbink.
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Abstract
This study provides the first estimates of the causal effect of time in school on cognitive 
skills for many countries around the world, for multiple age groups and for multiple sub-
jects. These estimates enable a comparison of the performance of education systems 
based on gain scores instead of level scores. We use data from international cognitive tests 
and exploit variation induced by school entry rules within a regression discontinuity frame-
work. The effect of time in school on cognitive skills strongly differs between countries. 
Remarkably, we find no association between the level of test scores and the estimated 
gains in cognitive skills. As such, a country’s ranking in international cognitive tests might 
misguide its educational policy. Across countries we find that a year of school time increases 
performance in cognitive tests with 0.2 to 0.3 standard deviations for 9-year-olds and with 
0.1 to 0.2 standard deviations for 13-year-olds. Estimation of gains in cognitive skills also 
yields new opportunities for investigating the determinants of international differences in 
educational achievements.
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3.1 Introduction
Many studies have found a strong association between the economic outcomes of nations 
and their cognitive skills (e.g. Hanushek and Woessman, 2008). It is therefore important to 
study international differences in the production of cognitive skills, and to examine how 
much children learn in school and whether this differs between countries. International 
tests, such as PISA, TIMSS or PIRLS, measure differences in cognitive skills of students 
between countries. The outcomes of these tests are increasingly used for the benchmark-
ing of education systems and for designing educational policies.15 However, it is difficult 
to investigate how much children learn in school because of the complex nature of the 
production of human capital. In the economic literature that investigates the so-called edu-
cational production function, student achievement at any point in time is typically seen as 
a cumulative result of the entire history of all inputs, for instance from family, peers, teach-
ers and school, and the individual’s ability (Hanushek and Rivkin, 2006). The multitude of 
observed and unobserved factors that might be important pose challenges for identifying 
the effect of time in school on cognitive skills and for assessing the performance of a coun-
try’s education system. Previous studies in economics have addressed these challenges 
by applying quasi-experimental designs for estimating the effect of completed schooling 
(Cascio and Lewis, 2006; Hansen et al., 2004), pre-primary education (Berlinski et al., 2009; 
Gormley and Gayer, 2005; Leuven et al., 2010) or grade retention (Jacob and Lefgren, 2009) 
on cognitive skills for specific countries and specific age groups. To our knowledge, how-
ever, previous studies in the economic literature have not attempted to identify the effect 
of spending one additional year in school on cognitive skills across countries, age groups 
and subjects enabling comparisons between countries. Moreover, the recent literature 
that investigates the determinants of international differences in educational achievement 
has mainly focused on identifying cross-country associations (Hanushek and Woessmann, 
2011).16
15 For instance, Germany, Denmark and Japan have experienced a ‘PISA-shock’ that resulted in a 
range of educational reforms. Lower-than-expected results triggered intense public and politi-
cal debate on educational performance (Breakspear, 2012). TIMSS and PIRLS results have been 
used to inform policy considerations in for example Hong Kong, Norway, New Zealand, The Rus-
sian Federation and The Republic of South Africa. Participating countries use TIMSS and PIRLS 
for establishing achievement goals and standards for educational improvement, stimulating 
curriculum reform, and improving teaching (IEA, 2011).
16 Some recent studies apply a quasi-experimental approach for investigating specific factors such 
as the effects of class size (Woessmann and West, 2006), central exams (Jürges et al., 2005), 
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This study provides the first estimates of the effect of time in school on cognitive skills 
for many countries around the world, multiple age groups and multiple subjects which ena-
ble a comparison of the performance of education systems based on gain scores instead of 
level scores. We use data from international cognitive tests and exploit variation in time in 
school induced by school entry rules.17 Students born in adjacent months are assigned to 
different grades due to these school entry rules. As a result, students who are almost the 
same age differ in their time spent in school. This provides the opportunity to isolate the 
effect of time spent in school from the effect of time spent outside of school.18 We apply 
this framework for estimating the effect of spending one year in school for samples of 
countries that participated in international cognitive tests. Within this framework we also 
address issues, such as sampling bias and violations of the exclusion restriction, that have 
been neglected in previous studies that exploit variation induced by school entry rules (see 
Section 3.2).
This framework enables us to perform four types of empirical analyses. First, we esti-
mate the average effect of one year of school time on student performance in math and 
science. This yields estimates across countries, for two age groups and for two subjects. 
Second, we are able to estimate the gains in cognitive skills for each separate country. 
These estimates capture the gain in student achievement from the last year in school 
before the test was taken which can be interpreted as a measure of the performance of 
the education system. Third, we rank countries based on this measure of performance and 
compare this ranking with the ranking based on the level of the scores in international 
cognitive tests that is currently used for benchmarking of education systems. Fourth, this 
framework provides new opportunities for investigating the determinants of international 
differences in student achievement. We illustrate this by examining the effect of external 
exit-exams on student achievement using a specification that yields estimates of gains in 
relative age (Bedard and Dhuey, 2006) or private school competition (West and  Woessmann, 
2010) using data from international cognitive tests.
17 School entry cut-off dates have also been used for investigating the effects of relative age 
( Bedard and Dhuey, 2006), or the effects of school starting age on student performance (Black 
et al., 2011; Fredriksson and Öckert, forthcoming) and the effects of education on earnings 
(e.g. Angrist and Krueger, 1991).
18 This approach was introduced by development psychologists for separating schooling and age 
effects on test scores in a regression discontinuity framework (e.g. Baltes and Reinert, 1969; 
Cahan and Davis, 1987; Cahan and Cohen, 1989) and was recently applied in the economic lit-
erature for estimating the effect of completed schooling (Cascio and Lewis, 2006) or the effect 
of early childhood education (Gormley and Gayer, 2005) on cognitive skills.
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achievement, and compare these results with previous studies that used a control strategy 
for estimating cross-country associations.
For applying this framework data are needed that include students in adjacent grades 
that took the same test in the same period. The data collected in the 1995 TIMSS study offer 
the opportunity to apply this framework.19 In the TIMSS study 9-year-olds and 13-year-olds 
were tested in math and science. The achievement tests were based on a curriculum frame-
work developed through an international consensus-building process by all participating 
countries. For the analysis we only use data from countries that apply clear nationwide 
school entry rules; 21 countries for the 9-year-olds and 34 countries for the 13-year-olds.
Our empirical results can be summarized in three main findings. First, we find large 
differences in the effect of time in school on student learning between countries for both 
subjects and age groups. Some countries produce high gains in cognitive skills whereas in 
other countries additional time in school does not increase cognitive skills. Countries that 
achieve higher gains in cognitive skills for math also achieve higher gains in science. More-
over, countries with higher gains for 9-year-olds also have higher gains for 13-years-olds. 
Across countries we find that time in school on average matters for student performance in 
international cognitive tests. A year of school time increases performance in cognitive tests 
with 0.2 to 0.3 standard deviations for 9-year olds and with 0.1 to 0.2 standard deviations 
for 13-year olds. Hence, the effect of time in schools seems to reduce with age. This might 
indicate that later grades add less to the knowledge base or that the tests do a poorer job 
at measuring the full range of skill differences.
Second, and most remarkable, we find no association between the estimated gains in 
achievement and the level of test scores of countries. At all levels of test scores we observe 
countries with high achievement gains and countries with low gains in achievement. The 
lack of association has been found for both tests (math, science) and for both age groups 
(9-year olds and 13-year olds). This implies that assessments of the performance of edu-
cation systems based on the estimated gains in achievement often are inconsistent with 
performance assessments based on level scores, and raises concerns about the current use 
of the outcomes of international cognitive tests in educational policy. A mere focus on test 
score levels is likely to yield misleading information about the performance of the educa-
tion system. Low levels of test scores, or declining trends in test scores, could not be the 
result of low performing education systems. High levels of test scores could mask low per-
forming education systems. Our estimated gains in achievement tell a different story about 
19 More recent TIMSS studies only sample students in one grade.
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the performance of education systems. Using these gain scores as an additional instrument 
for the assessment of the performance of education systems is likely to reduce the risk 
of providing misleading policy information. The estimation of gain scores, which becomes 
possible when the current collection of international data is extended towards samples of 
students in adjacent grades, is likely to improve decisions on educational policies.
Third, the estimation of gain scores can be important for investigating international 
differences in educational achievement. For instance, studies that use control strategies 
have consistently found that students perform better in countries with external exit exams 
(Hanushek and Woessmann, 2011; Bishop, 1997; Woessmann, 2001, 2003). However, we do 
not find higher gains in achievement in countries with an external exit exam for 9-year-olds 
and 13-year-olds compared to countries that do not have external exit exams.
This chapter makes several contributions to the current economic literature. First, we 
contribute to the literature on the educational production function by applying a method for 
measuring gains in achievements across countries. To our knowledge no previous study has 
estimated causal effects of time in school for different countries using a quasi- experimental 
approach. This method produces estimates of gains in achievement by different education 
systems, which enable a comparison of the performance of education systems based on 
gain scores instead of level scores. We compare the assessment of the performance of 
education systems based on the estimated gains with the performance assessments based 
on level scores. This comparison reveals that educational policies solely based on test score 
levels are potentially misguided because they ignore the gains that have been achieved.
Second, we contribute to the literature that investigates the effect of time in school 
on student performance (e.g. Gormley and Gayer, 2005; Hansen et al., 2004; Cascio and 
Lewis, 2006; Berlinski et al., 2009; Leuven et al., 2010). We add to this literature by investi-
gating the effect of time in school across countries, age groups and subjects. Third, previ-
ous studies that exploited variation induced by school entry rules have neglected various 
issues that might bias the estimates, such as sampling bias, relative age effects or viola-
tions of the exclusion restriction. In this chapter we explicitly address these problems. In 
particular, we interpret our main estimates as lower bounds and also generate estimates 
that are adjusted for sampling bias. Fourth, we contribute to the literature that uses inter-
national cognitive tests for investigating the determinants of international differences in 
educational achievements. The typical features of human capital production pose major 
challenges for the identification of the effect of characteristics of education system and the 
cross-sectional structure of the international tests hinders value-added or panel estima-
tions. Therefore, it has been argued that ‘further exploration of quasi-experimental set-
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tings in the  international data should be high on the agenda’ (Hanushek and Woessman, 
2011). This is exactly what this chapter does. We apply a quasi-experimental approach 
using international data and this approach might yield new opportunities for identifying the 
effects of characteristics of education systems. We illustrate this by comparing estimates of 
the effect of external exit exams using level scores with the estimates based on gain scores.
This study is organized as follows. Section 3.2 explains the empirical strategy used for 
estimating the effect of one year of school time on test performance. The data used in 
the analyses are described in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 shows the estimates of the effect 
of one year of time in school for pooled samples of countries. In Section 3.5 differences 
between countries are investigated. Section 3.6 compares country rankings of level scores 
with country rankings of gain scores. Section 3.7 illustrates the opportunities of the quasi-
experimental approach for investigating international differences in student achievements 
and Section 3.8 concludes.
3.2 Previous studies and empirical strategy
The basic framework in the economic literature that studies the effects of educational 
inputs models student achievement as a function of family, peer, community, teacher and 
school inputs and student ability (Hanushek and Rivkin, 2006). Student achievement at any 
point in time is seen as a cumulative result of the entire history of all inputs and the individ-
ual’s initial endowment (e.g. innate ability). A common approach for modeling this so-called 
educational production function is to assume that the cumulative achievement function 
is additively separable and linear (e.g. Boardman and Murnane, 1979; Todd and Wolpin, 
2003). Estimating the effect of input factors, such as time in school, is complicated because 
in any actual application we will generally not be able to control for all relevant school, fam-
ily or student characteristics. If some omitted variables are correlated with time in school, 
then the estimated parameters will be biased. Hence, the cumulative character of the pro-
duction of human capital poses challenges for identifying the effect of time in school.
Previous studies in economics have addressed these challenges by applying quasi-
experimental designs for estimating the effect of schooling on cognitive skills.20 The effect 
of schooling has been analyzed from different perspectives. A first strand of the literature 
20 For surveys of the development psychology literature on the estimation of schooling effects, 
see Ceci (1991) and Stipek (2002). In addition, there are studies in the education literature 
about the effects of schooling, see for instance Luyten (2006).
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focuses on the effect of completed schooling on cognitive skills. Several studies have used 
quarter of birth as an instrument for completed schooling (Neal and Johnson, 1996; Hansen 
et al., 2004) as in the seminal paper by Angrist and Krueger (1991). These studies find that 
one additional year of completed schooling increase cognitive skills with approximately 
0.2 standard deviations. A recent study investigates the effect of an increase of compulsory 
schooling by one or two years on cognition (Meghir et al., 2013). They find that the reform 
increased cognitive skills on average, with 7 to 10 percent of a standard deviation. Cascio 
and Lewis (2005) exploit variation induced by school entry rules for estimating the effect of 
completed schooling on cognitive skills measured by the Armed Forces Qualification Test 
(AFQT). They find that an additional year of high school raised scores of minorities with 
0.3 standard deviations.
A second strand of the literature focuses on variation in schooling from pre-primary 
education.21 For instance, Gormley and Gayer (2005) and Gormley et al. (2005) estimate the 
impact of Oklahoma’s pre-K program for 4-year-olds in Tulsa on cognitive/knowledge test 
scores, motor skills and language scores by exploiting cutoff requirements for enrolment in 
pre-K. Attendance increases test scores by approximately 0.4 standard deviations.22 A third 
strand of the literature focuses on grade retention. For instance, Jacob and Lefgren (2009) 
estimate the effect of grade retention on high school completion by exploiting a nonlinear 
relationship between current achievement and the probability of being retained. They find 
that retention among sixth-grade students does not affect the likelihood of high school 
completion, but retention of eight-grade students increases high school dropout.23 Our 
study is also related to a fourth strand of the literature which uses so-called value-added 
models for estimating gains in student achievement or the rate of learning over specific 
time periods. These models include measures of prior achievement to eliminate confound-
ing by past unobserved parental and school inputs, for instance for estimating teacher fixed 
effects which can be linked to teacher characteristics (e.g. Rivkin et al., 2005; Hanushek 
et al., 2005). Dynamic sorting of teachers and students might bias the estimated effects 
in these models (Rothstein, 2010). Our approach also focuses on the estimation of gains 
in cognitive skills but uses a quasi-experimental approach instead of controlling for prior 
achievements.
21 Early childhood interventions like Head Start or the Perry Preschool Project have been studied 
intensively. For surveys, see Currie (2001) and Almond and Currie (2010).
22 For other recent studies, see Berlinsky et al. (2009) and Leuven et al. (2010).
23 For other recent studies, see Manacorda (2012) or Schwerdt and West (2012).
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Empirical strategy
In this chapter we focus on estimating the effect of time in school on cognitive skills. For 
identifying the effect of time in school we use a quasi-experimental design that was first 
applied by development psychologists (e.g. Balter and Reinert, 1969; Cahan and Davis 1987; 
Cahan and Cohen, 1989) and recently also applied in economic studies (Cascio and Lewis, 
2006; Gormley and Gayer, 2005).24 The key idea for identification is that school entry rules 
create variation in time in school for children born close to the cut-off date. Students who 
are almost the same age differ in their time spent in school. A comparison of the test scores 
of students around this cut-off date yields estimates of the effect of one school year. In this 
chapter we apply this approach to samples of countries that participated in international 
cognitive tests. Figure 3.1 illustrates the approach using scores from the math and science 
tests of the 1995 TIMSS study for 9-year-olds in two adjacent grades.25 The top panel shows 
results for Singapore, the bottom panel shows results for England. The left figure shows the 
assignment of students to grades on both sides of the cut-off date of the school entry rule; 
the middle (right) figures show the scores on the math (science) test. The horizontal axis 
shows the age of the student relative to the cut-off date. Each dot represents a monthly 
average of the grade-level or the test score.
The left figures show that both countries quite strictly apply the school entry rule for assign-
ing students to grades. Nearly all students to the left of the cut-off date are in the higher 
of the two adjacent grades and nearly all students to the right of the cut-off date are in 
the lower of the two grades.26 In both countries we also observe that scores in math and 
science decline with age which confirms previous findings about the importance of age at 
entry for test performance (Bedard and Dhuey, 2006). The cut-off date divides students of 
very similar age into groups that differ in the number of years they have spent in school. 
Students on the left hand side of the cut-off date have spent one more year in school than 
students on the right hand side. For students from Singapore we observe a discontinuity in 
the math and science scores around the cut-off date. This discontinuity can be interpreted 
24 Also Luyten (2006) exploits a quasi-experimental design to estimate the effects of extra school-
ing with the same data used in this study. We differ from this study in two important ways: 
1) we estimate the effects of additional schooling for more countries and 2) we use reduced 
form estimates of the effect of being born left of the cutoff on student achievement instead of 
OLS-estimates of the effect of grade level on student achievement. 
25 It should be noted that these grades also include 8-year-olds and 10-year-olds.
26 The first stage estimates (equation (3.2)) for Singapore and England respectively are 0.96 and 
0.93. Section 3.5 presents the first stage estimates of all countries used in the estimations.
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as the effect of one year spent in school in Singapore. For students in England we do not 
observe a discontinuity in test scores. This suggests that one year spent in school in England 
does not add more to the performance of students in math and science measured in the 
1995 TIMSS study than one year spent out of school.
Estimating the effect of time in school by exploiting school entry rules
In a situation of full compliance with the school entry rules, the effect of one year in school 
on student performance can be estimated by using a regression discontinuity model that 
exploits the discontinuities created by the entry rule. The basic assumption in this model is 
that students on both sides of the discontinuity are very similar and that the relationship 
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Figure 3.1: Grade level and math/science scores around the cut-off date for 9-year-olds from Sin-
gapore and England (TIMSS 1995)
Notes: Each dot represents a monthly average of the grade level or the test score. Students born in month 0 are 
born in the first month after the cutoff. See table 3A.1 for the cutoff dates per country.
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between date of birth and student performance is smooth around the discontinuity.27 For 
each country, the effect of one year in school can be estimated using the following speci-
fication:
(3.1) 
where  is the student performance of student i,  is a dummy variable for being in the 
higher grade,  is the month of birth of the student,  is the cut-off date of the 
country,  is a vector of control variables and  are unobserved factors. In this specification 
 is a smooth function of age which is allowed to be different at either side of the cut-off 
(  and ), as suggested by Lee and Lemieux (2010):
The main parameter to be estimated is  which can be interpreted as the effect of one 
year of school time on the test performance. Identification of  is based on the non-linear 
relationship between age and time in school around the cut-off date.
A concern with this approach is non-compliance with the school entry rules. The grade 
level of a student (G) might differ from the time spent in school because of retention or 
acceleration, or because of schools that do not comply with the country’s school entry 
rule. In that case, equation (3.1) would probably yield biased estimates of the effect of 
time in school because it is likely that students who deviate from the regular path are not a 
random draw from the population. This problem has been recognized in development psy-
chology and in economics. Studies in development psychology have dealt with this problem 
by excluding non-compliers (e.g. Cahen and Cohen, 1989). This creates, however, a non-
random sample that might induce biased estimates. Studies in the economic literature on 
schooling or starting age have often dealt with non-compliance by using an instrumental 
variable approach in which the school entry rule is used as an instrumental variable for 
the grade level (e.g. Cascio and Lewis 2006; Bedard and Dhuey 2006). In this approach the 
variation in time in grade that is induced by the school entry rule is used for estimating the 
27 Cascio & Lewis (2006) exploit variation in school-entry dates across states in the USA and use 
individuals in other states as controls. With this approach they don’t need to assume that rela-
tionship between date of birth and student performance is smooth.
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causal effect of time in a specific grade on cognitive skills. The first stage and second stage 
equations can then be estimated using Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS):
(3.2) 
 
(3.3) 
where  is a dummy variable for being born on the left side of the cutoff date, which is 
equivalent to being eligible for one extra year of time in school. Estimation of  will yield 
the causal effect of time in grade if the usual IV-assumptions hold (see below). This esti-
mate can then be interpreted as the effect of time in grade for those students who move 
to the next grade if their expected time in school, due to the school entry rule increases 
by one year. Hence, for students who follow the regular path through education without 
deviations such as retention or acceleration. The estimate of the effect of time in school 
on grade level ( ) in the first stage equation indicates the proportion of the students of a 
specific country that stays on the regular track of the education system of that country. For 
applying this IV-approach three assumptions should hold. First, the school entry rule should 
have an effect on the grade level of students. Hence, there should be no weak instrument 
problem. The empirical analysis in the next sections shows that in all selected countries 
the school entry rule is an important determinant of the observed grade level. The second 
assumption is that the cut-off date should not be correlated with unobserved determinants 
of cognitive skills. We will address this assumption below. The third assumption, which is 
neglected in previous studies on schooling or starting age, is the exclusion restriction; the 
instrument should only have an effect on cognitive skills through the endogenous variable. 
In our application this means that the difference in cognitive skills between students born 
on either side of the cutoff date should only be the result of the time spent in the highest 
grade by students who are on track. However, all students on the left side of the cutoff 
have been treated with an additional year in school; a year in a higher grade or a year of 
being retained. Hence, it is assumed that grade retention or acceleration of students has no 
effect on cognitive skills. Given the recent studies on grade retention (see above) it seems 
not likely that this assumption holds. We, therefore, focus our analysis on estimating the 
reduced form of this IV-approach:
(3.4) 
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For the identification of the effect of time in school on cognitive skills in equation (3.4) 
several further issues are important. First, school entry rules not only induce a difference 
in the time spent in school for students of nearly similar age but also induce a difference in 
relative age in class (school starting age). Students on the left of the cut-off not only receive 
an additional year of education but are also assigned to be the youngest in their grade. 
Students on the right of the cut-off are assigned to be the oldest in their grade. Differences 
in relative age have been shown to be important for short-term and long-term cognitive 
outcomes (Bedard and Dhuey, 2006). We address this identification issue by using a model 
specification that allows the effect of the assignment variable age to be different at either 
side of the cutoff. Age and relative age are perfectly correlated because both are measured 
from the cut-off date. This means that in our specification the age effect on both sides of 
the cut-off not only controls for maturity but also for relative age in grade.28
Second, some countries apply a clear school entry rule but also use a rolling admission 
of students. For these countries the school entry rule does not create a one-year difference 
in time in school, but leads to a different timing of grade promotion. Hence, for these coun-
tries students on the right side of the cut-off date have spent more time in lower grades 
than students on the left side of the cut-off date. We address this issue in the sensitivity 
analysis in which we exclude countries with rolling admission from the estimation sample.
Third, equation (3.4) yields the causal effect of one year of school time on cognitive skills 
if the conditional independence assumption holds. Hence, the critical assumption is that 
students near the cut-off date are very similar on observed and unobserved characteristics. 
This assumption seems plausible since parents are unlikely to plan the exact date of birth 
of their child. However, there is evidence that parents in the U.S. schedule births in order 
to avoid taxes (Dickert-Conlin and Chandra, 1999). Several recent studies have investigated 
whether birth around the school entry cut-off dates is random.29 For the US (Dickert-Conlin 
and Elder, 2010; McCrary and Royer, 2010), Chile (McEwan and Shapiro, 2008) and Argen-
tina (Berlinski et al., 2011) no evidence has been found for the non-randomness of births 
around cut-off dates. However, the timing of births in Japan seems to be related with school 
entry cut-off dates (Shitgeoka, 2013). The number of births sharply increases in the first 
28 Bedard and Dhuey (2006) estimated the effects of age relative to the cut-off data and frame the 
estimates in terms of relative age. These estimates are the combined effect of maturity and age 
at entry. Black et al. (2011) isolate the effect of these two variables. 
29 Several studies have raised concerns about the randomness of season of birth (Bound and 
Jaeger, 2000; Cascio and Lewis, 2006; Dobkin and Ferreira, 2010; and Buckles and Hungerman, 
2012).
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days after the cut-off date. Hence, some Japanese parents seem to have a preference for 
their children to belong to the oldest in class. This might induce a bias for the estimated 
effect because it is not clear which parents try to postpone the birth of their child. To 
address this issue we exploit the fact that our data contains information about the exact 
date of birth. We will perform sensitivity tests by using estimation samples in which we 
exclude students born on the first days around the cut-off date (see Section 3.4).
Fourth, a further and related issue, which is not addressed in previous studies that use 
school entry rules, is sampling bias. Our sample consists of students in two adjacent grades 
that contained the largest proportion of students from a specific age group; 9-year-olds or 
13-year-olds (see next section). The disadvantage of this sampling strategy is that that we 
do not observe students from these age groups that are not in these grades. If we imagine a 
country in which the 9-year-olds are evenly distributed over the two adjacent grades, then 
the higher grade will contain the oldest 9-year-olds (group B) together with the youngest 
10-year-olds (group A), and the lower grade contains the youngest 9-year-olds (group C) 
together with the oldest 8-year-olds (group D). Groups A and B are on the left side of the 
cutoff in figure 3.1 and, groups C and D are on the right side of the cutoff. For our main esti-
mation sample we use students from group B and group C, and we compare the difference 
in performance of these two groups at the cut-off. However, in group B we do not observe 
students who have been accelerated, and in group C we do not observe students who have 
been retained. It might be expected that this will induce a downward bias for the estimated 
effects because students who have been accelerated will probably have a relatively high 
ability, and students who have been retained will probably have a relatively low ability.30 
This implies that the estimated effects should be interpreted as lower bound estimates. It 
should be noted that the ‘missing students’ in our estimation sample are the students who, 
because of their relative age in grade, are the least likely to be accelerated or retained. To 
further address this issue we will perform two types of sensitivity analysis. First, we will 
estimate the main models for samples of countries in which most students are on track; 
countries with a first stage estimate (equation (3.2)) of at least 0.75.31 In these countries 
only a very small proportion of students will not be observed. Second, the advantage of 
30 In table 3A.4 it can be observed that retained students born at the left side of the cut-off on 
average score lower than students that are on track and, that accelerated students born at the 
right side of the cut-off on average score higher than students that are on track. 
31 This first stage estimate should not be directly interpreted as the proportion of missing stu-
dents. The missing students can be observed in groups A and D, the first stage estimate is based 
on group B and C.
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the  sampling strategy is that we also have data of students in groups A and D which we can 
exploit to approximate the sampling bias of the 9-year-olds in groups B and C. In group A, 
which contains the youngest 10-year-olds, we can observe students who have been 
retained. We use these students to adjust for sampling bias in group C, which contains the 
youngest students of the 9-year-olds. Moreover, in group D, the oldest 8-year-olds, we can 
observe students who have been accelerated. We use these students to adjust for sampling 
bias in group B, which contains the oldest students of the 9-year-olds. By assuming that the 
proportion of retained and accelerated students, and the relative score of these retained 
or accelerated students compared to students who are on track does not change between 
grades, we can adjust their scores and include them in the main estimation sample. Hence, 
for our approximation of the sampling bias we adjust the scores of some students from 
groups A and D, and include them in the main estimation sample consisting of students in 
groups B and C. We use these samples to obtain estimates that are adjusted for sampling 
bias (the Appendix provides further details about this procedure). For the main models we 
will show the lower bound estimates and the estimates that are adjusted for sampling bias.
3.3 Data
The data used in this study come from the 1995 TIMSS study.32 The 1995 TIMSS study 
collected mathematics and science achievement results from third and fourth graders in 
26 countries and from seventh and eighth graders in 41 countries.33 These achievement 
tests are based on a curriculum framework developed through an international consensus-
building process by all participating countries. International experts in mathematics, sci-
ence, and measurement contributed to the development of the achievement tests and the 
tests were endorsed by all participating countries. The sampling focused on the two adja-
cent grades that contain the largest proportion of 9-year-olds – third and fourth graders 
in most countries – or the largest proportion of 13-year-olds – seventh and eighth graders 
in most countries. These samples also include students who are one year younger or older 
than the age groups that were targeted. This sampling strategy enables us to apply the 
regression discontinuity framework that we discussed in Section 3.2. After the 1995 TIMSS 
32 See, http://timss.bc.edu/timss1995i/Database.html for TIMSS data.
33 These data were also used in a quasi-experimental study on international differences in class 
size effects (Woessmann and West, 2006).
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study the sampling strategy was changed and focuses only on one grade, which makes it 
impossible to apply our estimation framework.
From the 1995 TIMSS study we include all countries in the analysis that apply clear 
nationwide school entry rules. For the nine-year-olds we included 21 out of 26 participating 
countries. Australia, the USA and Ireland have been excluded because the rules regarding 
the school cutoff date vary across regions or are at the discretion of educators or parents. 
Kuwait and Israel have been excluded because in those countries only one grade was sam-
pled or no information on test scores was available. For the thirteen-year-olds we included 
34 out of 41 participating countries. Again Australia, USA, Ireland, Kuwait and Israel have 
been excluded. Columbia has been excluded because there is no clear cut-off date in 
average grade. The Republic of South Africa has not been included because the teacher 
and school data were not deemed internationally comparable. Bedard and Dhuey (2006) 
excluded more countries from their estimation sample because of concerns about the strict 
application of the school starting age rules or measurement error in the date of birth. They 
additionally excluded Germany, the Netherlands, Hungary, Switzerland and Korea. In our 
analysis, which focuses on differences between grades, it seems that these countries can 
be included because we observe sharp discontinuities in average grade around the cutoff 
date. We test the robustness of our findings by replicating our main estimations for the 
sample of countries used by Bedard and Dhuey (2006).
As dependent variables we use the TIMSS test scores in math and science. These scores 
have been standardized with a mean of 500 points and a standard deviation of 100 points 
which can be easily translated into the usual effect sizes from a standard normal distribu-
tion. TIMSS uses an incomplete or rotated-booklet design for testing children on the major 
outcome variables. For each student and each test TIMSS selects five plausible values. In 
the estimation we use all five plausible values and adjust standard errors as recommended 
when using the plausible values methodology (Von Davier et al., 2009). Our main control 
variable is the date of birth of the student measured by month. For many countries we also 
have the exact date of birth, which we will use in the sensitivity analysis. Other control vari-
ables that we use are gender, born in country of test, living with mother/father, language 
of test spoken at home, number of books at home, and mother’s and father’s educational 
level.
School entry rules are crucial in our analysis. We use information from Bedard and 
Dhuey (2006) and several online sources, and empirically checked this information in our 
data. For some countries we could not obtain information about the cutoff dates. In those 
cases we used the cutoff date from the data (see table 3A.1 in the Appendix).
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3.4 Theeffectofoneyearofschooltimeoncognitiveskillsacross
countries
This section presents the first part of our empirical analysis. We estimate the average effect 
of one year of school time for students in different age groups, on the performance in 
cognitive tests for the pooled samples of countries. This estimate can be interpreted as 
the effect of spending one year in school across countries, and might be considered as an 
international benchmark for gains in cognitive skills for specific age groups and subjects.
To obtain estimates of the average effect of one year of school time in all the selected 
countries from TIMSS we have pooled the data for each test (TIMSS 9, TIMSS 13) and esti-
mated equation (3.4). In this model we have also included country dummies and interac-
tions of these dummies with a linear function of age such that we allow the functional form 
of age to be different at either side of the cut-off for each country. The critical assumption in 
applying this model is that students near the cut-off date are very similar on observed and 
unobserved characteristics. To investigate this assumption we compared the covariates of 
students born in the months around the cut-off date (see table 3A.2 in the Appendix). In 
addition, we performed balancing tests, in which observed characteristics are regressed on 
a dummy for being born at the left side of the cut-off and a function of age (table 3A.3 in the 
Appendix). For 9-year-olds we find that students on both sides of the cut-off are very simi-
lar. For 13-year-olds, however, we find a difference with respect to the educational level 
of the mother. This difference might be the result of sampling bias which we will address 
below.
Table 3.I shows the estimation results based on equation (3.4) for both subjects and age 
groups. In panel A and B we show the estimation results using the TIMSS achievement tests 
in math and science respectively for 9-year-olds and 13-year-olds. Columns (1) to (4) show 
the reduced form estimates from equation (3.4). The odd columns only control for age, the 
even columns also control for gender, born in country of test, lives with mother/father, 
language of test spoken at home and number of books at home. These columns also report 
the first stage estimate from equation (3.2) which can be interpreted as the proportion 
of students that is on track. We use two discontinuity samples around the cut-off date: 
± 3 months and ± 6 months. Columns (5) to (12) show the result from various sensitivity 
analyses. All sensitivity analyses use the sample of students born six month before or after 
the cutoff date, and include all controls like in column (4). Columns (5) and (6) respectively 
include a quadratic or cubic function of month of birth. Columns (7) to (9) focus on the 
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3
 sample of countries for which the exact date of birth is available; 17 countries for 9-year-
olds, 30 countries for 13-year-olds.34
Column (7) uses a linear specification of month of birth like in column (4), column (8) uses the 
exact date of birth as assignment variable in a linear specification, and column (9) excludes 
students born three days before or after the cutoff date. Column (10) uses the same sample 
of countries as used by Bedard and Dhuey (2006). The last two columns address the issue 
of sampling bias. In column (11) the estimation sample only includes countries in which 
most students are on track; countries with a first stage estimate (equation (3.2)) of at least 
0.75. For the 9-year-olds the sample includes 9 countries; for the 13-year-olds 12 countries 
are included. Column (12) shows estimates that have been adjusted for sampling bias. The 
sampling bias is approximated by using data of students who are one year younger or one 
year older in the two adjacent grades. The standard errors of the estimates are adjusted for 
using plausible values (Von Davier et al., 2009), which causes a slight increase.
The estimates in column (1) to (4) of panel A of table 3.I show that one year of time in school 
increases performance of 9-year olds between 25 and 27 points in math and between 18 
and 20 points in science, which is between 0.2 and 0.3 standard deviations of test scores (a 
standard deviation of test scores is 100 points). The estimates are precise, and robust to the 
discontinuity sample. The inclusion of controls only slightly reduces the estimated effects, 
which confirms that students born around the cut-off date are quite similar in observed 
characteristics. Columns (5) to (12) show the results from various sensitivity analyses. Col-
umns (5) and (6) show that including a quadratic or cubic function of age, measured by year 
and month of birth, slightly increases the estimated effects. The estimates in columns (7) to 
(9) test the sensitivity of the results for using the exact date of birth as assignment variable 
and for a potential non-randomness of births around the cutoff. The estimates are very 
similar if we include the exact date of birth (column (8)) or exclude students born three days 
before or after the cutoff date (column (9)). Column (10) shows the estimation results for 
the sample of countries used by Bedard and Dhuey (2006). This sample is more restrictive 
and also excludes countries with a rolling admission. The estimated effect for this sample 
remains similar to the results in the other columns. Columns (11) and (12) aim to assess the 
sensitivity of the results to sampling bias. The estimated effects are 0.03 to 0.04 standard 
34 The number of observations for Greece has reduced substantially due to missing values of the 
day of birth.
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deviations higher than those in column (4), which suggests that for 9-year-olds sampling 
bias is small. For the sample of countries used for the estimations in column (11) the dif-
ference between the lower bound estimates and the unbiased estimates is 0.01 standard 
deviations (not shown in table 3.I). Hence, the lower bound estimates are probably not very 
different from the unbiased effects of one year of time in school.
The estimates in column (1) to (12) should be interpreted as the effect of one additional 
year in school at the age of 9. As in previous studies, we can also attempt to estimate the 
effect of time in grade on cognitive skills by using an IV-approach. The IV-estimates can be 
obtained as the ratio of the reduced form estimates and the first stage estimates shown in 
column (1) to (4). If the IV-assumptions hold we would find that one year of time in grade 
increases the scores in math and science by approximately 40 and 30 points respectively. 
As mentioned above, this approach assumes that grade retention or acceleration has no 
effect on cognitive skills.
Panel B shows the effects of time in school for 13-year-olds. For the lower bound esti-
mates in columns (1) to (10) we find that one year of time in school increases performance 
by 6 to 8 points in math and by 11 to 12 points in science. The estimates of the lower bound 
effect are robust to the discontinuity sample and to various sensitivity tests. The estimated 
effects in columns (11) and (12), which are approximations of sampling bias, are larger than 
the lower bound estimates. The proportion of 13-year-olds that are not on track is larger 
than the proportion of 9-year-olds, which explains the increase in the difference between 
the lower bound estimates and the approximations of the unbiased effects. For the sample 
of countries used for the estimation in column (11) the difference between the lower bound 
estimates and the unbiased estimate is 0.02 standard deviations (not shown in table 3.I). 
Hence, for these 12 countries sampling bias is likely to be quite small.
The cross-country estimates of time in school yield three important findings. First, a 
year of school time matters for the performance of all age groups in math and science. 
Across countries a year of school time increases performance in cognitive tests with 0.2 to 
0.3 standard deviations for 9-year olds and with 0.1 to 0.2 standard deviations for 13-year-
olds. These effects are consistent with the results of previous studies based on credible 
research designs (Gormley and Gayer, 2005; Gormley et al., 2005; Hansen et al., 2004; Cas-
cio and Lewis, 2006; and Berlinski et al., 2009). Second, an additional year of time in school 
matters more at the age of 9 than at the age of 13. Hence, the effect of time in school 
seems to reduce with age. This might indicate that later grades add less to the knowledge 
base or that the tests do a poorer job at measuring the full range of skill differences. Third, 
the difference between the lower bound estimates and the unbiased estimates seems to 
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increase with the proportions of student that are not on track. For 9-year-olds the lower 
bounds estimates are likely to be quite close to the unbiased effects. For 13-year-olds this 
also holds for the sample of 12 countries with high proportions of students that are on 
track. The difference between the lower bound estimates and the approximations of the 
unbiased effects are larger for countries in which substantial proportions of students are 
not on track.
3.5 Internationaldifferencesingainsincognitiveskills
The second step in the empirical analysis is to investigate differences between countries. 
Which countries produce the largest effects of one year of school time on performance in 
cognitive tests?
Differences in achievements of 9-year-olds between countries
We start by analyzing the achievement of 9-year-olds. Column (1) of table 3.II shows the 
reduced form estimates (RF) of the gain in math skills caused by one year of additional 
school time. This estimate can be interpreted as the effect of spending one year in school 
in a specific country. The countries are ranked with respect to this estimate. We observe 
that the education systems of Norway and Singapore have produced the highest gain in 
achievement in math for 9-year-olds; the lowest gain in achievement in math has been pro-
duced by the education systems of New Zealand and Thailand. Column (2) shows estimates 
of the effect of one year of school time which are adjusted for sampling bias. Column (3) 
shows the mean level score of the highest of the adjacent grades for each country. Singa-
pore and South-Korea have the highest scores, whereas Iceland and Iran have the lowest 
level scores in math in the upper grades. We call these average scores the country level 
scores and in the next section we will compare them with the estimates of the effect of one 
year of school time. Columns (4), (5) and (6) show the reduced form estimate, the estimate 
that is adjusted for sampling bias, and the mean level score of the upper grade for the sci-
ence test. Column (7) shows the first stage estimates (FS) of the effect of being born on 
the left side of the cutoff date on the grade level. This estimate indicates to which extent 
a country keeps students on track. For instance, in Singapore, Iceland, Japan and England 
most students move through the education system in line with the prediction based on the 
school entry rule. All models control for age (in months) separately specified for both sides 
of the cut-off and use the sample of students born in the period between six month before 
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and six month after the cutoff date. The standard errors of the estimates are adjusted for 
using plausible values.
The estimates of the lower bound effect of one year of school time in columns (1) and (4) 
show that there are large differences in the gains in cognitive skills between countries. The 
estimated effects differ between 0 and 0.4 standard deviations of the test scores. High 
gains in achievement for both tests are found for Norway, Singapore and Iceland. On the 
other hand, we also find very low gains in cognitive skills; in five countries the estimated 
effects do not significantly differ from zero. Hence, one year of time in school does not yield 
a gain in cognitive skills in these countries. The country specific estimates remain quite 
Table 3.II: Reduced form estimates of the gain in cognitive skills and mean upper grade by country 
for 9-year-olds
Math Science
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ranking Country gain corr. gain mean  gain corr. gain mean firststage N
1 Norway 43.3 (7.4) 43.1 (7.4) 502  38.8 (8.5) 38.5 (8.5) 530 0.89 (0.02) 2133
2 Singapore 40.0 (5.2) 41.8 (5.2) 625 27.8 (4.9) 29.7 (4.9) 547 0.96 (0.01) 6986
3 Greece 36.3 (6.7) 38.0 (6.7) 492  21.7 (6.5) 23.2 (6.5) 497 0.89 (0.02) 2981
4 Iceland 34.6 (9.5) 35.9 (9.5) 474  30.9 (8.4) 32.4 (8.4) 505 0.96 (0.01) 1702
5 Iran 33.3 (7.1) 44.8 (6.6) 429 35.9 (6.8) 48.9 (6.4) 416 0.56 (0.04) 2716
6 Cyprus 30.5 (6.4) 33.9 (6.4) 502 20.4 (5.8) 23.2 (5.8) 475 0.79 (0.02) 3230
7 Japan 28.6 (5.4) 28.3 (5.4) 597  19.1 (5.3) 18.9 (5.3) 574 0.94 (0.01) 4343
8 Czech  
Republic 26.9 (6.9) 30.3 (6.9) 567  16.9 (6.5) 20.5 (6.5) 557 0.43 (0.03) 3108
9 Canada 24.4 (5.1) 29.9 (4.9) 532  21.7 (4.8) 28.7 (4.7) 549 0.70 (0.02) 7436
10 Netherlands 23.6 (6.8) 29.3 (6.9) 577 13.9 (6.7) 17.3 (6.6) 557 0.48 (0.04) 2241
11 Hungary 23.4 (7.8) 29.2 (7.8) 548 26.7 (7.0) 32.2 (7.0) 532 0.41 (0.04) 2743
12 Hong Kong 22.0 (5.6) 26.6 (5.5) 587 16.3 (5.0) 21.0 (4.9) 533 0.69 (0.02) 3851
13 Austria 21.9 (7.4) 27.9 (7.4) 559  11.4 (8.1) 17.6 (8.1) 565 0.55 (0.03) 2315
14 South-Korea 21.3 (6.5) 25.4 (6.2) 611 12.8 (6.4) 17.2 (6.1) 597 0.66 (0.03) 2636
15 Scotland 20.1 (6.6) 21.1 (6.6) 520 12.9 (7.2) 14.0 (7.2) 536 0.77 (0.03) 3089
16 Portugal 17.7 (7.3) 22.6 (7.3) 475  17.9 (8.9) 24.9 (8.9) 480 0.79 (0.03) 2310
17 England 13.5 (7.1) 13.6 (7.1) 513  12.9 (9.2) 13.4 (9.2) 551 0.93 (0.02) 3087
18 Slovenia 12.7 (7.3) 15.9 (7.3) 552 7.6 (7.1) 10.3 (7.1) 546 0.53 (0.03) 2484
19 Latvia 6.9 (7.8) 14.9 (7.4) 525 3.0 (9.0) 9.0 (8.5) 512 0.24 (0.05) 2116
20 New Zealand 2.7 (7.6) 2.3 (7.5) 499  3.8 (8.4) 3.6 (8.4) 531 0.40 (0.04) 2459
21 Thailand -0.4 (6.2) 14.6 (5.7) 490  -5.1 (6.0) 6.9 (5.5) 473 0.41 (0.05) 2837
Notes: 21 out of 26 participating countries have been included. See section 3.3 for the exclusion of 
five countries. The estimation sample consists of students born in the period 6 months before and 
after the cut-off date. The countries in grey are from the sample used by Bedard and Dhuey (2006). 
Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for using plausible values.
TXC 20140722 Gerritsen.indd   66 11-8-2014   15:14:19
How much do children learn in school? International evidence from school entry rules
67
3
similar when we use the exact birth date as assignment variable and exclude children born 
very close to the cutoff date (table 3A.5a in the Appendix). In general, countries with high 
gains in achievement in math also achieve high gains in science: the correlation between 
the estimates in columns (1) and (4) is 0.9, which is significant at the 1%-level. For most 
countries the lower bound estimates are very close to the estimates that are adjusted for 
sampling bias (columns (2) and (5)). However, for several individual countries, in particular 
Iran, Austria, Latvia and Thailand, the adjusted score is substantially larger than the lower 
bound estimates. In these countries the proportion of students that is not on track is rela-
tively high, as indicated by the first stage equation in column (5). The ranking of countries 
based on the adjusted estimates is quite similar to the ranking based on the lower bound 
estimates (the correlation between these estimates for both math and science is 0.94, 
which is significant at the 1% level).
Differences in achievements of 13-year-olds between countries
The sample of countries that can be used for estimating the effect for 13-years-olds con-
sists of 34 countries. Table 3.III shows the estimation results. Again we observe large dif-
ferences between countries. The lower bound estimates of the gains in cognitive skills 
(columns (1) and (4)) are substantially smaller for 13-years-olds than for 9-year-olds, which 
is in line with the results from the previous section. Singapore achieves the highest gains in 
cognitive skills in both subjects; the results for science are remarkably far ahead of all other 
countries. Another remarkable finding for the 13-year-olds is the large number of countries 
for which the lower bound estimate of the effect of one year of school time is statistically 
insignificant. This suggests that in these countries one additional year of school time does 
not matter for the performance on the TIMSS math or science tests. More countries gener-
ate a statistically significant effect in science than in math. The estimates are quite similar 
when we use the exact birth date as assignment variable and exclude children born very 
close to the cutoff date (table 3A.5b in the Appendix). Again we observe that countries 
with high gains in achievement in math also achieve high gains in science: the correlation 
between the estimates in columns (1) and (4) is 0.73, which is significant at the 1%-level. For 
countries with high proportions of students that are on track, indicated by high first stage 
estimates, we observe that the lower bound estimates are quite similar to the estimates 
that are adjusted for sampling bias (columns (2) and (5)). However, for countries with a 
relatively low first stage estimate the adjusted scores can be substantially higher than the 
lower bound estimates.
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Table 3.III: Reduced form estimates of the gain in cognitive skills and mean upper grade by country 
for 13-year-olds
Math Science  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ranking Country gain corr. gain mean  gain corr. gain mean firststage N
1 Singapore 27.8 (4.6) 27.8 (4.6) 643 55.9 (5.9) 56.6 (5.9) 607 0.96 (0.01) 3567
2 Sweden 19.1 (5.4) 22.0 (5.4) 519  25.2 (5.5) 28.3 (5.5) 535 0.91 (0.01) 3403
3 Italy 18.5 (8.3) 29.4 (8.1) 493  15.0 (8.0) 24.7 (7.8) 498 0.71 (0.03) 2186
4 Norway 18.2 (6.2) 18.5 (6.1) 503  22.1 (6.7) 22.8 (6.7) 527 0.84 (0.02) 2751
5 Iran 15.5 (7.1) 24.9 (6.5) 428 7.7 (6.9) 14.1 (6.3) 470 0.36 (0.04) 2495
6 Czech  
Republic 15.5 (5.6) 20.1 (5.5) 564  9.1 (5.6) 13.2 (5.5) 574 0.52 (0.02) 3248
7 Spain 13.6 (5.7) 27.0 (5.5) 487  10.9 (5.9) 23.4 (5.6) 517 0.73 (0.03) 3157
8 Iceland 13.5 (7.2) 13.9 (7.2) 487  17.1 (7.4) 17.5 (7.4) 494 0.94 (0.02) 1834
9 South-Korea 13.1 (6.5) 14.6 (6.5) 607 10.7 (6.2) 12.0 (6.1) 565 0.82 (0.02) 2912
10 Denmark 12.1 (7.3) 13.8 (7.3) 502  8.3 (8.2) 10.5 (8.2) 478 0.51 (0.04) 2096
11 Canada 9.9 (3.6) 16.0 (3.6) 527  3.2 (4.4) 9.3 (4.2) 531 0.55 (0.03) 7733
12 Latvia 9.9 (7.4) 17.7 (7.2) 493 23.2 (7.6) 33.1 (7.4) 485 0.57 (0.04) 2334
13 Scotland 9.9 (6.6) 9.6 (6.5) 498 12.7 (7.1) 13.1 (7.1) 517 0.75 (0.03) 2824
14 Thailand 9.7 (4.9) 14.9 (4.3) 522 11.1 (3.8) 18.6 (3.4) 525 0.46 (0.04) 5232
15 Cyprus 9.5 (8.1) 16.2 (8.0) 474 14.7 (7.8) 21.2 (7.8) 463 0.80 (0.02) 2837
16 Slovak Repub-
lic 8.6 (5.5) 12.5 (5.5) 547  11.9 (5.8) 15.7 (5.8) 544 0.79 (0.02) 3475
17 Belgium 
(French) 7.1 (6.8) 20.2 (6.5) 526  11.5 (7.7) 26.9 (7.4) 471 0.55 (0.04) 1872
18 Switzerland 6.7 (4.3) 19.0 (4.0) 545 8.7 (5.5) 21.2 (5.0) 522 0.30 (0.04) 3727
19 Japan 4.8 (4.6) 5.0 (4.6) 605  14.1 (4.5) 14.1 (4.5) 571 0.98 (0.01) 5158
20 Greece 3.0 (6.3) 11.2 (6.2) 484  5.9 (6.8) 13.0 (6.7) 497 0.75 (0.02) 3543
21 Belgium (Flem-
ish) 2.8 (4.8) 7.1 (4.8) 565  12.2 (5.4) 17.2 (5.3) 550 0.77 (0.03) 2622
22 Lithuania 2.6 (7.3) 7.5 (7.3) 477 17.6 (7.5) 23.5 (7.5) 476 0.55 (0.04) 2590
23 Romania 2.2 (6.3) 8.8 (6.0) 482 2.0 (6.8) 7.6 (6.5) 486 0.16 (0.03) 3504
24 Russia 1.9 (5.7) 4.8 (5.6) 535 14.9 (6.6) 19.2 (6.5) 538 0.47 (0.03) 3855
25 Hungary 0.5 (5.8) 3.2 (5.9) 537 4.0 (6.0) 6.3 (6.0) 554 0.30 (0.03) 2887
26 Portugal 0.4 (5.8) 18.8 (5.6) 454  13.4 (7.5) 34.5 (7.2) 480 0.62 (0.03) 2579
27 Germany -0.1 (6.4) 9.8 (6.2) 509 -0.4 (7.4) 11.6 (7.1) 531 0.36 (0.04) 2447
28 Slovenia -0.8 (6.3) 4.6 (6.2) 541 -10.3 (6.5) -6.4 (6.4) 560 0.43 (0.03) 2688
29 France -2.6 (6.7) 21.0 (6.3) 538  2.0 (6.6) 25.3 (6.2) 498 0.43 (0.04) 2159
30 Austria -3.6 (6.0) 4.8 (5.9) 539  1.1 (6.8) 10.9 (6.7) 558 0.53 (0.03) 2569
31 New Zealand -4.7 (6.0) -4.6 (6.0) 508  -3.4 (6.7) -3.2 (6.7) 525 0.29 (0.04) 3432
32 Netherlands -5.7 (6.5) 4.1 (6.5) 541 5.5 (7.2) 14.0 (7.1) 560 0.39 (0.04) 1770
33 Hong Kong -7.1 (6.3) -2.5 (6.1) 588 -2.2 (6.7) 2.7 (6.5) 522 0.59 (0.03) 2996
34 England -9.0 (9.4) -8.3 (9.3) 506  1.8 (9.0) 2.6 (8.9) 552 0.94 (0.02) 1834
Notes: 34 out of 41 countries have been included (see Section 3.3).  Estimation sample for estimating 
gains in achievement scores consists of students born in the period 6 months before and after the 
cut-off date. The countries in grey are from the sample used by Bedard and Dhuey (2006). Standard 
errors in parentheses are adjusted for using plausible values.
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We have also investigated whether countries that have high achievement gains for 
9-year-olds also have high achievement gains for 13-year-olds, and whether countries with 
low gains for 9-year-olds also have low gains for 13-year-olds. We find a correlation of 
0.51 for the reduced form estimates for math and a correlation of 0.34 for the reduced 
form estimates for science. The correlations for the math tests are statistically significant. 
This implies that education systems that are more effective in producing cognitive skills for 
9-year-olds are also more effective in producing cognitive skills for 13-year-olds.
3.6 Do gain scores and level scores yield a consistent assessment of 
educationsystems?
This section shows the results of the third part of our empirical analysis. We compare the 
estimates of the gains in cognitive skills with the levels of the cognitive skills as currently 
used for the benchmarking of education systems. Gain scores and level scores can both be 
considered as measures of the performance of an education system. An interesting ques-
tion is whether the rankings of the estimates of gains in cognitive skills in tables 3.II and 3.III 
are consistent with the ranking based on the level of the test scores. On the one hand we 
would expect a positive correlation between gain and level scores because the level scores 
are the sum of all gains in cognitive skills caused by time in and out of school. On the other 
hand gain scores and level scores might differ because both measures have limitations. 
Level scores do not isolate the contribution of time in school from the contribution of time 
out of school. High level scores could mask a low performing education system if the condi-
tions outside schools are favorable for learning, which means a high contribution of time 
out of school to student performance. Low level scores might also be misleading about the 
performance of the education systems if the conditions outside school are unfavorable 
for learning.35 Gain scores isolate time in school from time out of school but only measure 
the effect of one year in school. It follows that low gain scores could be the result of a low 
quality of education but also the result of the timing of the curriculum. The latter, however, 
seems to contrast with the way the TIMSS tests have been developed (see Section 3.3).
For investigating whether the two measures show a consistent ranking of countries 
we compare the reduced form estimates of the gain scores with the mean upper grade 
35 A similar concern arises when the performance of schools is compared. School with low level 
scores might actually have high ‘value added’ (Figlio and Loeb, 2011).
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scores.36 We use the mean of the upper grades scores, instead of the mean of the scores 
from both adjacent grades, because the gain scores measure the effect of time in school 
between the lowest and the highest grade and, therefore, are included in the mean upper 
grade scores. In figures 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 we have plotted the mean upper grade scores for 
the different age groups and subjects on the vertical axis against the estimates of the gains 
in achievement on the horizontal axis. Figure 3.2 shows the results for the 9-years-olds in 
math and science. Figure 3.3 shows the results for the 13-years-olds. In addition, figure 3.4 
plots the level score at age 13 against the gains in cognitive skills of 9-year-olds. We have 
included axes at the median level of gain scores and level scores in all figures which gener-
ate four quadrants of the performance of education systems: low level – low gain; low level 
– high gain; high level – low gain; high level – high gain.
In figure 3.2 we observe no association between the mean upper grade scores and the 
gains in cognitive skills for both subjects. For math we observe a large variation in gains in 
cognitive skills for countries below the median level scores. Hence, countries with a low 
level score are not only observed in the low gain quadrant but also in the high gain quad-
rant. For instance, Norway has the highest gain of all countries but also a level score below 
the median level. The gain scores for countries above the median level scores are less dis-
persed and more concentrated around the median gain scores. For science we observe a 
more even distribution of countries across the four quadrants of performance. A similar 
pattern is found for the 13-year-olds (figure 3.3).37 We observe no association between 
mean level scores and gains in cognitive skills. Countries with high level scores are not 
consistently found in the top of the ranking based on the gain scores. Similarly, countries 
with low level test scores do not systematically have low gains in achievement. Singapore 
can be considered as a (positive) outlier for both subjects in figure 3.3. Figure 3.4 shows the 
association between the gain score at the age of 9 and the level score at the age of 13. We 
observe that the country rankings for the 13-year olds in TIMSS are not related with the 
gains in achievement for 9-year olds.
The results from figures 3.2 and 3.3 have been summarized in table 3.IV. This table 
shows correlations between the estimates of the gains in achievement and the country 
36 See for the mean upper grade scores TIMMS 9 http://timssandpirls.bc.edu/timss1995i/
TIMSSPDF/P1HiLite.pdf and for TIMMS 13 http://timssandpirls.bc.edu/timss1995i/TIMSSPDF/
P2HiLite.pdf. 
37 Figure 3.3 also distinguishes countries with and without an external exit exam which is relevant 
for the analysis in the next section. 
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Figure 3.2: The association between country level scores and the effect of one year of school time 
on cognitive skills for 9-year-olds.
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Figure 3.3: The association between country level scores and the effect of one year of school time 
on cognitive skills for 13-year olds.
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Figure 3.4: The association between country level scores of 13-year-olds and the effect of one year 
of school time on cognitive skills for 9-year-olds.
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level scores by test and age group. The table also includes the results of sensitivity analyses 
with respect to the size of the discontinuity samples (panel A), the non-random timing of 
birth (panel B), and the inclusion of countries not used in the sample of Bedard and Dhuey 
(2006) and sampling bias (panel C). The main finding of table 3.IV is that the correlation 
between the gain scores and the country level scores is close to zero and statistically insig-
nificant for all subjects and age groups. This result is found for the main results as shown in 
figure 3.2 and 3.3 (middle panel of panel A) and is robust to a series of sensitivity analyses 
as shown in the other panels of table 3.IV. In panel C we find higher correlations for 13-year-
olds in the sample of countries with a first stage estimates above 0.75. However, this corre-
lation is completely driven by the large gains of Singapore. The estimates that are adjusted 
for sampling bias suggest a negative correlation between gain scores and level scores.
The low correlations imply that country level scores and country gain scores often tell dif-
ferent stories about the performance of education systems. Hence, countries that are top 
ranked in the test are not necessarily characterized by high gains in achievement, and low 
ranked countries are not necessarily characterized by low gain scores. The current use of 
the outcomes of international cognitive tests in educational policy focuses on the ranking 
along the vertical axis. The figures in this section show that these rankings hide large varia-
tion in gains in cognitive skills between countries illustrated by the variation along the hori-
zontal axis. As such, gain scores add a second dimension for assessing the performance of 
education systems. For educational policy it seems useful to focus not only on the ranking 
along the vertical axis but also take the horizontal axis into account, for instance by looking 
at the four quadrants of performance. For countries in the low level – low gain quadrant or 
in the high level – high gain quadrant the assessment of the performance seems clear. But 
for countries in the other two quadrants, the assessment of the performance of education 
system is less clear. For example, the below median level score of Norway can be inter-
preted as a signal of low quality education. However, the high gain scores tell a different 
story and suggest that other factors are likely to explain the low level scores.38 For countries 
in these two quadrants a mere focus on the ranking along the vertical axis might yield mis-
leading information for educational policy.
38 It might be speculated that the relatively late school starting age in Norway lowers the level 
scores.
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3.7 Investigatingthedeterminantsofinternationaldifferencesin
cognitiveskills
The estimated effects of the effect of time in school are also of interest to the literature 
that uses international cognitive tests for investigating the determinants of international 
differences in educational achievement (Hanushek and Woessmann, 2011). This literature 
investigates whether differences in school inputs or institutions, such as school account-
ability and autonomy, central exams, competition between schools or tracking, can explain 
the large differences in achievements of students between countries. Most studies in this 
recent literature have focused on identifying cross-country associations.39 However, due to 
the complex nature of the production of human capital it remains unclear whether these 
39 Several studies have used a quasi-experimental design, see Section 3.1.
Table 3.IV: Correlations between countries gain score and mean upper grade by age group and 
subject
Panel A Totalsampleusingdifferentdiscontinuitysamples
±3months ±6months ±9months
test subject correlation p-value N  correlation p-value N  correlation p-value N
TIMSS 9 math 0.05 0.83 21 0.07 0.75 21 0.09 0.71 21
TIMSS 9 science -0.23 0.32 21 -0.20 0.38 21 -0.18 0.44 21
TIMSS 13 math 0.08 0.65 34 0.04 0.81 34 0.04 0.84 34
TIMSS 13 science 0.05 0.80 34  0.13 0.46 34  0.14 0.43 34
Panel B
Addressingbirthselectionaroundthecutoffusing±6monthssampleanddifferent
assignment variable:
birth day
birth day excluding 3 days 
beforeandafterthecutoff birth month
test subject correlation p-value N  correlation p-value N  correlation p-value N
TIMSS 9 math 0.30 0.24 17 0.28 0.28 17 0.29 0.25 17
TIMSS 9 science -0.13 0.61 17 -0.08 0.77 17 0.06 0.82 17
TIMSS 13 math 0.14 0.46 30 0.13 0.49 30 0.15 0.44 30
TIMSS 13 science 0.14 0.45 30 0.13 0.51 30  0.14 0.47 30
Panel C Addressingrollingadmissions&sampleselectionusing±6monthssample:
Bedard and Dhuey sample
countrieswithfirst
stage>0.75
gains corrected for sample 
selection
test subject correlation p-value N  correlation p-value N correlation p-value N
TIMSS 9 math 0.01 0.99 10 0.22 0.56 9 -0.01 0.96 21
TIMSS 9 science -0.28 0.44 10 -0.07 0.86 9 -0.38 0.09 21
TIMSS 13 math -0.08 0.76 18 0.33 0.30 12 -0.14 0.43 34
TIMSS 13 science -0.08 0.76 18  0.47 0.13 12  -0.08 0.66 34
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associations can be interpreted as causal effects. Therefore, it has been argued that ‘further 
exploration of quasi-experimental settings in the international data should be high on the 
agenda’ (Hanushek and Woessman, 2011). This chapter provides such a quasi-experimental 
setting and the previous section shows that assessments of the performance of education 
systems based on level scores might be different from assessments based on gain scores. 
The approach that is applied in this chapter might also yield new opportunities for investi-
gating the determinants of international differences in education achievements between 
countries. Whereas the current literature tries to relate differences in student outcomes to 
differences in input factors or institutions, it is also possible to relate differences in gains in 
achievement to differences in input factor or institutions. The advantage of our approach is 
that it isolates the effects of time in school from the effects of time out of school.
To illustrate these opportunities, we re-examine the impact of curriculum-based exter-
nal exit exam systems (CBEEE). Previous studies have investigated the effects of external 
exit-exams and provide a consistent picture about the beneficial effect of external exit-
exams. The effects might be even larger than a whole-grade level equivalent, between 
0.2 to 0.4 standard deviations of the respective tests (Hanushek and Woessmann, 2011). 
These results have also been found for the 1995 TIMSS math and science achievements of 
13-year-olds in a study that uses country level data (Bishop, 1997) and in a study that uses 
micro-level data (Woessman, 2003). We conduct a similar analysis using gains in achieve-
ments. Table 3.V shows the estimations results; the left panel shows the results using coun-
try level-data, the right panel shows the results using micro-level data.
The first column of panel A of table 3.V replicates the estimates from Bishop (1997). The 
mean upper grade scores of 34 countries are regressed on a dummy for having a curricu-
lum-based external exit exam. The estimates show that countries that have an external-
exit exam score 29 points higher on math and 33 points higher on science tests. Bishop 
(1997) reports similar results (23 points for math and 34 points for science) in models with 
more controls. In columns (2) and (3) the estimated gains in achievement instead of the 
mean upper grade scores are used as dependent variable. Column (2) uses the lower bound 
estimate of the gains in cognitive skills; column (3) uses estimates that are adjusted for 
sampling bias. The estimates show that countries that have an external exit-exam do not 
produce higher gains in achievement than countries that do not have an external exit exam; 
the point estimates are negative and in column (3) we even find statistically significant neg-
ative effects. The right panel of table 3.V uses micro-level data; column (4) uses a specifica-
tion as in Woessman (2003). The models in columns (5) and (6) are based on equation (3.4), 
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and include dummies for having an external exit exam and an interaction of time in school 
(grade) with the external exit exam (CBEEE) like in equation (3.5):
(3.5) 
The estimates show that students in countries with external exit exams score 25 (30) points 
higher on math (science) and the estimated effects are statistically significant. Woessman 
(2003) also finds statistically significant positive effects, but these effects are smaller after 
including an extensive set of family background and school-input controls (11 (16) points 
for math (science)). However, we do not find a positive effect of external exit-exams on the 
gains in achievement in the last year before the test. This result can also be observed in 
figure 3.3 which distinguishes countries with and without an external exit exam. We do not 
Table 3.V: The effect of curriculum-based external exams on cognitive skills of 13-year and 9-year 
olds
Country level data Micro-level data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 
mean upper 
grade gain corr. gain  
mean upper 
grade gain corr. gain
Panel A: 13-year-olds
math 28.5* -1.9 -6.8** 24.5*** -1.8 -3.1
(15.6) (3.0) (3.0) (0.6) (2.5) (2.5)
Observations 34 34 34 116235 104316 109942
science 33.0*** -2.5 -8.8** 29.5*** -0.9 -1.4
(11.7) (3.8) (3.8) (0.6) (2.5) (2.5)
Observations 34 34 34 116235 104316 109942
PanelB:9-year-olds
math 41.0** -0.0 -0.7 51.4*** 3.9 6.0
(17.0) (6.6) (5.5) (1.1) (3.8) (3.8)
Observations 21 21 21 71874 66803 68869
science 33.9** -4.3 -3.9 35.9*** -2.3 0.86
(15.2) (6.0) (5.3) (0.8) (3.6) (3.6)
Observations 21 21 21  71874 66803 68869
Notes: In columns (1)-(3) the country’s mean/gain has been regressed on a dummy for CBEEE-country. In col-
umn (4) individual test scores have been regressed on the CBEEE-dummy. The model in columns (5) and (6) also 
includes a dummy for CBEEE-countries and the interaction of CBEEE with the dummy for being born before the 
cutoff date (see equation (3.5)). For the country level data robust standard errors are used. For the micro-level 
data standard errors are adjusted for using plausible values.
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observe that countries with external exams have higher gains in achievement than coun-
tries without an external exit exam.
A limitation of the gain score approach is that it only refers to the achievements in 
the last year before the test. Hence, it is possible that we fail to find an effect of exter-
nal exit-exams because they only affect the results in earlier years in school. The TIMSS 
test scores of 9-year-olds provide an opportunity to observe what happened in one of the 
earlier years. The estimation results, based on the same models, are shown in panel B of 
table 3.V. Again we observe substantial positive effects of external exit exams in columns 
(1) and (4). The estimates indicate that central exit-exams increase test scores in math by 
51 points and in science by 36 points. However, the estimated effects become statistically 
insignificant when we focus on gains in achievement. This means that we do not find higher 
gains in achievement during two school years for students in countries that have an exter-
nal exit exam compared to students in countries that do not have external exit exams. 
Although this finding relates to two school years, which is one quarter of the total amount 
of time in school, it raises concerns about unobserved differences between countries that 
have external exit exams and countries that do not have external exit exams in the studies 
that previously used the 1995 TIMSS data for estimating the effect of external exit-exams.
In sum, our re-examination of previous results on the effect of external exit exams using 
the 1995 TIMSS data shows that results based on level scores might differ from the results 
based on gain scores. This illustrates that an approach that focuses on gains in achievement 
might offer new opportunities and insights for investigating the determinants of interna-
tional differences in educational achievement.
3.8 Conclusions
This study applies a quasi-experimental approach for estimating the effect of one year of 
school time on the performance in international cognitive tests by exploiting the assign-
ment of students to different grades based on school entry rules. This method produces 
estimates of gains in cognitive skills for students in different age groups in the year before 
the test for worldwide samples of countries and for individual countries. This method 
also enables a comparison of the performance of education systems based on gain scores 
instead of level scores.
We find that time in school on average matters for student performance in interna-
tional cognitive tests. For the pooled sample of countries we find that a year of school time 
increases performance in cognitive tests with 0.2 to 0.3 standard deviations for 9-year olds 
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and with 0.1 to 0.2 standard deviations for 13-year-olds. These effects are consistent with 
the results of previous studies based on credible research designs (Gormley and Gayer, 
2005; Gormley et al., 2005; Hansen et al., 2004; Cascio and Lewis, 2006; and Berlinski et 
al., 2009). We also find large differences in the estimated gains in achievement between 
countries for both subjects and age groups. Countries that achieve higher gains in cognitive 
skills for math also achieve higher gains in science. Moreover, countries with higher gains 
for 9-year-olds also have higher gains for 13-years-olds.
The sampling strategy of the TIMSS-project, which focused on two adjacent grades, 
might induce a downward bias for our estimates. Therefore, the main estimates should 
be interpreted as lower bound estimates. For 9-year-olds the lower bound estimates are 
probably quite close to the unbiased effect. However, for 13-year-olds the lower bound 
estimates will probably underestimate the gains in cognitive tests for countries in which a 
large proportion of students is not on track.
Remarkably, we find no association between the estimated gains in achievement and 
the level scores of countries. At all levels of test scores we observe countries with high 
achievement gains and countries with low gains in achievement. The lack of association 
has been found for both tests (math, science) and for both age groups. Hence, assessments 
of the performance of education systems based on the estimated gains in achievement 
often are inconsistent with performance assessments based on level scores. This inconsist-
ency might be explained by limitations of both measures. Level scores do not distinguish 
between the contribution of time in school and the contribution of time out of school. The 
gain scores only refer to the gain in achievement in the year before the test. The inconsist-
ency of the two measures implies that the benchmarking of education systems based on 
level scores might yield misleading information about the performance of education sys-
tems. Low levels of test scores, or declining trends in test scores, might not be the result of 
low performing education systems. High levels of test scores could mask low performing 
education systems. Using gain scores as an additional instrument for the assessment of the 
performance of education systems is likely to reduce the risk of providing misleading policy 
information.
The quasi-experimental approach for estimating gains scores used in this chapter can 
also be important for investigating international differences in educational achievements. 
For instance, studies that use control strategies have consistently found that students per-
form better in countries with external exit exams. However, we do not find higher gains in 
achievements in countries with a central exit exam for 9-year-olds and 13-year-olds com-
pared to countries that do not have central exit exams.
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This study shows that time in school is important for acquiring cognitive skills and 
that there are large differences in the effects between countries. Estimates of the gains in 
achievement for separate countries provide a different assessment of the performance of 
education systems, and of the effect of specific elements of education systems, than level 
scores. The estimation of gain scores, which becomes possible when the current collection 
of international data is extended towards samples of students in adjacent grades, is likely 
to improve decisions on educational policies and could offer new opportunities for investi-
gating the determinants of international differences in student achievement.
3.9 Appendix
Table 3A.1: Cutoff dates per country & source and data availability
Country Cutoffdate Source TIMSS9 TIMSS 13
Austria1 September 1 Bedard and Dhuey yes yes
Belgium-Flemish January 1 Bedard and Dhuey no yes
Belgium-French January 1 Bedard and Dhuey no yes
Canada January 1 Bedard and Dhuey yes yes
Czech Republic September 1 Bedard and Dhuey yes yes
Denmark January 1 Bedard and Dhuey no yes
England September 1 Bedard and Dhuey yes yes
France January 1 Bedard and Dhuey no yes
Greece April 1 Bedard and Dhuey yes yes
Iceland January 1 Bedard and Dhuey yes yes
Italy January 1 Bedard and Dhuey no yes
Japan April 1 Bedard and Dhuey yes yes
New Zealand May 1 Bedard and Dhuey yes yes
Norway January 1 Bedard and Dhuey yes yes
Portugal January 1 Bedard and Dhuey yes yes
Slovak Republic September 1 Bedard and Dhuey no yes
Spain January 1 Bedard and Dhuey no yes
Sweden January 1 Bedard and Dhuey no yes
Germany2 July 1 Internet/TIMMS Data no yes
Singapore3 January 1 Internet/TIMMS Data yes yes
South-Korea4 March 1 Internet/TIMMS Data yes yes
Latvia5 September 1 Internet/TIMMS Data yes yes
Scotland6 March 1 Internet/TIMMS Data yes yes
Lithuania7 September 1 Internet/TIMMS Data no yes
Romania8 September 1 Internet/TIMMS Data no yes
Hungary9 June 1 Internet/TIMMS Data yes yes
Slovenia10 January 1 Internet/TIMMS Data yes yes
Netherlands11 October 1 Internet/TIMMS Data yes yes
Iran October 1 TIMSS Data yes yes
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Country Cutoffdate Source TIMSS9 TIMSS 13
Thailand January 1 TIMSS Data yes yes
Cyprus March 1 TIMSS Data yes yes
Switzerland January 1 TIMSS Data no yes
Russia October 1 TIMSS Data no yes
Hong Kong January 1 TIMSS Data yes yes
Notes: All cutoff dates have been checked in our data and show a (sharp) discontinuity in average grade around 
the given cutoff. The column ‘Source’ shows whether the cutoff was also shown in other sources. Cutoff dates 
refer to the situation in 1995. The columns ‘TIMSS 9’ and ‘TIMSS 13’ show whether the country was included 
for these tests.
1 Bedard and Dhuey use January 1 as the cutoff date, we deviate based on the data and: http://virtuelleschule.
bmukk.gv.at/fileadmin/folder/Folder_Basisinformationen/school_system_Austria_EN.pdf
2 http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schulpflicht_(Deutschland)
3 http://www.moe.gov.sg/education/
4 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Education_in_South_Korea#Elementary_school
5 http://www.viaa.gov.lv/files/news/1808/educ_in_latvia.pdf
6 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Education_in_Scotland
7 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Education_in_Lithuania
8 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Romanian_educational_system
9 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Education_in_Hungary
10 http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/education/eurydice/documents/eurybase/national_summary_sheets/047_SI_
EN.pdf
11 http://www.onderwijsinspectie.nl/actueel/vraagantwoord#Wie_bepaalt_of_een_kind_overgaat_naar_
groep_3_
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Table 3A.2a: Means of test scores and covariates by age relative to the cutoff for the pooled sam-
ple of 9-year-olds
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-12 549.21 538.68 0.51 0.93 0.75 0.96 0.85 95.94 4999
-11 547.29 536.93 0.51 0.93 0.76 0.95 0.84 96.77 5137
-10 545.45 535.48 0.52 0.93 0.74 0.96 0.84 97.78 5613
-9 543.34 532.30 0.50 0.92 0.76 0.95 0.84 97.69 5664
-8 542.74 532.14 0.51 0.93 0.76 0.95 0.84 97.41 5763
-7 538.04 528.83 0.50 0.93 0.75 0.96 0.84 95.76 5676
-6 538.46 528.05 0.50 0.93 0.76 0.96 0.84 97.62 5707
-5 533.71 522.10 0.49 0.92 0.74 0.96 0.84 95.01 5812
-4 533.02 521.58 0.51 0.93 0.74 0.96 0.84 97.58 5535
-3 529.74 516.15 0.50 0.93 0.72 0.96 0.85 92.75 6099
-2 526.90 515.43 0.50 0.92 0.73 0.95 0.84 95.14 5678
-1 517.61 506.14 0.50 0.93 0.73 0.96 0.85 93.07 5911
0 498.54 494.00 0.51 0.92 0.75 0.96 0.85 97.37 5400
1 489.24 487.23 0.49 0.92 0.74 0.96 0.84 97.33 5266
2 488.91 484.65 0.51 0.92 0.75 0.96 0.84 96.59 5261
3 485.70 483.74 0.49 0.93 0.75 0.96 0.85 98.58 5348
4 481.92 479.15 0.52 0.93 0.74 0.95 0.85 93.91 5431
5 479.01 476.73 0.51 0.92 0.75 0.95 0.84 96.18 5355
6 479.60 475.20 0.49 0.92 0.74 0.95 0.84 96.72 5372
7 474.85 471.19 0.50 0.93 0.72 0.94 0.84 92.73 5200
8 474.75 470.37 0.48 0.92 0.72 0.95 0.84 92.43 5099
9 475.07 466.54 0.49 0.92 0.71 0.95 0.85 93.02 4957
10 473.42 466.33 0.49 0.92 0.70 0.95 0.85 91.21 4436
11 468.58 460.85 0.49 0.93 0.70 0.95 0.84 89.33 4623
Notes: The relative age of the oldest students is -12; relative age 0 means born in the first month at the right side 
of the cut-off data.
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Table 3A.2b: Means of test scores and covariates by age relative to the cutoff for the pooled sam-
ple of 13-year-olds
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-12 518.765 513.228 0.502 0.940 0.827 0.952 0.826 102.198 0.261 0.315 7752
-11 517.974 514.059 0.498 0.939 0.838 0.952 0.832 105.008 0.286 0.342 7701
-10 517.791 513.232 0.501 0.944 0.842 0.955 0.829 106.183 0.282 0.337 8666
-9 518.192 513.094 0.501 0.945 0.849 0.954 0.838 106.671 0.297 0.350 9126
-8 518.042 512.474 0.502 0.947 0.841 0.958 0.827 106.556 0.284 0.334 9329
-7 513.727 508.215 0.505 0.946 0.834 0.959 0.833 104.163 0.285 0.341 9222
-6 515.361 509.274 0.499 0.943 0.837 0.955 0.837 104.889 0.294 0.340 9168
-5 514.537 508.856 0.494 0.946 0.837 0.959 0.841 106.206 0.300 0.354 9256
-4 512.667 505.842 0.497 0.944 0.832 0.954 0.840 106.218 0.293 0.340 9233
-3 511.510 504.443 0.492 0.949 0.831 0.959 0.838 105.772 0.295 0.345 9160
-2 509.452 503.850 0.491 0.948 0.835 0.954 0.838 104.219 0.285 0.333 8747
-1 505.535 500.905 0.498 0.950 0.822 0.957 0.843 102.909 0.289 0.354 9191
0 500.315 489.859 0.490 0.949 0.839 0.954 0.837 104.547 0.307 0.357 8563
1 499.595 488.652 0.499 0.952 0.838 0.957 0.844 106.647 0.307 0.351 7883
2 496.908 487.421 0.486 0.954 0.845 0.958 0.843 107.520 0.316 0.368 8364
3 495.877 484.989 0.490 0.955 0.841 0.958 0.843 107.507 0.313 0.362 8422
4 493.663 482.046 0.490 0.949 0.836 0.962 0.844 106.720 0.297 0.358 8403
5 493.269 482.782 0.494 0.959 0.842 0.962 0.846 108.773 0.316 0.364 7926
6 493.782 480.746 0.479 0.956 0.838 0.961 0.846 107.214 0.313 0.362 8156
7 492.918 481.231 0.483 0.954 0.836 0.964 0.843 106.992 0.325 0.383 7962
8 492.970 480.117 0.488 0.954 0.824 0.963 0.847 108.596 0.324 0.377 7906
9 493.018 478.652 0.481 0.954 0.823 0.967 0.851 107.079 0.312 0.361 7316
10 491.793 479.242 0.477 0.955 0.831 0.959 0.852 106.122 0.309 0.361 7052
11 488.953 478.188 0.467 0.959 0.815 0.967 0.858 105.302 0.308 0.368 6634
Notes: The relative age of the oldest students is -12; relative age 0 means born in the first month at the right side 
of the cut-off data. High educational level is defined as having some vocational education or more.
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Table 3A.3a: Balancing tests for 9-year-olds
Effectsonvariable
Effectsondummy=1ifvariableis
missing
±3months ±6months ±3months ±6months
Effectofbeingbornleftof 
thecutoffdateon: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Female -0.00644 0.00189 0.00106 0.000600
(0.0117) (0.00757) (0.00123) (0.000932)
N 33502 66560 33615 66803
Born in country of test 0.00681 0.00311 -0.00254 -0.000786
(0.00603) (0.00432) (0.00289) (0.00221)
N 30798 61120 33615 66803
Language at home is 
 language of test 0.0121 0.00229 0.00277 0.00351
(0.00994) (0.00687) (0.00664) (0.00513)
N 24666 49050 33615 66803
Living with father -0.00613 0.000481 0.00213 -0.000342
(0.00855) (0.00576) (0.00326) (0.00240)
N 30575 60559 33615 66803
Living with mother 0.000436 -0.00503 0.000197 -0.000594
(0.00464) (0.00309) (0.00277) (0.00219)
N 30702 60793 33615 66803
Number of books at home -0.525 -0.914 -0.00340 -0.00851**
(1.733) (1.254) (0.00492) (0.00340)
N 29706 58884 33615 66803
Notes: Each cell shows the estimation results of a separate regression of the covariate on a dummy for being 
born at the left side of the cut-off and a linear function of age. All models include country dummies and interac-
tions of these dummies with the age function which differs at either side of the cutoff. The dependent variable 
in columns (3) and (4) is a dummy for having a missing value on the relevant covariate.
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Table 3A.3b: Balancing tests for 13-year-olds
Effectsonvariable
Effectsondummy=1ifvariableis
missing
±3months ±6months ±3months ±6months
Effectofbeingbornleftof
thecutoffdateon: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Female 0.00222 0.00194 -0.00193*** -0.00125***
(0.00996) (0.00636) (0.000690) (0.000452)
N 51839 104162 51908 104316
Born in country of test -0.00279 -0.00257 0.00118 0.000752
(0.00414) (0.00273) (0.00185) (0.00127)
N 47727 95783 51908 104316
Language at home is  language of 
test -0.000758 -0.00226 -0.00927* -0.00736**
(0.00613) (0.00424) (0.00485) (0.00370)
N 45561 91554 51908 104316
Living with father -0.00368 -0.00240 0.00180 -0.00121
(0.00693) (0.00467) (0.00231) (0.00157)
N 48507 97408 51908 104316
Living with mother -0.000945 0.000630 -0.000108 -0.00186
(0.00365) (0.00255) (0.00187) (0.00128)
N 48725 97833 51908 104316
Number of books at home -1.159 -0.871 -0.00105 -0.00117
(1.362) (0.913) (0.00219) (0.00148)
N 48536 97463 51908 104316
High educated mother -0.0102 -0.0150*** -0.00740 -0.0173***
(0.00872) (0.00576) (0.00786) (0.00498)
N 35683 71869 51908 104316
High educated father 0.00549 -0.00569 -0.00229 -0.0102**
(0.0103) (0.00694) (0.00745) (0.00505)
N 34732 69875 51908 104316
Notes: Each cell shows the estimation results of a separate regression of the covariate on a dummy for being 
born at the left side of the cut-off and a linear function of age. All models include country dummies and interac-
tions of these dummies with the age function which differs at either side of the cutoff. The dependent variable 
in columns (3) and (4) is a dummy for having a missing value on the relevant covariate.
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Appendix:samplingbiasadjustment
Table 3A.4 illustrates the sampling bias adjustment. For instance, we do not observe 
retained students born in the first month at the right side of the cut-off date (relative age=0). 
 However, we do observe retained students born one year earlier (relative age = -12). We 
adjust the scores of these students and include them in the main estimation sample. The 
adjusted score is obtained by:
Hence, for the missing students with relative age=0 we get: 492.40*439.79/553.60=492.4
0*0.79=391.17.
Adjusted Scores for missing accelerated students are similarly obtained:
To obtain estimates that are adjusted for sampling bias we perform this adjustment for 
each separate month  for missing delayed students, and [ ]6 1∈ − −i ,  for missing 
accelerated students.
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Table 3A.4: Fraction on track and average test scores of those on track and not on track (delayed 
or accelerated) for TIMMS 9. l=left of the cutoff, r=right of the cutoff
rel.age(l) ontrack(l)
mathontrack
(l)
math delayed 
(l)
science on 
track(l)
science 
delayed(l) N
-12 0.96 553.60 439.79 543.00 431.11 4999
-11 0.95 552.02 447.80 541.93 431.64 5137
-10 0.96 550.33 435.40 540.32 426.11 5613
-9 0.95 548.72 450.66 537.28 446.69 5664
-8 0.94 548.59 449.64 537.74 443.10 5763
-7 0.94 543.89 449.54 534.36 445.10 5676
-6 0.93 546.16 442.95 535.30 438.11 5707
-5 0.91 540.77 461.40 528.43 457.27 5812
-4 0.90 541.75 453.36 529.38 450.50 5535
-3 0.86 542.77 450.16 527.61 446.10 6099
-2 0.85 538.12 464.04 524.60 464.07 5678
-1 0.79 532.37 462.32 518.05 461.56 5911
rel.age(r) ontrack(r)
mathontrack
(r)
math 
accelerated(r)
science on 
track(r)
science acce-
lerated(r) N
0 0.88 492.40 544.92 488.86 532.84 5400
1 0.94 485.58 541.89 484.26 530.05 5266
2 0.96 487.53 525.59 483.54 514.22 5261
3 0.98 484.87 518.83 483.14 507.47 5348
4 0.98 481.18 520.73 478.69 503.52 5431
5 0.98 478.50 507.47 476.18 507.22 5355
6 0.99 479.26 507.59 474.97 494.04 5372
7 0.99 474.46 502.53 470.97 486.76 5200
8 0.99 474.63 483.30 470.19 483.32 5099
9 0.98 474.50 507.13 465.99 497.18 4957
10 0.99 473.45 471.19 466.38 461.11 4436
11 0.99 468.39 483.51 460.52 487.32 4623
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Table 3A.5a: Estimated gains in achievement by assignment variable (birth month/birth day) for 
9-year olds. 3 days around the cutoff excluded when using birth day as assignment vari-
able
Math Science
birth month birth day birth month birth day
Ranking Country gain N  gain N  gain N  gain N
1 Norway 43.3 (7.4) 2133  - -  38.8 (8.5) 2133  - -
2 Singapore 40.0 (5.2) 6986 38.3 (5.2) 6855 27.8 (4.9) 6986 26.3 (4.9) 6855
3 Greece 36.3 (6.7) 2981  33.4 (11.2) 1055  21.7 (6.5) 2981  23.0 (11.0) 1055
4 Iceland 34.6 (9.5) 1702  34.2 (9.2) 1474  30.9 (8.4) 1702  26.6 (9.0) 1474
5 Iran 33.3 (7.1) 2716 - - 35.9 (6.8) 2716 - -
6 Cyprus 30.5 (6.4) 3230 34.3 (6.5) 3167 20.4 (5.8) 3230 23.7 (5.6) 3167
7 Japan 28.6 (5.4) 4343  31.6 (5.3) 4268  19.1 (5.3) 4343  21.3 (5.4) 4268
8 Czech Republic 26.9 (6.9) 3108  28.2 (7.4) 2777  16.9 (6.5) 3108  14.3 (7.4) 2777
9 Canada 24.4 (5.1) 7436  - -  21.7 (4.8) 7436  - -
10 Netherlands 23.6 (6.8) 2241 21.5 (6.6) 2195 13.9 (6.7) 2241 11.0 (6.9) 2195
11 Hungary 23.4 (7.8) 2743 28.8 (8.0) 2590 26.7 (7.0) 2743 30.1 (7.6) 2590
12 Hong Kong 22.0 (5.6) 3851 22.0 (5.5) 3724 16.3 (5.0) 3851 17.0 (5.1) 3724
13 Austria 21.9 (7.4) 2315  22.0 (7.8) 2263  11.4 (8.1) 2315  11.2 (8.1) 2263
14 South-Korea 21.3 (6.5) 2636 24.2 (6.5) 2570 12.8 (6.4) 2636 16.0 (6.8) 2570
15 Scotland 20.1 (6.6) 3089 18.5 (7.1) 2593 12.9 (7.2) 3089 7.3 (7.8) 2593
16 Portugal 17.7 (7.3) 2310  16.6 (7.5) 2185  17.9 (8.9) 2310  17.9 (8.8) 2185
17 England 13.5 (7.1) 3087  - -  12.9 (9.2) 3087  - -
18 Slovenia 12.7 (7.3) 2484 14.5 (7.3) 2416 7.6 (7.1) 2484 9.4 (7.1) 2416
19 Latvia 6.9 (7.8) 2116 5.4 (8.5) 1906 3.0 (9.0) 2116 3.0 (9.1) 1906
20 New Zealand 2.7 (7.6) 2459  4.4 (7.6) 2405  3.8 (8.4) 2459  5.9 (8.2) 2405
21 Thailand -0.4 (6.2) 2837  13.5 (6.3) 2558  -5.1 (6.0) 2837  7.1 (6.1) 2558
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Table 3A.5b: Estimated gains in achievement by assignment variable (birth month/birth day) for 
13-year-olds. 3 days around the cutoff excluded when using birth day as assignment 
variable
Math Science
birth month birth day birth month birth day
Ranking Country gain N  gain N gain N  gain N
1 Singapore 27.8 (4.6) 3567 26.8 (4.9) 3502 55.9 (5.9) 3567 55.0 (6.2) 3502
2 Sweden 19.1 (5.4) 3403  16.6 (5.5) 3235 25.2 (5.5) 3403  23.3 (5.7) 3235
3 Italy 18.5 (8.3) 2186  16.1 (8.4) 2142 15.0 (8.0) 2186  12.1 (8.0) 2142
4 Norway 18.2 (6.2) 2751  - - 22.1 (6.7) 2751  - -
5 Iran 15.5 (7.1) 2495 - - 7.7 (6.9) 2495 - -
6 Czech Republic 15.5 (5.6) 3248  14.4 (5.8) 3162 9.1 (5.6) 3248  8.0 (5.8) 3162
7 Spain 13.6 (5.7) 3157  14.6 (5.9) 3084 10.9 (5.9) 3157  11.6 (6.0) 3084
8 Iceland 13.5 (7.2) 1834  11.8 (7.6) 1641 17.1 (7.4) 1834  14.0 (7.9) 1641
9 South-Korea 13.1 (6.5) 2912 13.8 (6.8) 2857 10.7 (6.2) 2912 11.8 (6.3) 2857
10 Denmark 12.1 (7.3) 2096  15.2 (7.7) 2000 8.3 (8.2) 2096  10.8 (8.5) 2000
11 Canada 9.9 (3.6) 7733  - - 3.2 (4.4) 7733  - -
12 Latvia 9.9 (7.4) 2334 9.1 (7.6) 2263 23.2 (7.6) 2334 24.2 (8.0) 2263
13 Scotland 9.9 (6.6) 2824 8.5 (7.1) 2457 12.7 (7.1) 2824 9.4 (7.7) 2457
14 Thailand 9.7 (4.9) 5232 8.3 (4.8) 5120 11.1 (3.8) 5232 10.1 (4.2) 5120
15 Cyprus 9.5 (8.1) 2837 6.5 (8.4) 2772 14.7 (7.8) 2837 12.5 (8.1) 2772
16 Slovak  
Republic
8.6 (5.5) 3475  9.3 (5.5) 3385 11.9 (5.8) 3475  10.5 (5.9) 3385
17 Belgium (French) 7.1 (6.8) 1872  6.8 (7.2) 1778 11.5 (7.7) 1872  11.9 (7.9) 1778
18 Switzerland 6.7 (4.3) 3727 5.4 (4.4) 3595 8.7 (5.5) 3727 8.9 (6.0) 3595
19 Japan 4.8 (4.6) 5158  3.7 (4.7) 5075 14.1 (4.5) 5158  13.7 (4.8) 5075
20 Greece 3.0 (6.3) 3543  14.4 (10.2) 1484 5.9 (6.8) 3543  12.6 (10.4) 1484
21 Belgium  
(Flemish)
2.8 (4.8) 2622  2.8 (5.0) 2479 12.2 (5.4) 2622  13.0 (5.5) 2479
22 Lithuania 2.6 (7.3) 2590 2.2 (7.7) 2531 17.6 (7.5) 2590 19.2 (7.8) 2531
23 Romania 2.2 (6.3) 3504 -1.8 (6.4) 3305 2.0 (6.8) 3504 -3.8 (7.3) 3305
24 Russia 1.9 (5.7) 3855 1.1 (5.9) 3780 14.9 (6.6) 3855 14.5 (6.7) 3780
25 Hungary 0.5 (5.8) 2887 2.4 (6.0) 2827 4.0 (6.0) 2887 6.0 (6.1) 2827
26 Portugal 0.4 (5.8) 2579  1.5 (5.9) 2532 13.4 (7.5) 2579  15.2 (7.6) 2532
27 Germany -0.1 (6.4) 2447 - - -0.4 (7.4) 2447 - -
28 Slovenia -0.8 (6.3) 2688 1.0 (6.4) 2646 -10.3 (6.5) 2688 -9.3 (6.6) 2646
29 France -2.6 (6.7) 2159  -1.0 (7.0) 2121 2.0 (6.6) 2159  3.7 (6.7) 2121
30 Austria -3.6 (6.0) 2569  -6.1 (6.2) 2498 1.1 (6.8) 2569  -0.4 (7.0) 2498
31 New Zealand -4.7 (6.0) 3432  -3.4 (6.3) 3333 -3.4 (6.7) 3432  0.2 (7.1) 3333
32 Netherlands -5.7 (6.5) 1770 -4.1 (6.8) 1677 5.5 (7.2) 1770 6.6 (7.6) 1677
33 Hong Kong -7.1 (6.3) 2996 -6.7 (6.4) 2895 -2.2 (6.7) 2996 -0.6 (7.0) 2895
34 England -9.0 (9.4) 1834  -11.3 (9.9) 1635 1.8 (9.0) 1834  -1.7 (9.7) 1635
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Abstract
This chapter evaluates the effects of the raising of the minimum school leaving age (ROSLA) 
from 14 to 15 in the Netherlands in 1971. The policy goal was to increase the number of 
high school graduates. The analysis shows that the change led to a decrease in the high 
school dropout rate of approximately 20%. However, there were no benefits in terms of 
employment or higher wages. I investigate several explanations for this finding and pre-
sent suggestive evidence in support of a skill-based explanation that no more labor-market 
relevant skills were learned during this extra year of school compared to those skills previ-
ously learned out of school.
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4.1 Introduction
Changes in compulsory schooling laws have often been used by policymakers to increase 
the educational level of the population, in particular for those in the left tail of the ability 
distribution. Typically, these changes come in the form of rises in the minimum school leav-
ing age, such as the rise from 14 to 15 in the UK in 1947 or from 14 to 16 in France in 1967. 
The most prominent argument for implementing these changes is that this would improve 
the labor market prospects for those considered to underinvest in schooling. However, the 
literature that evaluates the effects of changes in compulsory schooling laws shows that 
these changes do not always lead to better labor-market outcomes. Whereas studies that 
use Anglo-Saxon data find positive returns to increases in compulsory schooling, studies 
that use data from continental European countries find no returns.40 This puzzling result has 
led researchers to speculate about what explains the differences between these countries. 
One explanation is that it matters whether labor-market relevant skills are learned in the 
additional year, as these skills are important for later labour market outcomes (Pischke and 
von Wachter, 2008; Oosterbeek and Webbink, 2007). Another explanation is that it matters 
whether the additional year is accompanied by certification (Grenet, 2013).
The aim of this chapter is to explore this puzzling result further by evaluating a change in 
a compulsory schooling law that was specifically targeted at increasing the number of high 
school graduates. If certification is the leading explanation, an increase in the number of 
high school graduates should result in higher earnings and a better labor market position. If 
it matters what type of skills are learned in school, this has not necessarily to occur: when 
no relevant labor-market skills are learned but only a certificate is obtained (for example 
for the acquisition of other type of skills), an additional year in school may not result in 
higher earnings or a better labor market position.
To this end, I exploit the raising of minimum school leaving age from 14 to 15 in the 
Netherlands. The policy goal of this reform was to enable low ability students to obtain 
a high school diploma. The change in the compulsory schooling law was implemented in 
1971 to make the duration of compulsory education equivalent to the duration necessary 
to complete the lowest track of secondary school. It extended the duration of compulsory 
schooling from 8 to 9 years without changing the curriculum. Because at that time the 
Netherlands applied a school entry rule with a cutoff date set at the first of October, I am 
able to estimate the impact of this change in a regression discontinuity design. Individuals 
40 See Section 4.2 for a short review of this literature.
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born on or after 1 October 1956 were the first to be affected by the change in the law. By 
using data on the educational level, and labor market position I can compare the outcomes 
of those born around this date. I exploit a unique dataset that includes information on 
earnings and employment over the period 2000-2009 and on social welfare benefits since 
the fifteenth birth day of the respondents. This enables me to estimate effects on these 
outcomes over a period that spans the respondents working life.
I find that the change led to a significant decrease in the high school dropout rate of 
approximately 20%. However, I do not find benefits in terms of employment or higher 
wages when the population is aged 43-53. I explore several explanations for this finding, 
and give some suggestive evidence in support of the skill-based explanation similar to that 
of Pischke and von Wachter (2008) that no more labor-market relevant skills were learned 
during this extra year of school compared to those skills previously learned out of school. I 
show that the change also did not lead to gains in literacy skills or labor market outcomes 
other than earnings.
I contribute to the current literature in two ways. First, I give a new piece of evidence 
that increases in compulsory education do not lead to better labor market outcomes. This 
is important as they are often considered as an effective policy to improve the labor market 
position of students of low ability. Second, I show that the differences in returns between 
countries are not necessarily explained by certification. In both the UK and the Netherlands 
the raising of the minimum school leaving led to more certificates, but only for the UK 
the change also led to higher earnings. Moreover, the UK- reform did also lead to better 
(literacy) skills whereas the Dutch reform did not. This suggests that differences between 
countries are more likely to be explained by differences in the type of skills learned in an 
additional year in school than by differences in certification.
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section I discuss the 
previous studies. Section 4.3 provides additional information on the reform. In Section 4.4 I 
give a description of the data. Section 4.5 illustrates the empirical strategy and Section 4.6 
shows results. In Section 4.7 I explore several explanations for the main findings, and Sec-
tion 4.8 concludes.
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4.2 Related literature
This section discusses the literature that estimates the (financial) returns to changes in 
compulsory schooling laws.41 In particular I focus on the returns to educations literature 
that uses increases in the minimum school leaving age as instrument for schooling in a Min-
cerian wage equation. However, I will not focus on the returns to schooling, but rather on 
the direct impact of the change of the law on earnings. This impact is implicitly estimated 
in reduced form regressions where an outcome for earnings is regressed on the instrument 
(for example a dummy for a birth cohort that has been first affected by the change in the 
law). I do so because the aim of this chapter is to investigate what the effects are of changes 
in compulsory schooling laws, not what the effects are of extra schooling. Moreover, I focus 
on studies that use credible exogenous variation in the timing of implementation of these 
laws to estimate this impact. As pointed out by Grenet (2013) these studies use ‘this type 
of variation across states or regions within a difference-in-difference framework or studies 
in which smoothly is controlled for the evolution of education and earnings across cohorts 
in a regression-discontinuity design’. This means, for example, that they adequately control 
for a smooth function in birth cohort when using the change of the compulsory schooling 
law as instrument for schooling. Hence, the reported effects below are the reduced form 
estimates from the returns to education literature with credible research designs. I will dis-
tinguish between Anglo-Saxon countries and continental European countries because the 
findings differ between these countries.
Anglo-Saxon countries
For the UK, USA and Canada positive returns have been found to changes in compulsory 
schooling. One of the reforms that have been studied most is the raising of the minimum 
school leaving age from 14 to 15 in the United Kingdom in 1947. This reform affected a 
large part of the British population and increased the number of years of schooling on 
average by about 0.4 years. This reform has been exploited by Oreopoulos (2006) and 
Devereux and Hart (2010) to estimate the returns to schooling. Depending on the specifi-
cation and outcome measure used (log hourly wages or annual/weekly earnings), reduced 
form  estimates of the effects of this change range from 1 to 7%. In addition, Grenet (2013) 
41 There is also a large and fast growing body of research that uses changes of compulsory school-
ing laws to estimate its impact on outcomes of cognitive and non-cognitive skills, subjective 
well-being, health, crime, teenage childbearing and political involvement, see for example 
 Grenet (2013) for a recent overview of this literature. 
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 evaluates the effects of the raising of the minimum school leaving age from 15 to 16 in 1972 
for the same country. He finds that this reform increased the average number of schooling 
years by about 0.3 years and that estimated returns are in the order of 2% using the log 
hourly wage as outcome measure. An important difference between the 1947-reform and 
the 1972-reform is that the latter was accompanied by certification,42 whereas the former 
was not.
For the United States and Canada changes in the minimum school leaving age from 14 
to 15 have been exploited by Oreopoulos (2006). He finds that the impact of these changes 
affected a smaller part of the population than in the UK as they increased the number of 
years of schooling on average by about 0.1 years. Estimated returns are also somewhat 
smaller and range between 1-2%.
Continental European countries
For Sweden, Germany, France and the Netherlands no returns are found to similar changes 
in compulsory schooling. Meghir and Palme (2005) evaluate a social experiment in Sweden 
where compulsory schooling was increased from seven or eight to nine years. Overall the 
change increased the years of schooling by about 0.3 years, but did not have an impact on 
earnings. Pischke and von Wachter (2008) use the extension of the duration of the basic 
vocational track by one additional year in Germany just after the Second World War. They 
find that the change increased the years of schooling by about 0.2 years but document zero 
returns. Grenet (2013) finds no returns for France, exploiting the Bedoin reform that was 
adopted in 1959, which raised the minimum school leaving age from 14 to 16 in 1967 and 
increased the years of schooling by about 0.3 years. Oosterbeek and Webbink (2007) find 
no returns to an extra year of basic vocational education in the Netherlands in which the 
extra year was accompanied by an increase of the minimum school leaving age from 15 to 
16 in 1975.
These European studies show that it is not obvious that increases in duration of com-
pulsory schooling would improve labour market outcomes. Moreover, the studies show a 
remarkable difference between the Anglo-Saxon countries and the countries from conti-
nental Europe. In the literature two different explanations are given for these differences. 
A first explanation, given by Grenet, is that it matters whether the additional year in school 
is accompanied by certification. Another explanation, given by Piscke and von Wachter, is 
42 Especially the number of junior secondary schooling certificates increased due to the 
1972-reform, see Grenet (2013).
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that it matters whether relevant labor-market skills are learned. The aim of this chapter is 
to explore this issue further by exploiting a reform in the Netherlands that was specifically 
targeted at increasing the number of high school certificates. If certification is the leading 
explanation, an increase in the number of high school certificates should result in higher 
earnings and a better labor market position. If it matters what type of skills have been 
learned in school, this has not necessarily to occur: when no relevant (labor-market) skills 
are learned but only a certificate is obtained, an additional year in school may not result in 
higher earnings or a better labor market position.
It is important to note that the reform studied in this chapter is different from the one 
studied by Oosterbeek and Webbink. Whereas they exploit the extension of the duration 
of the basic vocational track by one year in 1975 which was accompanied by the rise of the 
minimum school leaving age from 15 to 16, I exploit the 1971-rise of the minimum school 
leaving age from 14 to 15 which was not accompanied by a change in the length or content 
of the curriculum. Hence, the curriculum remained the same in the 1971-reform.
4.3 Reform&institutionalbackground
The compulsory schooling law was changed in 1971, with the argument that the years of 
compulsory schooling needed to be adapted to the ‘current requirements that society 
imposes upon those who will participate in the labor market’ (Memorie van Toelichting, 
1968). The duration of compulsory education was extended from 8 to 9 years. This was 
equivalent to raising the minimum school leaving age from 14 to 15 as the starting age of 
compulsory schooling remained unchanged at six.43 The reason for the change was that 
the old law, with 8 years of compulsory schooling, did not cover the complete duration of 
any track that would lead to a secondary school certificate. Primary school took 6 years, 
and finishing the lowest track of secondary school took at least another 3 years. Hence, a 
minimum of 9 years was required to obtain a high school diploma. The policy document 
that addressed the preparation of the law stated this in the following way: “One of the 
basic ideas [...] is that after six years of primary school every pupil should have the possibil-
ity to receive both general and vocational education that suits his abilities and capacities 
the best as possible. To realize this idea, it is therefore necessary to extent the duration of 
43 More formally, the rule stated that a student had to go to school in the school year in which he 
became 7 years old.
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 compulsory schooling, as receiving a certificate of the lowest vocational track in secondary 
school (LBO) takes at least 3 years’’ (Memorie van Toelichting 1968).
At that time, the Dutch secondary education system was a highly differentiated system. 
After six years of primary school, students (aged 12) were tracked into one of the four 
tracks of the secondary school system. These tracks can be considered as different levels 
of education. The two lowest tracks, LBO and MAVO, offered students a basic vocational 
program. Finishing these tracks took at least 3 years.44 The third track (HAVO) prepared 
students for high vocational training and took 5 years. The highest track (VWO) gave access 
to university and took 6 years.
The main purpose of the policy change was to enable students, who otherwise would 
have dropped out of school, to obtain a high school diploma. These students were in par-
ticular (low ability) students who after eight years in school were either in one of the two 
lowest tracks of the secondary school system (LBO or MAVO) or still in primary school 
because of (multiple) retention (Memorie van Toelichting 1968). The individuals who were 
first affected by the new law were born in October 1956: they were 14 years old at the end 
of the school year 1970/1971 and had to stay one year longer in school than individuals 
born before that date. This October cutoff was based on the rights and obligations for stu-
dents to enroll in primary school. The Appendix will provide more information on this rule.
The result of the increase in the minimum school leaving age was an increase in the high 
school completion rate. Figure 4.1 shows the relationship between high school completion 
and birth month. Each dot represents the fraction that completed high school (y-axis) for 
a cohort of individuals born in a given month (x-axis). The cohort of students that was first 
affected by the law, the cohort born in October 1956 has been rescaled to 0. The discon-
tinuity in the high school completion rate is visible at that point; the rate suddenly rises 
by 2 percentage points, from 90% to 92%. This suggests that the change in compulsory 
schooling law resulted in a decrease in the high school dropout rate from 10% to 8%, which 
means a reduction of school dropout by 20%. In the remainder of this chapter, I will use 
this discontinuity to estimate the returns to the change in the compulsory schooling law in 
a regressions discontinuity framework.
44 Until 1975 around half of all graduates from Dutch basic vocational schools finished a 3-years 
program, the other half finished a 4 years program. In 1975 all 3 years programs were extended 
to four years. This change is studied by Oosterbeek & Webbink (2007).
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Figure 4.1: High school completion by birth month
Each dot represents the fraction that completed high school for a cohort of individuals born in a given month. 
The x-axis ranges from October 1951 (-60) to September 1960 (59). The cohort born in October 1956 is repre-
sented by 0 on the x-axis. Quadratic polynomial fitted at either side of the cutoff.
4.4 Empirical strategy
The aim of the empirical strategy is to estimate the causal effect of the change in the com-
pulsory schooling law on education and labor market outcomes. I exploit the cutoff date 
of 1 October 1956 to estimate this impact. By using data on date of birth, education and 
labor-market position I can compare the outcomes of those born around this date. That is, 
I am able to evaluate the effect of the change in the compulsory schooling law in a regres-
sion discontinuity (RD)-framework (see Oreoupoulos, 2006; or Grenet, 2013, for examples).
The basic assumptions in RD-models are that individuals on both sides of the cutoff are 
very similar and that the relationship between date of birth and the outcome is smooth 
around the discontinuity. I follow the standard approach as proposed by Lee and Lemieux 
(2010) by estimating the following equation for each outcome ,
(4.1) 
TXC 20140722 Gerritsen.indd   99 11-8-2014   15:14:24
Chapter 4
100
Herein is  a dummy for being born on or after 1 October 1956 and  a smooth-
ing polynomial of order g in birth month , with =0 referring to October 1956. I include a 
linear (g=1), square (g=2), cubic (g=3), quartic (g=4), quintic (g=5) and sextic (g=6) function 
of  in my models and interactions of  with this function ( ). By 
including the interactions I allow the polynomial to be different at either side of the cutoff. 
By increasing the order, the polynomial should become flexible enough to pick up non-
linear age effects.45 In the analysis I will use the Akaike Information Criterion to choose the 
optimal order of the polynomial (see Lee and Lemieux, 2010).  is a vector of dummies for 
gender and ethnicity. Equation (4.1) is estimated by OLS and standard errors are adjusted 
for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the birth month level. The main parameter of inter-
est is  which represents the effect of the change in the compulsory schooling law, i.e. 
the effect of being born after the cutoff date implying 9 years of compulsory schooling in 
stead of 8 years. I can only interpret this coefficient as such if I may assume that the cohorts 
born on or after 1 October 1956 are not confronted with other changes in laws or regula-
tions compared to those born before this date. To my knowledge there were no other laws 
implemented that affected this birth cohort.
4.5 Data
The data for the analysis come from the Dutch Labour Market Panel (Arbeidsmarktpanel, 
Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek), which is a large panel dataset constructed by Statistics 
Netherlands. The sample is representative for the Dutch population. It contains informa-
tion about the labor-market position of about 1.2 million Dutch inhabitants over the years 
1999-2009. The data contain information on completed education, date of birth, income, 
employment, and social security dependency. I restrict the sample to those individuals who 
are born between October 1946 and September 1966. This means I have 10 year cohorts 
born before October 1956 and 10 after. This yields a sample of approximately 390,000 
observations. In the analysis I will exploit all years except 1999 because no information on 
gross hourly wage is available for this year. Also, I focus the analysis on the period 2006-
45 Assuming that E[ | ], the conditional expectation of the unobserved determinants of  given 
the birth month, is continuous, we can approximate it by a polynomial of order g, and the 
approximation will become arbitrarily accurate as g goes to infinity ( ) (Cellini et al., 
2010).
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2009 because for the earlier years there are more missing values on this variable.46 Other 
outcomes (see below) have been consistently measured over the period 2000-2009.
In the main analysis, I use as dependent variables three measures: (1) high school com-
pletion (2) a dummy for whether the respondent is employed in a given year and (3) log 
gross hourly wage in a given year. High school completion is a dummy that equals 1 if the 
respondent completed at least the lowest track of secondary school, LBO (equivalent to 9.5 
years of formal schooling)47 and 0 if the respondent only finished primary school (equiv-
alent to 6 years of formal schooling). I use this variable rather than completed years of 
schooling because the aim of the law was to enable students to obtain a high school certifi-
cate in the lowest tracks of secondary school. The second measure, a dummy for working, 
is used because for low ability students one of the benefits of having a high school degree 
is that they are able to acquire a job rather than to earn more conditional on having a job.
Besides these main outcomes I will use dummies for being self-employed, and dummies 
for participation in social welfare, unemployment and disability benefits. In addition, I will 
use three labor-market related measures that cover a larger period of the respondents 
working life. A special feature of the Dutch Labor Market Panel is that it provides informa-
tion about 1) the number of years that people had a paid job since age 15, 2) the number 
of years they were unemployed since age 15 and 3) the number of years they received dis-
ability benefits since age 15. These outcomes were obtained by surveys in which respond-
ents were asked to retrospectively evaluate their employment status since their fifteenth 
birthday. These variables will be exploited in Section 4.7 when I look at the impact of the 
change on these outcomes.
As independent variable I use a dummy that equals 1 if the respondent is born on or 
after 1 October 1956 (hence aged 53 years or less in 2009) and 0 if he/she is born before 
that date.
Also, covariates are added to the models. In a regression discontinuity framework the 
most important covariate is the ‘assignment’ or ‘running’ variable. In my case, this is birth 
month. I rescale the birth month of the cohort that was first affected by the law to zero. 
That is, I assign a zero to the individuals born in October 1956. This means that those born 
in September 1956, August 1956 are assigned -1, -2, etcetera, and those born in November 
46 I loose about half the number of observations for hourly wage over the period 2000-2005 
which may raise concerns about the representativeness of this sample. 
47 Based on the fact that about half of students finished a 3-year track and the other half a 4-year 
track in secondary education at that time. Hence, 6+(3+4)/2=6+3.5=9.5.
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1956, December 1956 are assigned 1, 2 and so on (as in figure 4.1). Other covariates in the 
models are ethnicity and gender.
In table 4.I, I present descriptive statistics (i.e. averages) of the main outcomes and 
covariates for each birth cohort born between October of a given year and September 
next year. The discontinuity in high school completion is clearly visible: the rate rises from 
0.90 to 0.92 if one switches from the year-cohort born before the cutoff date to the cohort 
born thereafter. However, there seems not to be a discontinuity in log gross hourly wage 
and employment; the values of these variables after the cutoff date are not much different 
from those before. This suggests that the change in the law did not have an impact on these 
outcomes.
4.6 Theimpactofthereformoneducation,employmentandearnings
This section presents the estimates of the impact of the raising of the minimum school 
leaving age from 14 to 15 on high school completion, employment and earnings based on 
equation (4.1). It consists of two parts. In the first part the main estimates are shown for 
the outcomes measured in the last year of my dataset, 2009 (when the respondents born in 
October 1956 are about 53 years old). With the outcomes from this year various robustness 
analyses are performed with two estimation samples, the total sample and the low track 
sample, see below. In the second part estimates are given for each year over the period 
2000-2009 for both estimation samples using the preferred specification. Hence, in this 
part I estimate the impact of the change in the law separately on the 2000-outcome, the 
2001-outcome, 2002-outcome and so forth. These estimates will give the complete earn-
ings and employment profiles for the population aged 43-53.
Part I: the effect of the reform on 2009-outcomes, total sample
Table 4.II presents estimates of the change of the compulsory schooling law on high school 
completion (panel A), employment (panel B), and earnings (panel C)48 for the total sample. 
Columns (1)-(6) include a linear, square, cubic, quartic, quintic and sextic function of birth 
month respectively. At the bottom of each panel the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) 
is reported which is a goodness-of-fit test on which we base the order of the polynomial 
that should be included. The lower the AIC, the better the fit is. In almost all analyses this 
48 The estimation sample for earnings is smaller than for being employed, because information on 
earnings is only available for employed individuals.
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 statistic is smallest for third degree polynomials or higher. This indicates that at least a cubic 
should be included to let the polynomial to be flexible enough for our RD-design.49 Hence, 
results based on linear and squares in birth month should not be considered reliable.
Panel A shows that the rise of the minimum school leaving age from 14 to 15 significantly 
increased the level of schooling. The estimates are robust to the inclusion of different orders 
of the birth month polynomial. Based on the most flexible specification in column (6), I find 
that the fraction of individuals that obtained a high school certificate has increased with 
about 1.8 percentage points. This is equivalent to an increase of about 0.1 years of school-
ing, which is about the same size as the impact of the changes in compulsory schooling laws 
on education in Canada and the USA (see Section 4.2). However, in contrast to these Anglo-
Saxon countries the change in the compulsory schooling law did not lead to an increase in 
earnings or a higher probability of being employed in 2009. The estimated coefficients in 
panels B and C are precise, close to zero and insignificant. For earnings the estimated coef-
ficients are even negative in all specifications; the point estimate in column (5) indicates 
that the change in the law decreased income by 1%. Hence, the change in the compulsory 
schooling law caused an increase in the level of schooling but did not lead to higher wages.
Part I: the effect of the reform on 2009-outcomes, low track sample
The purpose of the change in the law was to enable low ability students to obtain a high 
school certificate. These students were in particular students who after eight years of 
schooling were in one of the two lowest tracks of the secondary school system, LBO or 
MAVO. Hence, one may expect that this group would benefit most from the new law. One 
way of investigating this is to look at the instrumental variables estimates of the returns to 
high school completion. They would give the returns to high school completion for those 
who comply with the change, such that one could obtain an idea of whether those affected 
would have (financially) benefited from the change of the law. These estimates are eas-
ily obtained by dividing the reduced form coefficients in panels B or C by the first stage 
49 The estimated coefficients of the polynomial are highly significant when using a linear or square 
function of birth month. The estimated coefficients turn insignificant when including a third 
order or higher.
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Table 4.II: Estimated effects on 2009-outcomes, total sample
Panel A Dependentvariable:highschoolcompletion
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dummy for individual born 
in or after October 1956 0.0105*** 0.0142*** 0.0178*** 0.0156*** 0.0154*** 0.0183***
(0.00180) (0.00271) (0.00346) (0.00412) (0.00497) (0.00578)
Birth month controls linear square cubic quartic quintic sextic
Observations 387532 387532 387532 387532 387532 387532
R-squared 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.055
Akaike Information  Criterion 
(AIC) 122084.5 122084.1 122081.7 122084.3 122088.3 122089.6
Panel B Dependentvariable:employed2009
Dummy for individual born 
in or after October 1956 -0.0742*** 0.0427*** 0.00395 -0.00467 0.00524 0.00599
(0.0112) (0.00712) (0.00666) (0.00874) (0.0115) (0.0138)
Birth month controls linear square cubic quartic quintic sextic
Observations 387532 387532 387532 387532 387532 387532
R-squared 0.152 0.159 0.159 0.159 0.160 0.160
Akaike Information  Criterion 
(AIC) 423237.9 419869 419640.7 419640.1 419610.3 419613.3
Panel C Dependentvariable:earnings2009
Dummy for individual born 
in or after October 1956 -0.00919** 0.0121** -0.00264 -0.00349 -0.0114 -0.00239
(0.00379) (0.00547) (0.00671) (0.00832) (0.00967) (0.0117)
Birth month controls linear square cubic quartic quintic sextic
Observations 248081 248081 248081 248081 248081 248081
R-squared 0.103 0.104 0.104 0.104 0.104 0.104
Akaike Information  Criterion 
(AIC) 287383.3 287339.3 287332.3 287335.9 287337.2 287339.2
Notes: Each cell is an OLS-regression. All regressions include dummies for gender and ethnicity. Stan-
dard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the birth month 
level .*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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coefficients from panel A.50 However, as the reduced form estimates are close to zero and 
insignificant (and for earnings even negative), these instrumental variables estimates will 
be little informative.
To investigate whether low ability students may have benefited from the law, I focus on 
a subsample of the total sample, consisting of individuals who reported that their highest 
level of completed education is at most a certificate of one of the two lowest tracks of sec-
ondary school (LBO or MAVO). The individuals in this sample either obtained a LBO/MAVO 
high school diploma or only finished primary school. Hence, individuals with a diploma 
higher than MAVO are excluded. I define this sample as the low track sample (see table 4A.1 
and figure 4A.1 in the Appendix for descriptive statistics and a discontinuity graph).
A possible concern with this approach is that this sample is selected on the outcome. 
Such a selective sample may give biased results because I exclude individuals that could 
have obtained certificates higher than MAVO through the change in the law. However, this 
problem might be mitigated by the fact that at that time low ability students in the lowest 
tracks of the secondary school system (LBO, MAVO) often did not end up in higher tracks.
Table 4.III presents estimates of the change in the compulsory schooling law on the 
main outcomes for the low track sample. As expected, the estimated coefficient for high 
school completion is larger in this sample than in the total sample (panel A). Based on the 
most flexible specification in column (6), high school completion among low ability stu-
dents increased 5 percentage points through the change in the compulsory schooling law 
(equivalent to an increase of about 0.2 years of schooling). Again, however, I do not find 
evidence that the change resulted in higher earnings or higher probability to be employed; 
the estimates in panels B and C are not significantly different from zero. Hence, the change 
in the compulsory schooling law increased the level of schooling for students of low ability, 
but the change has not been financially beneficial for them.
Robustness
Estimates from a regression discontinuity design could be sensitive to the window of the 
estimation sample chosen and the degree of the smoothing polynomial included (see Lee 
and Lemieux, 2010). In this section I investigate to what extent my estimates change when 
50 Estimates and standard errors are obtained by an instrumental variables approach to a Mince-
rian wage equation in which high school completion is instrumented by the dummy for being 
born on or after 1 October 1956. Estimates in panel A in tables 4.II and 4.III should then be 
considered first stage estimates. The F-statistic of the first stages are above 10 (they range 
between 12 and 16), indicating that there is no weak instrument problem.
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Table 4.III: Impact of 1971-ROSLA on 2009-outcomes, low track sample
Panel A Dependentvariable:highschoolcompletion
Independent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dummy for individual born in 
or after October 1956 0.0279*** 0.0356*** 0.0441*** 0.0490*** 0.0495*** 0.0507***
(0.00489) (0.00752) (0.00953) (0.0110) (0.0122) (0.0129)
Birth month controls linear square cubic quartic quintic sextic
Observations 125767 125767 125767 125767 125767 125767
R-squared 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.057
Akaike Information  Criterion 
(AIC) 150421.3 150423.2 150423.4 150425.7 150429.1 150429.7
Panel B Dependentvariable:working2009
Dummy for individual born in 
or after October 1956 -0.0603*** 0.0399*** 0.00917 -0.00209 0.0161 0.0119
(0.0106) (0.00905) (0.0105) (0.0135) (0.0164) (0.0199)
Birth month controls linear square cubic quartic quintic sextic
Observations 125767 125767 125767 125767 125767 125767
R-squared 0.159 0.164 0.164 0.164 0.164 0.164
Akaike Information  Criterion 
(AIC) 157332.3 156618 156587.2 156585.7 156573.9 156577.6
Panel C Dependentvariable:earnings2009
Dummy for individual born in 
or after October 1956 -0.0136** 0.0162** 0.00156 0.0140 0.0223 0.0165
(0.00585) (0.00755) (0.0101) (0.0124) (0.0152) (0.0182)
Birth month controls linear square cubic quartic quintic sextic
Observations 66443 66443 66443 66443 66443 66443
R-squared 0.117 0.118 0.118 0.118 0.118 0.118
Akaike Information  Criterion 
(AIC) 45810.34 45763.7 45763.1 45764.54 45765.8 45769.5
Notes: Each cell is an OLS-regression. All regressions include dummies for gender and ethnicity. Stan-
dard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the birth month 
level .*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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I restrict the sample to 5 and 3 years distance to the cutoff and use a square and linear func-
tion of birth month as smoothing polynomial respectively.
The results of my robustness analysis are shown in table 4.IV. In panel A I report the 
results of regressions where I use the sample of individuals that are born between Octo-
ber 1951 and September 1960, which is a 5 year distance to the cutoff. In this estimation 
sample I include a square function of birth month. In panel B I restrict the sample further 
to individuals that are born between October 1953 and September 1959, which is a 3 year 
distance to the cutoff. Because of the smaller sample size, I only include a linear term in 
birth month. By using this estimation window, I exclude individuals that also were affected 
by the 1975-reform studied by Oosterbeek and Webbink. The estimates in panel A and B 
are given for the total sample and the low track sample.
Table 4.IV shows that the main results do not change: also when using different estimation 
windows and smoothing polynomials the estimates are about the same size for high school 
completion and insignificant for outcomes employed and earnings. In the next part I will 
give the estimates for each year over the period 2000-2009, thereby showing employment 
and income profiles.
Part II: employment and income profiles over 2000-2009
The outcomes used in tables 4.II and 4.III come from the year 2009 when the respondents 
who were first affected by the law (born in October 1956) are about 53 years old. Bhuller, 
Mogstad and Salvanes (2012) point out that estimates may differ at different ages because 
of life cycle bias. In addition, the effect on lifetime income may be different from the effect 
on income measured at a particular age. Perhaps respondents gained from the change 
in the law earlier in life, and these gains are not reflected in what is measured in 2009.51 
Therefore, I will investigate returns at other ages by estimating the impact of the change of 
the law on employment and earnings for each year (2000, 2001, 2002, etc) in the dataset. 
Hence, I estimate the effect of the change in the law on earnings and employment when 
those born in October 1956 are 43 years old in 2000, 44 years old in 2001 and so on. The 
results of these analyses are summarized in figures 4.2 and 4.3. I call these figures the 
employment and income profiles. The y-axis represents the estimated effect (solid line) 
51 Because 2009 is a recession year, one could argue that in particular in recessions persons would 
benefit from extra schooling such that we should have seen returns to extra schooling espe-
cially in this year. 
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Table 4.IV: Impact of 1971-ROSLA on 2009-outcomes for various estimation windows
Dependent variable:
high school 
completion
employed 
2009 earnings2009
Independent variable: (1) (2) (3)
Panel A: 5 year distance to cutoff
Total sample
Dummy for individual born in or after October 1956 0.0161*** 0.00665 -0.000
(0.00378) (0.00701) (0.00699)
Observations 193254 193254 132705
Lowtracksample
Dummy for individual born in or after October 1956 0.0472*** 0.0102 0.00794
(0.0104) (0.0112) (0.0106)
Observations 61245 61245 35767
Panel B: 3 year distance to cutoff
Total sample
Dummy for individual born in or after October 1956 0.0154*** 0.00518 -0.00232
(0.00316) (0.00594) (0.00604)
Observations 116011 116011 80285
Lowtracksample
Dummy for individual born in or after October 1956 0.0441*** 0.0106 0.00893
(0.00876) (0.00988) (0.00893)
Observations 36442 36442 21437
Notes: Each cell is an OLS-regression. The regressions in panel A include a square in (rescaled) birth month and 
interactions of the dummy for individual born in or after October 1956 with this square. In panel B it is a linear 
term. All regressions include dummies for gender and ethnicity. Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted 
for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the birth month level .*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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and the 95% confidence interval (dotted lines). The x-axis represents the year used in the 
 estimation, which ranges from 2000 to 2009. Estimates are based on the sample with a 
5 year distance to the cutoff and a square in birth month that differs at either side of the 
cutoff. The order of the polynomial is based on the Akaike Information Criterion.52 The esti-
mates are robust to the various robustness analyses presented in the first part.
The figures show that the estimates for employment and earnings (solid line) are not sig-
nificantly different from zero in all years 2000-2009: over this period the zero is covered 
by the 95% confidence interval (dotted lines). This holds for both the total and the low 
track sample.53 For the total sample, the estimates for income are even negative in most 
years. The 95% confidence interval shows that positive effects of 1% can be excluded. In 
comparison, for Anglo-Saxon countries returns have been found between 1 and 7% (see 
Section 4.2). Hence, the results for the Netherlands are different from those for the Anglo-
Saxon countries and do not depend on the year the outcomes have been measured, nor on 
the estimation window used or the order of the birth month polynomial included.
4.7 Why zero returns?
Why did the raising of the minimum school leaving age from 14 to 15 in the Netherlands not 
lead to higher wages while researchers do find returns in the Anglo-Saxon countries when 
exploiting similar changes? In this section, I investigate three possible explanations.
First I investigate whether the zero returns are a result of possible wage rigidity differ-
ences between the Netherlands and the Anglo-Saxon countries. Second, I investigate two 
other explanations that have previously been given in the literature: whereas Grenet postu-
lates that it matters whether the additional year in school is accompanied by certification, 
 Pischke and von Wachter postulate that it matters whether labor-market relevant skills are 
learned in the extra year.
52 In many estimations with this sample (i.e. the 5-year distance to the cutoff sample), the AIC was 
smallest when using a square function of birth month.
53 Except for employed in the low track sample in 2002.
TXC 20140722 Gerritsen.indd   110 11-8-2014   15:14:26
Zero returns to compulsory schooling: is it certification or skills that matters? 
111
4
 
-.0
2
-.0
1
0
.0
1
.0
2
.0
3
.0
4
es
ti
m
at
ed
 e
ff
ec
t o
n 
em
pl
oy
ed
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
year
estimate 95% CI
total sample
-.0
2
-.0
1
0
.0
1
.0
2
.0
3
.0
4
es
ti
m
at
ed
 e
ff
ec
t o
n 
em
pl
oy
ed
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
year
estimate 95% CI
low track sample
Figure 4.2: The impact of 1971-ROSLA on being employed in years 2000-2009
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Figure 4.3: The impact of 1971-ROSLA on log hourly wage in years 2000-2009
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Wage rigidity?
An explanation for not finding returns could lie in the wage setting institutions in the 
Netherlands, which, in contrast to those in the UK or USA, may prevent the adjustments 
necessary to reflect any returns. For example, the fraction of workers that is covered by 
collective bargaining agreements is much higher in the Netherlands than in the UK or USA: 
82% versus 35 or 12% respectively (OECD, 2009).54 This could mean that productivity dif-
ferences between individuals are not reflected in earnings because negotiated wages are 
kept higher than the market-clearing level wages. In that case the change in the compul-
sory schooling law may have contributed to the productivity of the individuals who were 
affected, but this higher productivity is not reflected in their wages. I give some suggestive 
evidence that may rule out this possibility.
First, because employers should be more willing to employ the more productive indi-
viduals with the extra schooling than the equally expensive individuals without the extra 
schooling, it might be expected that employers hire them more often. But as shown in the 
previous section, the estimated effect of the change in the compulsory schooling law on 
being employed is not significantly different from zero.
Second, if individuals notice that their extra skills are not recognized or rewarded by 
 employers, they may decide to start their own business. In that case, it might be expected 
that they would be self-employed more often. However, estimates of the impact of the 
reform on a dummy for self-employed are also not significantly different from zero, see 
figure 4.4. This suggests that, although the change in the compulsory schooling led to a 
higher educated population, it did not lead to a more productive one. Pischke and von 
Wachter (2007) and Grenet (2013) perform similar analyses for their countries and also find 
no effects on being (self-) employed, suggesting that wage rigidity is also not important for 
explaining the zero returns for Germany and France.
What matters most: certification or skills?
Another possible explanation for not finding returns is that the additional year in school 
was not accompanied by academic credentials (i.e. certifications). This explanation is given 
by Grenet. In his paper, he finds no returns for France when exploiting the Bedoin Reform 
which raised the minimum school leaving age by 2 years from 14 to 16 in 1967, whereas he 
does find returns for the UK in the 1972-reform that increased the minimum school leaving 
age by only one year (from 15 to 16). Because the latter was accompanied by a  certificate, 
54 http://www.oecd.org/els/emp/43116624.pdf.
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and the former not, he argues that the certification differences between the countries 
could explain the differences in returns.
However, the results in the previous sections suggest that it is not certification that 
explains the zero returns. In both the UK and the Netherlands the raising of the minimum 
school leaving age led to more certificates, but only for the UK the change also led to 
higher  earnings. A reason for this difference might be that the group of people affected 
by the 1971-ROSLA from 14 to 15 in the Netherlands was smaller than the group of people 
affected by the 1972-ROSLA from 15 to 16 in the UK (+0.1 years of schooling versus +0.3 
years of schooling). However, the impact of the reform on education in the Netherlands 
was about the same size as in the USA and Canada where positive effects of increases in 
compulsory schooling on earnings have been found. Hence, one might expect that esti-
mates of the effect of the Dutch reform on earnings would lie in the same ballpark of the 
estimates found for these countries. But as shown in figure 4.3, effects larger than 1% can 
be excluded.
Further suggestive evidence that certification does not explain the zero results may 
come from a comparison between the two reforms in the UK: the 1947-ROSLA from 14 to 
15 (without certificate) and the 1972-ROSLA from 15 to 16 (with certificate). If academic 
credentials were important then it would have been less likely to find returns from the 
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Figure 4.4: The impact of 1971-ROSLA on being self-employed in years 2000-2009 (conditional on 
being employed)
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1947-reform as this reform was not accompanied by such credentials. However, as shown 
in Section 4.2, in both reforms positive returns have been found. This makes a story that 
heavily relies on certification less likely. Moreover, both reforms led to more cognitive skills 
such that it is impossible to disentangle which mechanism was responsible for the higher 
earnings.55 In the 1972-reform, for example, the higher earnings could be due to the extra 
skills learned in the additional year, the certificate or the combination of both. Hence, a 
comparison of these two reforms might be more in favor of a skill-based explanation than 
of an explanation that solely or heavily relies on certification.
Such a skill based explanation is given by previous studies that find zero returns to 
increases in compulsory education. Pischke and von Wachter give some suggestive evi-
dence for this explanation in their study for Germany. They show that German individuals 
perform much better on quantitative and mathematics test than people in a similar posi-
tion in the UK, Canada or USA, thereby suggesting that most labor-market relevant skills 
were learned earlier in the education system in Germany than in the Anglo-Saxon coun-
tries. This would mean that children did not learn more relevant skills in the additional year 
in school than in the year out of school. Oosterbeek and Webbink follow the same line of 
reasoning for the Netherlands, which is a country very similar to Germany, and also come 
up with this skill based explanation for the zero returns to the Dutch 1975-reform.
In this chapter, which is also set in the Netherlands, I will add a few pieces of evidence 
that may support this skill based view. First, I investigate whether the raising of the mini-
mum school leaving age from 14 to 15 led to higher cognitive skills as measured by the Inter-
national Adult Literacy Survey (IALS) in 1994 (when those born in October 1956 are about 
38 years old). Table 4.V presents reduced form regressions of the impact of the reform on 
three measures of literacy skills (see figures 4A.2-4A.4 for graphs). As can be seen, the esti-
mates are not significantly different from zero. It should be noted, though, that the sample 
size is limited, which may make it difficult to detect any small effects of the reform on these 
skills. However, the estimates do rule out modest or large impacts.56 This stands in contrast 
with the UK-reforms in which positive effects on cognitive skills have been found.
55 See Banks and Mazonna (2012) for the effect of the 1947-reform on cognitive skills and Grenet 
(2013) for the effect of the 1972-reform on literacy skills.
56 The raw scores have been used as outcome measure. If I translate these effect sizes in percent-
age of standard deviations I am able to rule out effects larger than 0.2σ using the 95% confi-
dence interval. 
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Table 4.V: Impact of 1971-ROSLA on literacy skills from Adult Literacy Survey 1994
Dependent variable:
Independent variable:
prose literacy 
score
document 
 literacy score
quantitative
 literacy score
Dummy for being born in or after 1957 -0.762 -0.943 -0.315
(4.066) (4.893) (5.055)
Observations 1517 1517 1517
R-squared 0.018 0.018 0.010
Notes: Each cell is an OLS-regression. The regressions include a linear term of rescaled birth year (with 0 refer-
ring to birth year 1957) and the interaction of the dummy for being born in or after 1957 with this term. Birth 
year is constructed by subtracting age from the survey year, hence 1994-age. Sample is restricted to those 
born between 1946 and 1966. All regressions include a dummy for gender. Standard errors (in parentheses) are 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the birth year level .*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Second, I investigate whether the reform led to gains in other labor-market outcomes than 
earnings. If there were any (small) effects of the reform on relevant labor-market skills, one 
might expect that the change would affect other labor-market outcomes such as the prob-
ability to live on disability benefits.57 In figures 4.5-4.8 I present estimates of the impact of 
the reform on dummies for participation in disability, unemployment, and social welfare 
benefits. Estimates are based on the sample with a 5 year distance to the cutoff and a 
square in birth month that differs at either side of the cutoff. As can be seen, the estimates 
of the effects of the change in the compulsory schooling law on these three measures are 
insignificant in almost all years.58
57 The acquisition of those skills may lead to other type of jobs that may be less stressful. This in 
turn may reduce the risk to become disabled.
58 Except for unemployment benefits in 2007.
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Figure 4.5: The impact of 1971-ROSLA on having disability benefits in years 2000-2009
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Figure 4.6: The impact of 1971-ROSLA on having unemployment benefits in years 2000-2009
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Figure 4.7: The impact of 1971-ROSLA on having welfare benefits in years 2000-2009
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*Unemployment, welfare or disability benefits
Figure 4.8: The estimated effect of the change in the law of having benefits* in years 2000-2009
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Finally, I investigate whether individuals may have gained from the change before age 43, 
as estimated effects on outcomes only go back as far as the year 2000 (when those born in 
October 1956 are about 43 years old). One might argue that the gains from the change in 
the law are internalized in their adolescent years, meaning that the outcomes measured in 
2000-2009 do not capture the total number of years being (un)employed or having a paid 
job since the respondents left school. As pointed out in the data section, a nice feature 
of the Dutch Labour Market Panel is that it provides information on the number of years 
that people had a paid job, were unemployed and living on disability benefits since their 
fifteenth birthday. Regressions results with these three outcomes are presented in columns 
(1)-(3) of table 4.VI. They show that the change in the compulsory schooling law did not 
result in more years of having a paid job, less years of being unemployed or less years of 
living on disability benefits since age 15. Hence, the evidence presented in this section sug-
gests that the change in the compulsory schooling law did not lead to higher literacy skills 
or to better labor-market outcomes in general. This can be interpreted as evidence sup-
porting a skill-based explanation for the zero returns found in this chapter.
4.8 Conclusions
In this chapter I evaluated the raising of the minimum school leaving age from 14 to 15 in the 
Netherlands in 1971. The policy goal of this change was to increase the number of high school 
certificates. The analysis showed that the change reduced the high school dropout rate by 
approximately 20%. However, there were no benefits in terms of employment or higher 
wages when the population was aged 43-53. These results are consistent with previous work 
from continental Europe that documents zero returns to compulsory schooling, but stands 
in contrast with that from Anglo-Saxon countries in which positive returns are found. As a 
reason for not finding returns I give some suggestive evidence in support of the skill-based 
explanation that no more labor-market relevant skills were learned during this extra year of 
school compared to those skills previously learned out of school. I show that the change also 
did not lead to gains in literacy skills, nor in labor market outcomes other than earnings.
The contributions of these results to the current literature will be twofold. First, I give 
an additional piece of evidence that changes in compulsory schooling might not be effec-
tive in improving the productivity of the population. Second, I show that differences in 
returns between countries are not necessarily explained by differences in certification. In 
both the UK and the Netherlands the raising of the minimum school leaving led to more 
certificates, but only for the UK the change also led to higher (literacy) skills and earnings.
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Table 4.VI: Impact of 1971-ROSLA on employment and living on disability benefits since age 15 of 
the respondent
Years  having 
jobsince
age 15
Years 
 unemployed 
since age 15
Years 
 dis abled since 
age 15
Independent variable: (4)  (5)  (6)
Panel A: 5 year distance to cutoff
Total sample
Dummy for individual born in or after October 1956 -0.0448 0.00498 0.0665
(0.0553) (0.0323) (0.0406)
Observations 186105 190841 190958
Lowtracksample
Dummy for individual born in or after October 1956 0.0542 -0.0910 0.106
(0.0975) (0.0641) (0.0755)
Observations 56858 59861 59901
Panel B: 3 year distance to cutoff
Total sample
Dummy for individual born in or after October 1956 -0.00388 0.0106 0.0327
(0.0471) (0.0275) (0.0342)
Observations 111845 114581 114622
Lowtracksample
Dummy for individual born in or after October 1956 0.0637 -0.0682 0.0902
(0.0811) (0.0565) (0.0644)
Observations 33910  35627  35626
Notes: Each cell is an OLS-regression. The regressions in panel A include a square in (rescaled) birth 
month and interactions of the dummy for individual born in or after October 1956 with this square. 
In panel B it is a linear term. All regressions include dummies for gender and ethnicity. Standard 
errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the birth month level 
.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Taken together, this suggests that (further) increasing compulsory schooling may be 
ineffective for improving the productivity of the population if no labor market relevant 
skills are learned in the additional schooling year(s).
4.9 Appendix
DerivationoftheOctobercutoffdate
A Dutch school year runs from August 1 of a given year to July 31 next year. In the period 
under investigation, students had to go to school in the school year in which they became 
7 years old. There was an exception, however, for students born in August or September: 
they had the right to enroll in the current school year (starting in August) or in the school 
year prior to this year (starting in August one year earlier). Hence, students born from Octo-
ber onwards had to start primary school in the current school year. This means that the 
students born in October 1956 enrolled primary school in the school year 1963/1964 (i.e. 
started school on the first of August 1963). They completed 8 years of compulsory school-
ing on 31 July 1971 (6 years of primary school, and 2 years of secondary school if they did 
not retain). They had to complete a ninth compulsory year in the school year 1971/1972.
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Figure 4A.1: Discontinuity in low track sample
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Figure 4A.2-4A.4: Birth year 1957 is represented by zero on the x-axis; at each dot the num-
ber of observations is given that was used for the calculation of the averages.
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Figure 4A.2: No impact of 1971-ROSLA on prose literacy
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Figure 4A.3: No impact of 1971-ROSLA on document literacy
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Figure A.4: No impact of 1971-ROSLA on quantative literacy
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59 This is joint work with Dinand Webbink.
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Abstract
This chapter evaluates the effects of a subsidy program targeted at improving the school 
facilities for biology, physics and chemistry in secondary schools. The goal of this policy was 
to increase the enrollment rate in science and engineering (S&E) related courses at sec-
ondary and subsequent education institutions. The subsidy was assigned to schools based 
on a priority score reflecting the ambition level of schools to improve student achieve-
ment. Schools with scores below a threshold value did not receive subsidy. We exploit the 
assignment procedure in a regression discontinuity framework to estimate the impact of 
the subsidy on student outcomes. We find that the subsidy increased the enrollment rate 
in S&E-related courses in secondary school by 3 percentage points (equivalent to a rise of 
approximately 7.5%). In addition, we find that the enrollment rate in S&E-related courses 
in tertiary education increased by 2.5 percentage points (equivalent to a rise of approxi-
mately 11%). We do not find that the increased enrollment led to a deterioration in student 
achievement as measured by students’ biology, physics, and chemistry grades. This sug-
gests that supply side policies that make S&E-related courses more attractive are capable 
of increasing the number of S&E students, while keeping the quality of the supply of S&E 
students constant.
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5.1 Introduction
Shortages of science and engineering (S&E) workers are seen as a threat to society’s wel-
fare as these workers are important for research and development (R&D), which is gener-
ally considered to be an important driver of economic growth (Freeman, 2006; Goolsbee, 
1998). In many countries the government intervenes in the labour market for S&E work-
ers by subsidizing R&D activities. The economic rationale for government intervention is 
that, when left to the market, private firms will underinvest in R&D because they cannot 
fully appropriate the returns on their investments. Hence, government interventions that 
increase the R&D activities of private firms can raise domestic welfare.
There are two main ways by which a government can try to increase the number of S&E 
workers: by supply side policies or by demand side policies. Supply side policies focus on 
increased enrollment and graduation in S&E studies. This could result in more S&E gradu-
ates, which might lead to more R&D-activity. Typical supply-side instruments are financial 
incentives (such as lower tuition fees) or projects aimed at increasing interest in technol-
ogy or promoting the graduation rate of S&E students. Demand side policies focus on 
the demand for R&D by private firms. Typical instruments are R&D subsidies that directly 
increase R&D spending, which may induce a higher supply of S&E workers.
Although both types of policies are widely used, little is known about their effective-
ness. There is some evidence that demand side policies (for example increased spending on 
R&D subsidies) do not lead to more S&E workers but only increase wages because workers 
supply labor inelastically (Goolsbee, 1998). With respect to supply side policies, even less 
seems to be known. We know of no convincing evidence of the impact of such policies on 
the supply of S&E-graduates.
This chapter looks at an intervention that was specifically targeted at increasing the 
enrollment rate in S&E-related courses. In 2004 the Dutch Inspectorate of Education raised 
concerns about the poor state of school facilities for biology, chemistry, and physics in 
many Dutch secondary schools (Annual Report 2003/2004). They argued that this would 
discourage students from pursuing a science and engineering career. More specifically, it 
would negatively affect a student’s choice for S&E related courses in secondary educa-
tion and subsequent courses in higher education. These concerns were raised in a broader 
context in which shortages of Dutch engineers were considered to be a serious threat for 
future welfare.
To address this problem, the Minister of Education launched a subsidy in which schools 
could apply for extra funds to improve their school facilities (Regeling Bètalokalen). This 
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arrangement was implemented in 2007. The assignment of the subsidy was based on a 
priority score related to the school’s ambition level for improving student achievement. 
Schools with levels above a certain cutoff value were assigned the subsidy; schools with lev-
els lower than this value were not. Because the cutoff score was (and remained) unknown 
to the schools, the assignment procedure gives an opportunity to estimate the causal 
impact of the subsidy in a regression discontinuity framework. Using the ambition level as 
‘running variable’, assignment to treatment status can be considered ‘as good as random.’
The features of the Dutch education system allow us to estimate the impact of the sub-
sidy on enrollment rates in S&E-related courses and academic outcomes such as grades. 
After the third grade in secondary school, students (aged 15) have to choose between 
4 subjects (‘profiles’) for the continuation of their school career. These subjects differ in 
the courses students are obliged to follow. Students who choose ‘nature’ profiles have 
to follow courses in biology, chemistry, and physics. Students who choose ‘society’ pro-
files typically follow courses in economics, literature, and history. At the end of secondary 
education students are tested in each course by nationwide exams and, after graduation, 
they choose which course to follow in tertiary education. By using data on grades and 
subject choice of multiple cohorts of students from 2008-2012, we estimate the short and 
long-term impact of the subsidy on three important outcomes: (1) student’s choice with 
respect to their profiles in secondary education, (2) students’ biology, chemistry, and phys-
ics grades and (3) students’ study choice in tertiary education. By focusing on students’ 
profile choices and their chosen subject in tertiary education we investigate whether the 
additional investment in school facilities yield more S&E students. By focusing on students’ 
biology, chemistry, and physics grades, we are able to investigate whether increased enroll-
ment in S&E related studies implies a deterioration of the quality of the supply of S&E 
students. Typically biology, chemistry, and physics are taught in labs, which is not the case 
for other courses such as languages and economics. If better school facilities attract new 
students of lower ability, we might expect lower achievement levels in these S&E related 
courses.
We find that the subsidy raised the fraction of students that choose nature profiles 
by 3 percentage points (a rise of approximately 7%). Four years after the intervention 
this translates into an almost equivalent rise in the enrollment of students in S&E related 
courses in tertiary education. We do not find that the additional investment in school facili-
ties led to lower biology, physics or chemistry grades. This suggests that supply side policies 
that make S&E-related courses more attractive are capable of increasing the number of 
S&E students, while keeping the quality of the new supply of S&E students constant.
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The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 5.2 we discuss the related 
literature. In Section 5.3 we give additional information on the Dutch secondary school 
system. In Section 5.4 we discuss the features of the subsidy program and give additional 
information on the school’s proposed projects. In Section 5.5 we discuss the assignment 
procedure and our empirical strategy. Section 5.6 shows the estimation results. Finally, Sec-
tion 5.7 offers some concluding comments.
5.2 Related literature
To our knowledge, no previous studies have investigated the relationship between bet-
ter school facilities and the supply of S&E graduates. There is, however, a large body of 
research that investigates the relationship between the quality of the learning environment 
and student achievement. Although the majority of this literature focuses on associations 
(see Hanushek, 1997; Earthman, 2002; and Mendell and Heath, 2004, for reviews), there 
are some studies that aim to estimate the causal impact of a better learning environment 
on student achievement. Obtaining credible estimates of this impact is difficult because 
exogenous variation in the quality of school facilities is rare. Investment in these facilities 
is typically endogenous as schools are free to choose how much to invest and often align 
this amount to the needs of their students. Because students sort into schools based on 
these investments, students in schools with high or low quality facilities are not likely to be 
comparable. Unobserved characteristics may differ between the students of these schools, 
which would confound the causal relationship between the quality of school facilities and 
student outcomes. In this section, we therefore focus on the literature that addresses these 
identification issues.
A first body of literature is related to additional spending on schools in general (see 
Guryan, 2000; Papke, 2005; Card and Payne, 2002; Chay et al., 2005; Leuven et al., 2007). 
In these studies exogenous variation in expenditure is produced by funding schemes or by 
regulation (and changes therein) through which some schools obtain more resources than 
others. These studies find mixed results of the impact of extra resources for schools on stu-
dent outputs. Because schools are free to choose what to do with the extra resources, this 
literature finds it difficult to disentangle the mechanisms that led to the observed student 
outcomes. Higher achievement, for instance, could be due to extra spending on personnel, 
school facilities, or on a combination of both.
A second strand of literature is related to additional investment in information and com-
munication technology (ICT) that aims to promote the use of computers in the classroom. 
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The exogenous variation used in these studies is often produced by the assignment proce-
dure of subsidy programs that are specifically earmarked for the purchase of computers 
(see Angrist and Lavy, 2002; Goolsbee and Guryan, 2006; Leuven et al., 2007; Machin et al., 
2007). Except for the study of Machin, the studies find no effect of increased ICT-spending 
(or use of computers) on student achievement.
One study that focuses on school facilities in general is Cellini et al. (2010). In this study 
the broad economic impact of investment in school facilities is estimated by using house 
prices as main outcome. The authors exploit exogenous variation in referenda outcomes 
for bond proposals in California which determined whether school districts could issue 
bonds for the improvement of their school facilities. They use a dynamic regression discon-
tinuity framework in which they compare school districts where a bond proposal passed 
by one vote with school districts where a proposal failed by the same margin. They find 
that house prices rise in districts where the proposal passed. Moreover, they find that the 
willingness to pay for houses in these districts is larger than the cost of extra capital spend-
ing. In addition, they find positive effects on student achievement. Their results indicate 
that investment in school facilities matters and that Californian school districts underin-
vest in these facilities. As the authors note, the advantage of working with house prices 
is that they capture more than academic benefits alone: non-academic benefits such as 
students’ health and the aesthetic appeal for well featured school facilities are captured 
too. When they relate house prices to student achievement, they find that the increased 
student achievement explains only a small part of the increased house prices, suggesting 
that the benefits of better school facilities are typically non-academic.
5.3 Dutchsecondaryeducation
The Dutch secondary education system is publicly funded60 and is a highly differentiated 
system. After 8 years of primary school, students (aged 12) are tracked into one of the three 
tracks of the secondary school system. These tracks can be considered to have successive 
levels of education. The lowest track, VMBO, offers students a basic vocational program at 
four different levels. Finishing this track takes 4 years. The middle track (HAVO) prepares 
students for higher level vocational training (HBO) and takes 5 years. Finishing the highest 
60 Since 1995 the system is lump sum financed. That is, schools receive a fixed amount of money 
based on the number of students in the school. 
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track (VWO) gives access to university and takes 6 years. Our study focuses on the HAVO 
and VWO tracks.
After completing the third year in secondary school, students (aged 15) in HAVO and 
VWO tracks have to choose between four profiles which prepare them for education in 
specific fields of tertiary education (economics, literature, health, engineering etc.). For 
HAVO  students this means spending an additional two years in high school doing courses in 
their chosen profile. For VWO students this means an additional three years. The profiles 
students can choose from are (1) culture & society, (2) economics & society, (3) nature & 
health, and (4) nature & engineering. Switching profiles during these years is difficult and 
uncommon. In figure 5.1 we sketch the Dutch education system.
Each profile contains a number of compulsory courses. Specifically, and most impor-
tantly for this study, is that HAVO and VWO students in nature-profiles (3) and (4) have to 
do courses in physics, chemistry, and biology. Typically, these profiles prepare students for 
S&E related courses in higher education. For example, VWO-students who graduate from 
high school with profile (4) have access to mechanical engineering at an institute of tech-
nology at university.
Graduation from high school is based on passing all (or a number of) compulsory courses 
in the chosen profile.61 Passing a course is determined by the average of the grades of 
two exams: a school exam (Schoolexamen, SE) and a nationwide exam (Centraal Schriftelijk 
Examen, CSE). Exams are taken for each subject (biology, chemistry etc.) and level (HAVO, 
VWO). Dutch grades range from 1 (very bad) to 10 (excellent), with an average grade of 
5.5 being sufficient to pass a course. The content of the school exam is determined by the 
school and thus not comparable across schools. The content of the nationwide exam is 
centrally determined by the CITO-agency, which has been commissioned by the Ministry of 
Education to develop exams. This exam is taken in May or June, near the end of the school 
year.62 All students are obliged to participate in these exams. The grades of these exams 
are comparable across schools because the exams are the same within each subject and 
level. We will use the grades of this exam to investigate the effects of the policy on student 
achievement in physics, chemistry, and biology.
61 The rules with respect to graduation changed over the period under investigation. This doesn’t 
matter for our this chapter as we compare the outcomes of treated and non-treated schools in 
a given year. 
62 The Dutch school year runs from August 1 of a given year to July 31 next year.
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Figure 5.1: Sketch of Dutch secondary education system (excluding VMBO)
5.4 The subsidy program
The policy
In 2004 the Dutch Inspectorate of Education raised concerns about the poor state of 
the school facilities for biology, chemistry, and physics in many Dutch secondary schools 
(Annual Report, 2003/2004). This would negatively affect the choice of HAVO and VWO 
students for pursuing an engineering career. More specifically, it would negatively affect 
the choice for nature profiles in secondary education and subsequent decisions to follow 
a higher engineering education. These concerns were raised in a broader context in which 
shortages of Dutch engineers were seen a serious threat to future welfare.
To address this problem, the Minister of Education launched a subsidy arrangement 
in which schools could apply for extra funds to improve their school facilities (Regeling 
Bètalokalen). The arrangement was introduced in 2007. Between March 31, 2007 and May 
15, 2007 all Dutch secondary schools could apply. The maximum amount of money that 
could be requested was €150,000, and schools had to co-finance their project for at least 
50% of the total budget. This meant that if a project would cost €250,000 in total, the 
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schools had to pay at least €125,000 themselves, and could only receive a subsidy up to 
€125,000. If a project would cost €450,000, then they had to pay at least €300,000 them-
selves.
In total 272 schools applied. From these 272 schools, 150 schools were assigned the 
subsidy (a total of €19.3 million). In the next section we describe the assignment procedure, 
which is important for our empirical strategy. First, we give some background information 
on the schools’ proposed projects.
Background information on proposed projects for treated and non-treated 
schools
Table 5.I presents additional information on the schools’ proposed projects. We do this 
both for schools that received the subsidy and for schools that did not. Throughout the 
chapter we refer to them as the treated and non-treated schools, respectively. The infor-
mation is derived from a policy report (Dialogic, 2007).63 It was based on surveys among 
subsamples of the treated (n=126) and non-treated schools (n=88).
In panel A we give descriptive statistics about the amount of money requested, and 
the amount co-financed by the schools. The treated schools requested approximately 
€130,000, the non-treated schools about €107,000. The table shows that getting no extra 
subsidy did not restrain the non-treated schools from additional spending on technology 
labs; 30% decided to fully carry out their project regardless of the fact their application was 
rejected, whilst 44% decided to carry out their project partially. This means that 74% of the 
non-treated schools decided to invest in new school facilities, even though they did not 
receive the extra subsidy. However, their spending was much less than originally planned 
as the amount requested exceeded the amount invested by almost a half (€107,238 ver-
sus €54,392). More importantly, the difference between the average amount invested 
in treated and non-treated schools was about €500,000, meaning that the investment 
of treated schools were about 10 times larger than that of non-treated schools. In addi-
tion, the treated schools invested about 3 times more than the extra subsidy they received 
(€418,581 versus €128,533). Apparently, receiving the subsidy triggered schools to invest 
more in their labs than they originally planned as the amount invested is much more than 
the  co-finance requirement of 50%.
63 http://www.dialogic.nl/documents/2007.051-1013.pdf
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Panel B shows information about how the money was spent by the treated schools. 
In the survey the schools were asked how they distributed the money over 5 items. The 
percentages had to add up to 100%. 79% of the investment was related to technology labs: 
that is, adjusting or restructuring old labs (41%), building new labs (15%), and buying new 
equipment such as oxygen cabinets (23%). 21% of the investment was ICT-related: 15% 
went to new ICT-equipment and 6% to infrastructural adjustments. Hence, most of the 
money was invested in school labs.
Panel C gives information on the timing of the implementation of the projects.64 In 2007, 
17% of the schools had finished their planned projects. This percentage was 70% in 2008. In 
2010 all schools that received subsidy had finished their projects.
64 In the survey the schools were asked about their expectation to finish their projects
Table 5.I: Background information on proposed projects from survey; treated schools (n=126) 
and non-treated schools (n=88)
 
Treated 
schools
Non-treated 
schools
A. Finance
Average  amount requested for proposed project (subsidy)* € 128,533 € 107,238 
% of schools that fully implemented their proposed project 100% 30%
% of non-treated schools that implemented their proposed projects partially - 44%
Average amount invested by school for proposed project € 547,114 € 54,392 
Average amount (co-) financed by school for proposed project € 418,581 € 54,392 
B. How was money spent by treated schools?
Adjusting or restructuring old technology labs 41% -
New equipment and materials for technology labs, i.e. oxygen cabinets, 
furniture, etc. 23% -
Building new technology labs 15% -
New ICT-equipment, i.e. computers, laptops, beamers, smart boards, 
calculators etc.
15%
-
Infrastructural adjustments with respect to ICT, i.e. new internet connections, 
fiber connections etc.
6%
-
C. Timing of implementation
% schools that finished implementation of proposed project in 2007 17% -
% schools that finished implementation of proposed project in 2008 70% -
% schools that finished implementation of proposed project in 2009 91% -
% schools that finished implementation of proposed project in 2010 100% -
N 126 88
* The averages in this row are based on the total sample which consist of 150 treated and 122 non-treated 
schools
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To sum up, the subsidy led to an additional investment of €500,000 in facilities for 
schools that received the subsidy. Most of these schools did not finish the implementation 
of their project until 2008, meaning that most schools were not treated until this year.
5.5 Assignment procedure & empirical strategy
Assignment procedure for receiving subsidy
The assignment procedure for receiving the extra subsidy is crucial for our empirical strat-
egy. The Ministry of Education commissioned the agency Platform Beta Techniek to carry 
out the procedure. All 272 applications were reviewed by a commission that was specifi-
cally appointed for the selection. The selection criteria for eligibility were based on three 
measures: (1) a score related to student achievement and enrollment in nature profiles, 
(2) a score related to the quality of the school facilities, and (3) a score related to the 
school’s level of ambition for improving enrollment and student achievement in nature pro-
files.65 With these scores the subsidy was assigned in two steps. First, based on the first two 
measures, four types of schools (i.e. quadrants) were determined: i) high achievement, bad 
facilities (93 schools); ii) high achievement, good facilities (74 schools); iii) low achievement, 
bad facilities (65 schools); and iv) low student achievement, good facilities (40 schools). All 
schools in the first quadrant were assigned the extra subsidy. All applications of the schools 
in the fourth quadrant were rejected.
In the second step, the schools in the second and third quadrant were pooled and the 
ambition level (3) was used to rank these schools. The higher the ambition level, the higher 
the school emerged in the ranking. Schools ranked 94-15066 were assigned the extra subsidy 
(57 schools). Schools ranked 151-232 were not assigned the subsidy (82 schools). Hence, a 
cutoff was used for assignment, which was 150. The corresponding ambition level cutoff 
score was 3.853, and remained unknown to the schools. This threshold was used because 
the money was limited and the commission determined that a maximum of 150 schools 
could receive the subsidy. In figure 5.2 we sketch the assignment procedure.
65 The scores were grades that were given by the commission and varied between 1 and 5. A 
higher score means a higher achievement, quality or ambition level. The scores do not have a 
clear meaning by themselves. 
66 All 93 schools in the first quadrant of which the application was accepted were ranked 1-93. All 
40 schools in the fourth quadrant of which the application was rejected were ranked 233-272.
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Quadrant II: high achieve-
ment, good school facilities                          
(74 schools)
Quadrant III: low achieve-
ment, bad school facilities                         
(65 schools)
Quadrant IV: low achieve-
ment, good school facilities                           
(all 40 applications rejected)
Figure 5.2: Sketch of assignment procedure
In table 5.II we present the number of schools that received the subsidy by quadrant. There 
were more schools eligible for the subsidy in the second quadrant (high student achieve-
ment) than in the third quadrant (low student achievement) because the commission’s 
score with respect to the ambition level is highly correlated with student achievement 
( correlation=0.74). For our empirical strategy we focus on the schools in quadrants ii) and 
iii) because we can exploit the ranking of these schools in a regression discontinuity design. 
The schools in the first and fourth quadrant cannot be used in such a framework because 
these schools were not ranked according to ambition level (or any other variable).
Table 5.II: Number of schools that received subsidy by quadrant
 Quadrant:  
Received subsidy: I II III IV Total
yes 93 51 6 0 150
no 0 23 59 40 122
Total 93 74 65 40 272
Empirical strategy
We estimate the causal effect of the subsidy by exploiting the assignment procedure. Because 
the schools in quadrants ii) and iii) are ranked with respect to ambition, this variable can be 
used as the ‘running variable’ in a regression discontinuity framework (Lee and Lemieux, 
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2010). The basic assumptions in this framework are that schools around the cutoff are very 
similar and that the relationship between the running variable (ambition) and the outcome 
is smooth around the discontinuity. For each outcome we estimate the following equation:
(5.1) 
In this equation  is the outcome of school s in year  and  is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if school s received the subsidy and 0 if not.  is the ambition level with its cutoff 
level rescaled to 0. That is,
 
Hence, schools with an ambition level higher than the cutoff value (3.853) were assigned the 
subsidy and schools with a level lower than this value were not. We include a polynomial 
of , , in the specification and allow this polynomial to be different either side of the 
cutoff by including interactions of  with this polynomial. For choosing the appropri-
ate order of the polynomial in the RD-design, we used the Akaike Information Criterion. In 
all analyses, this statistic indicated that a linear term in ambition was flexible enough for 
the RD-design.67 In (5.1)  is a vector of baseline covariates from the (pre-intervention) 
year 2007. We control for the commission’s score for each school’s student achievement, 
the quality of the labs, and for the amount of subsidy requested. In some specifications we 
will also include the outcomes from the baseline year 2007 if available. Furthermore, we 
also include year dummies, , for the years 2008-2012 and interactions of these dummies 
with the 2007 covariates in our models as we pool school data from multiple years. For the 
estimation of equation (5.1) we apply OLS and adjust standard errors for heteroskedasticity 
and clustering at the school level.
The parameter of interest is  which represents the effect of receiving the extra sub-
sidy on the outcome. We interpret this coefficient as the effect of better school facilities 
with a value of approximately €500,000 euro (in 2007 prices, based on table 5.I). Because 
we do not have information about the actual investments for each school we cannot apply 
a two-stage-least-squares approach in which we estimate the effect of an additional euro 
67 In all analyses the statistic is smallest when using a linear term. Moreover, the estimated coef-
ficient of this term is often not significantly different from zero.
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spent on new school facilities. Hence, estimates of  should be considered as intent-to-
treat (i.e. reduced form) estimates.
Tests on the validity of the RD-design
The key assumption of the RD-design is that the covariates either side of the cutoff are 
locally balanced. This means that there should be no differences between treated and 
non-treated schools around the cutoff. To investigate this, we perform two tests. First, 
we present a density test in figure 5.3. We show two frequency histograms of the running 
variable Z (rescaled ambition level) to investigate whether there are discontinuous changes 
around the cutoff (McCrary, 2008). If schools knew the cutoff level, then they could have 
manipulated the running variable in order to obtain treatment status (that is, receiving 
the subsidy). In that case there might be more schools that just received the subsidy than 
schools that didn’t, which could indicate that there are differences between treated and 
non-treated schools around the cutoff. However, this seems unlikely because the schools 
did not know the cutoff. This is confirmed by the two histograms: they show that there are 
no discontinuities/ irregularities (for example spikes) in the number of schools around 0.
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Figure 5.3: Density test: frequency histograms of running variable; 5 bins (left) and 10 bins (right) 
to the left of the cutoff
Second, we present a balancing test. In table 5.III we investigate whether treated and non-
treated schools significantly differ around the cutoff in the amount of subsidy requested, 
the commission’s scores related to the quality of the school’s facilities and student achieve-
ment, and the fraction of students with nature profiles.68 Because these scores are derived 
68 See next section for descriptive statistics of these variables.
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from the pre-intervention year 2007 we expect these differences to become insignificant 
when the running variable is included. In column (1) we regress the outcome on the dummy 
for if the school received a subsidy without controls. In column (2) we include the running 
variable. As expected, there are significant differences between treated and non-treated 
schools in student achievement and quality of the school facilities (see columns (1)). By 
including the running variable, these differences become much smaller, and are no longer 
statistically significant at the 5% level (see columns (2)). Hence, we do not find strong evi-
dence for discontinuities around the cutoff in our baseline covariates, nor in the density of 
the running variable, suggesting that the key assumption of the RD-design holds. However, 
it should be noted that the estimates for student achievement and the subsidy requested 
are marginally significant at the 10% level, meaning that treated schools around the cutoff 
had higher student achievement and requested a lower subsidy than non-treated schools. 
In our analyses we include these covariates to control for these small differences.
Table 5.III: Balancing test, do schools differ around the cutoff in 2007-variables (pre-intervention)?
Dependentvariable(frompre-interventionyear2007):
quality of lab 
 spaces
student’s 
 achievement subsidy requested
fractionof
 students with 
natureprofiles
Independent 
 variable: (1) (2)  (1) (2)  (1) (2) (1) (2)
Dummy=1 if 
received subsidy 0.453*** 0.203 0.721*** 0.224* 5658 -24995* 0.009 0.016
(0.0808) (0.138) (0.0729) (0.119) (7770) (13367) (0.013) (0.209)
Running variable 
included  (ambition 
level) no yes no yes no yes no yes
Observations 139 139 139 139 139 139 136 136
R-squared 0.170 0.213  0.418 0.524  0.004 0.060  0.003 0.013
Notes: Each column is an OLS-regression. Columns (1) do not include controls. Columns (2) include the running 
variable. Outcomes from the year 2007 are used. Robust standard errors (between brackets) are used. * signifi-
cant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level.
5.6 Data
In our analysis we use school level data for years 2007-2012. We obtained all scores from 
the assignment procedure from the Platform Beta Techniek. This includes information on 
the ambition level, the quality of the labs, student achievement, and the amount of subsidy 
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requested for each school. The outcomes were obtained from an online source from the 
Ministry of Education, which includes information on students’ profile choice, grades and 
enrollment in tertiary education.69 For each year, we could match about 97% of the schools 
in the second and third quadrant from the assignment procedure with the schools from 
the online source of the Ministry.70 Hence, we created a panel dataset with information on 
137 schools from 2007-2012.
For our dependent variables we focus on three outcomes: 1) profile choice in secondary 
education (measured by enrollment in nature profiles in the fourth grade), 2) grades in biol-
ogy, physics and chemistry (measured at the end of the school year), and 3) enrolment in 
S&E related courses in tertiary education (measured one year after graduation). Hence, the 
dependent variables have been chosen such that we can follow cohorts of students over a 
part of their school career (profile choice -> high school graduation -> enrollment tertiary 
education). We use the information from multiple years to study the long term impact 
of the intervention. Descriptive statistics of these variables are listed in table 5.IV for our 
main estimation sample. They are shown for treated (T) and non-treated (NT) schools for 
each year. The number of observations differs between years because some schools do 
not appear in the central database of the ministry in all years. However, as mentioned, the 
percentage matched is never below 97%. Also, to adjust for the difference in the size of 
schools, the school’s averages and fractions have been weighted by the number of students 
used in the calculation of these statistics.71
First, we look at student choices with respect to their profile in grade 4 (first row of 
table 5. IV). We may expect that better school facilities affect this choice after finishing 
grade 3. There is a 1 percentage point difference in the fraction of students with nature 
profiles between treated and non-treated schools in 2007 (42% versus 41%). Thereafter, 
this difference increases to 4 percentage points in 2012 (48% versus 44%).
Second, we look at students’ (unstandardized) biology, physics, and chemistry grades 
in the final year of secondary school (rows 2-7). They are given for both HAVO and VWO 
69 http://www.duo.nl/organisatie/open_onderwijsdata/databestanden/vo/default.asp
70 Some schools were not administered in the online source from the Ministry of Education in all 
years. 
71 We do this by using the [aweight] option in Stata. If one school has 10 students with aver-
age biology grade of 6 and another school 30 students with average biology grade of 8, then 
the weighted average will be (10*6+30*8)/40=7.5 (which is the correct average). Not using the 
aweight option will give an incorrect average grade of (6+8)/2=7.
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students because the nationwide exams are different for these educational levels.72 The 
grades have not been standardized as the standard deviation of the grades is approxi-
mately equal to 1.73 This means that differences in grades can be interpreted as a percent-
age of standard deviation. The figures in rows 2-7 suggest that the increased enrollment in 
nature profiles did not have a negative impact on grades. There are hardly any differences 
in grades between treated and non-treated schools, regardless of the year. The maximum 
difference is only about 0.1 standard deviations.
Finally, we investigate student choices with respect to the field of study in higher educa-
tion (row 8). After graduation, students make a choice in which field they want to pursue 
their career. If better school facilities increase the fraction of students that choose nature 
profiles in secondary education, we may also expect an increase in the fraction of the entire 
school population in the final year of secondary school that choose S&E related courses in 
tertiary education after graduating from high school.74 It should be noted that we do not 
expect to see a change in this variable until 2012 because the third graders from schools 
that were treated in 2008 are still in secondary school in the years 2008-2011. Recall that 
after their profile choice (in 2008/2009) they had to spend two or three additional years in 
school. This means that we do not observe them in tertiary education until 2012. Hence, 
2012 should be considered the first post treatment year of the intervention if we use enroll-
ment in tertiary education as the outcome variable. This seems to be confirmed by the 
figures in table 5.IV: there are hardly any differences in this fraction between treated and 
non-treated schools up to 2011. In 2012, however, the difference is 2 percentage points 
(25% versus 23%).
The covariates for our analysis are shown in the bottom panel of table 5.IV (rows 9-12). 
Treated schools had higher ambition levels, higher student achievement, and better labs 
than the non-treated schools in the (pre-intervention) year 2007. They also requested more 
money (about €5,000 more). However, as shown in the previous section, these differences 
become smaller and turn statistically insignificant for the schools around the cutoff.
72 For the analysis presented in the next section, we pool the data of the HAVO and VWO stu-
dents.
73 Because we do not have information on grades at the individual level, we asked CITO for the 
standard deviation. For each course (biology, chemistry, physics) the standard error is approxi-
mately equal to 1.
74 Hence we do not look at the fraction of those with nature-profiles that choose S&E related stud-
ies in tertiary education. This transition probability may have been unaffected.
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5.7 Results
Impact of subsidy on profile choice
Table 5.V presents estimates of the effect of the subsidy on the fraction of students with 
nature profiles in the fourth grade based on equation (5.1). In all columns we adjust stand-
ard errors for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the school level. The first three columns 
give pooled estimates of this effect when we pool data from 2008-2012. Column (1) only 
includes the running variable and year dummies for 2008-2012. This estimate is the basic 
RD-estimate of the causal effect of the subsidy on the outcome because, conditional on 
the level of ambition, schools around the cutoff should be similar in their pre-intervention 
characteristics. In column (2) we add the other 2007-covariates. For our RD-approach to 
be robust, including these pre-intervention controls should not alter the estimates much 
compared to column (1). In column (3), we also include interactions of the year dummies 
with all our covariates, such that we allow the coefficients for the covariates to be different 
for each year. This is our most flexible specification.
The estimated effects in the three columns range between 2.5 and 3.5 percentage 
points and are significantly different from zero. Including the 2007 controls in column (2) 
decreases the estimated effect from 3.5 to 2.5 but improves precision as the standard error 
is smaller than in column (1). Allowing the specification to be different for each year in col-
umn (3) does not change the estimated effect compared to column (2). Hence, the results 
are robust to the inclusion of additional controls and the type of specification used. If we 
take 3 percentage points as the average estimated effect and 41% as the mean of the con-
trol group (based on table 5.IV), then the subsidy raised the fraction that choose nature 
profiles by approximately 3/41=7.3%.
In columns (4)-(6) we investigate whether short term effects are different from long 
term effects by allowing the estimated effect to be different for each year. We do this by 
including interactions of the dummy for whether the school received the subsidy with the 
year dummies. The rest of the specification used in these three columns is the same as in 
the first three columns.
The estimated effects differ somewhat between years, but an F-test (shown at the bot-
tom of the table) does not reject the hypothesis that the impact is the same across all years. 
The p-values range between 0.17 and 0.38, all exceeding the 5% significance level. Hence, 
we cannot conclude that the short-term impact of better school facilities is different from 
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the long-term impact. The results for 2012, which was 4 years after intervention,75 suggest 
that the impact is persistent because the estimated effects are in the order of 3 percentage 
points. The improved school facilities seem to have structurally increased the enrollment 
rate in nature-profiles.
One possible concern is that the estimates are driven by selection of students from 
other schools into the treatment schools. For example, students with strong preferences 
for well appointed school facilities and nature profiles might change schools if they see that 
the facilities have been improved in their neighboring schools. However, this seems unlikely 
as the treatment (i.e. the improvement of the school facilities) affects students in the third 
grade when they have already spent three years in their school. Hence, the effects we find 
are likely to be driven by the school’s own students who, because of the improvement in 
the school’s facilities, are more likely to enroll in nature profiles.
Impact of subsidy on grades
Table 5.VI presents estimates of the impact of the subsidy on students’ (unstandardized) 
biology, physics, and chemistry grades. In all columns we adjust standard errors for hetero-
skedasticity and clustering at the school level. Columns (1) to (3) give pooled estimates of 
this impact for these three courses, respectively. The specification used in these columns is 
the same as in column (3) in table 5.V, except that it also includes a dummy for educational 
level (VWO=1; HAVO=0) and its interaction with the years because the data for HAVO and 
VWO students have been pooled over all years.76 The estimates can be interpreted as per-
centage of standard deviations as the standard error of the grades is about 1.
The estimation results show that, although the enrollment rate in nature profiles has 
increased, which may indicate that students of lower ability may have selected themselves 
in these profiles, student achievement did not deteriorate. The estimated effects are not 
 significantly different from zero.
In columns (4)-(6) we investigate whether the short-term impact differs from the long 
term impact, an analogue to column (6) in table 5.V. Again, the estimated effects differ 
somewhat, but the F-test does not reject the hypothesis that the impact is the same in all 
years. The p-values range between 0.66 and 0.83, all clearly exceeding the 10% significance 
level. Hence, there seems to be no negative short- or long-term impact of the subsidy on 
student achievement.
75 Using 2008 as the year in which the schools were treated.
76 This also explains the larger number of observations in this table compared to table 5.V.
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Table 5.V: Impact of subsidy on fraction of students with nature profiles in fourth grade
Dependent variable:  
fractionofstudentswithnatureprofilesinfourthgrade
Pooledestimatesofimpact
 subsidy  
Estimatesofimpactsubsidy
by year
Independent variables: (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)
Dummy=1 if  received subsidy 
(pooled estimate) 0.0356** 0.0250** 0.0247*
(0.0169) (0.0123) (0.0126)
Dummy=1 if year=2008 * Dummy=1 
if  received subsidy 0.0320* 0.0213 0.0289**
(0.0183) (0.0145) (0.0146)
Dummy=1 if year=2009 * Dummy=1 
if  received subsidy 0.0431** 0.0320** 0.0321*
(0.0180) (0.0143) (0.0191)
Dummy=1 if year=2010 * Dummy=1 
if  received subsidy 0.0388** 0.0284** 0.0280*
(0.0188) (0.0141) (0.0155)
Dummy=1 if year=2011 * Dummy=1 
if  received subsidy 0.0221 0.0113 0.00209
(0.0179) (0.0139) (0.0197)
Dummy=1 if year=2012 * Dummy=1 
if  received subsidy 0.0426** 0.0326** 0.0326*
(0.0182) (0.0140) (0.0168)
p-value F-test: impact is same over 
years 2008-2012 0.17 0.17 0.38
Controls:
Running variable  
(ambition 2007) yes yes yes yes yes yes
Additional 2007 controls no yes yes no yes yes
Year dummies * all 2007 controls 
(full interacted model) no no yes no no yes
Observations 681 681 681 681 681 681
R-squared 0.085 0.426 0.438  0.088 0.429 0.440
Notes: Each column is an OLS-regression. All models include year dummies. Columns (1) and (4) 
include a linear term in the running variable that differs at either side of the cutoff. Columns (2) and 
(5) add the other 2007-variables: the commission’s score related to student achievement, the score 
related to the quality of the lab spaces, the amount of subsidy requested and the fraction of students 
with nature profiles in fourth grade in 2007. Columns (3) and (6) additionally include interactions 
of the covariates with the year dummies. Standard errors (between brackets) are clustered at the 
school level. Number of observations (schools) per year is 136, 137, 137, 136 and 135 for years 2008-
2012 respectively. * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 
1% level.
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Table 5.VI: Impact of subsidy on fraction of students that moves on to S&E related fields in tertiary 
education one year after graduation
Dependent variable: grades
Pooledestimatesofimpact
 subsidy
Estimatesofimpactsubsidy
by year
biology physics chemistry biology physics chemistry
Independent variables: (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)
Dummy=1 if received subsidy 
(pooled estimate) 0.0720 -0.0630 -0.111
(0.0561) (0.0913) (0.0900)
Dummy=1 if year=2009 * Dummy=1 
if received subsidy 0.0466 0.00436 -0.0488
(0.0732) (0.119) (0.109)
Dummy=1 if year=2010 * Dummy=1 
if received subsidy 0.119 -0.0977 -0.0964
(0.0763) (0.126) (0.131)
Dummy=1 if year=2011 * Dummy=1 
if received subsidy 0.0684 -0.0708 -0.143
(0.0704) (0.0962) (0.108)
Dummy=1 if year=2012 * Dummy=1 
if received subsidy 0.0528 -0.0825 -0.145
(0.0597) (0.0936) (0.0867)
p-value F-test: impact is same over 
years 2009-2012 0.66 0.74 0.83
Controls:
Running variable  
(ambition 2007) yes yes yes yes yes yes
Additional 2007 controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year dummies * all 2007 controls 
(full interacted model) yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 1067 1067 1067 1067 1067 1067
R-squared 0.160 0.097 0.133 0.160 0.098 0.134
Notes: Each column is an OLS-regression. In all columns the fully interacted model is used as in col-
umns (3) and (6) in table V. The models also include interactions of the dummy for educational level 
(1=VWO; 0=HAVO) and its interaction with the year dummies. Standard errors (between brackets) 
are clustered at the school level. For HAVO the number of observations (schools) per year is 130, 130, 
131, 130 for years 2008-2011 respectively. For VWO it is 137, 136, 136 and 137. These numbers add 
up to 1067. *significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level.
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Impact of subsidy on study choice in tertiary education.
Table 5.VII presents estimates of the impact of the subsidy on the fraction of students that 
were enrolled in S&E related studies one year after graduation. The table is structured in 
the same way as table 5.V. The first three columns give the pooled estimates. Columns (4)-
(6) investigate differences between the short- and long-term impact of the intervention.
As mentioned in the previous section, we do not expect to see differences between 
treated and non-treated schools until 2011, because the third graders that were affected 
by the new school facilities in 2008 or 2009 (when all school were treated) had to spend 
an additional two or three years in secondary school before they chose a course in ter-
tiary education. This means that 2012 is the first post treatment year of the intervention if 
we use enrollment in tertiary education as outcome variable. This is also reflected in the 
results in table 5.VII. The pooled estimates in columns (1)-(3) are not significantly different 
from zero because it pools data from 2009-2012, which only consist of one post treatment 
year (2012). In addition, the estimates are also not statistically different from zero if we 
look at the estimates by year in columns (4)-(6) for years 2009-2011. However, in 2012, esti-
mates are in the order of 2.5 percentage points and significantly different from zero. The 
F-test rejects the hypothesis that the impact is the same across all years at the 10% level 
(only in columns (4) and (5)). This estimate suggests that better school facilities resulted in 
a higher enrollment in S&E related courses four years after intervention. If we take 2.5 per-
centage points as the average estimated effect and 23% as the mean of the control group 
(based on table 5.IV), then the subsidy raised the fraction that choose nature profiles by 
approximately 2.5/23=11%.
5.8 Conclusions
In this chapter we evaluated the effects of a subsidy program targeted at improving school 
facilities for science and engineering (S&E) related courses in secondary schools. The sub-
sidy triggered schools to invest more in these facilities than they would originally invest. 
Typical, additional investments were about €500,000, lending support to an interpreta-
tion of our estimates as better school facilities with a value equal to this amount. For the 
 estimation of the effects we exploited the fact that schools were ranked according to a 
priority score and that a cutoff level was used to determine which schools could receive 
the subsidy.
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Table 5.VII: Impact of subsidy on fraction of students that moves on to S&E related fields in tertiary 
education one year after graduation
Dependentvariable:fractionofstudentsthatenrollsinS&E-related
studiesintertiaryeducationoneyearaftergraduation
Pooledestimatesofimpact
 subsidy  
Estimatesofimpactsubsidy 
by year
Independent variables: (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)
Dummy=1 if  received subsidy 
(pooled estimate) 0.0131 0.0123 0.0119
(0.00950) (0.00952) (0.00955)
Dummy=1 if year=2009 * Dummy=1 
if  received subsidy 0.00492 0.00405 0.00726
(0.0118) (0.0118) (0.0154)
Dummy=1 if year=2010 * Dummy=1 
if  received subsidy 0.0125 0.0117 -0.000125
(0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0111)
Dummy=1 if year=2011 * Dummy=1 
if  received subsidy 0.00852 0.00762 0.00614
(0.0115) (0.0114) (0.0136)
Dummy=1 if year=2012 * Dummy=1 
if  received subsidy 0.0271** 0.0262** 0.0346**
(0.0113) (0.0114) (0.0157)
p-value F-test: impact is same over 
years 2009-2012 0.10 0.10 0.13
Controls:
Running variable  
(ambition 2007) yes yes yes yes yes yes
Additional 2007 controls no yes yes no yes yes
Year dummies * all 2007 controls 
(full interacted model) no no yes no no yes
Observations 549 549 549 549 549 549
R-squared 0.049 0.053 0.071 0.057 0.060 0.078
Notes: Each column is an OLS-regression. All models include year dummies. Columns (1) and (4) include a linear 
term in the running variable that differs at either side of the cutoff. Columns (2) and (5) add the other 2007-vari-
ables: the commission’s score related to student achievement, the score related to the quality of the lab spaces 
and the amount of subsidy requested. Columns (3) and (6) additionally include interactions of the covariates with 
the year dummies. Standard errors (between brackets) are clustered at the school level. Number of observations 
(schools) per year is 136, 137, 137, 136 and 135 for years 2009-2012 respectively. *significant at the 10% level, 
** significant at the 5% level,*** significant at the 1% level.
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We find that better school facilities caused a significant increase in the fraction of 
 students that choose these S&E-related courses. The estimated effect is about 3 percent-
age points, which is equivalent to a rise of about 7%. In addition, we find that, after gradu-
ation, enrollment in S&E related courses in tertiary education increased by 2.5 percentage 
points, which is equivalent to a rise of approximately 11%. We do not find that the addi-
tional investment in school facilities negatively affected student achievement as measured 
by students’ biology, physics, and chemistry grades. This suggests that supply side policies 
that make S&E related courses more attractive are capable of increasing the number of 
S&E students without impacting the quality of the supply of these students. However, it 
remains unclear to what extent these policies increase the number of S&E workers (and 
hence R&D activity) because S&E students might choose other jobs than R&D after gradua-
tion when these jobs are much better paid. This is a topic for future research.
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Summary
This thesis looks at four different input factors that may contribute to the production of 
human capital. It investigates the importance of teacher quality, time in school, compul-
sory education, and school facilities for student outcomes, in particular student achieve-
ment. For estimating the effects of educational inputs education policies are used that 
were implemented in such a way that they lent themselves for an evaluation within a quasi-
experimental setting. Within such a setting causal estimates of the parameters of interest 
can be obtained. The chapters in this thesis are summarized below.
Chapter 2 examines the effect of teacher quality on student achievement using a novel 
identification strategy that exploits data on twins who entered the same school but were 
allocated to different classrooms in an exogenous way. The assignment of twins to differ-
ent classrooms can be viewed as a natural experiment that exposes very similar individuals 
to different schooling conditions. This quasi-experiment allows investigation of the causal 
effect of classroom quality on student outcomes using observational data. The variation 
in classroom conditions to which the twins are exposed can be considered as exogenous if 
the assignment of twins to different classes is as good as random. This assumption seems 
quite plausible within the institutional context of this study, which is Dutch primary edu-
cation. In many Dutch schools twins are assigned to different classes due to an informal 
policy rule that dictates that twins are not allowed to attend the same class. At school 
entry neither schools nor parents have much information about the ability or behavior of 
twins and the ability or behavior of their class mates. Moreover, because in early child-
hood twins are more similar than different, it seems unlikely that small differences between 
twins will affect the way they are assigned to different classes. By using this identification 
strategy, it is shown that that teacher quality is important, and that it is partly measured by 
teacher experience. It is found that (a) the test performance of all students improve with 
teacher experience; (b) teacher experience also matters for student performance after the 
initial years in the profession; (c) the teacher experience effect is most prominent in earlier 
 grades; (d) the teacher experience effects are robust to the inclusion of other classroom 
quality measures, such as peer group composition and class size; and (e) an increase in 
teacher experience also matter for career stages with less labor market mobility which 
 suggests positive returns to on the job training of teachers.
Chapter 3 uses school entry rules to provide the first estimates of the causal effect of 
time in school on cognitive skills for many countries around the world, for multiple age 
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groups and for multiple subjects. These estimates enable a comparison of the performance 
of education systems based on gain scores instead of level scores (i.e. average test scores). 
Data from international cognitive tests are used and variation induced by school entry 
rules is exploited within a regression discontinuity framework. The effect of time in school 
on cognitive skills differs strongly between countries. Remarkably, there is no association 
between the level of test scores and the estimated gains in cognitive skills. As such, a coun-
try’s ranking in international cognitive tests might misguide its educational policy. Across 
countries we find that a year of school time increases performance in cognitive tests with 
0.2 to 0.3 standard deviations for 9-year-olds and with 0.1 to 0.2 standard deviations for 
13-year-olds. Estimation of gains in cognitive skills also yields new opportunities for investi-
gating the determinants of international differences in educational achievement.
Chapter 4 evaluates the effects of raising the minimum school leaving age from 14 to 
15 in the Netherlands in 1971. The policy goal was to increase the number of high school 
graduates. The analysis shows that the change led to a decrease in the high school drop-
out rate of approximately 20%. However, there were no benefits in terms of employment 
or higher wages. Several explanations for this finding have been explored. Suggestive evi-
dence is presented in support of the skill-based explanation that no more labor-market 
relevant skills were learned during this extra year of school compared to those skills previ-
ously learned out of school.
Chapter 5 evaluates the effects of a subsidy program targeted at improving facilities for 
biology, physics and chemistry in secondary schools. The goal of this policy was to increase 
the enrollment rate in science and engineering (S&E) related courses at secondary and 
subsequent education institutions. The subsidy was assigned to schools based on a prior-
ity score reflecting the ambition level of schools to improve student achievement. Schools 
with scores below a threshold value did not receive subsidy. The assignment procedure is 
exploited in a regression discontinuity framework to estimate the impact of the subsidy on 
student outcomes. It is found that the subsidy increased the enrollment rate in S&E-related 
courses in secondary school by 3 percentage points (equivalent to a rise of approximately 
7.5%). In addition, it is found that the enrollment rate in S&E-related courses in tertiary edu-
cation increased by 2.5 percentage points (equivalent to a rise of approximately 11%). The 
increased enrollment did not lead to a deterioration in student achievement as measured 
by students’ biology, physics, and chemistry grades. This suggests that supply side policies 
that make S&E-related courses more attractive are capable of increasing the number of 
S&E students, while keeping the quality of the supply of S&E students constant.
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Nederlandsesamenvatting
‘Menselijk kapitaal is het geheel van competenties, kennis, sociale en persoonlijke vaardig-
heden die economisch waardevol zijn’77
Menselijk kapitaal is van groot belang voor onze welvaart (zie bijv. Hanushek en Woessman, 
2008). Economisch bloei zou niet mogelijk zijn, en we zouden bovendien minder geluk-
kig zijn als we niet in het bezit waren van een basishoeveelheid aan menselijk kapitaal. 
Gelukkig kunnen we zelf zorgen voor meer menselijk kapitaal door er in te investeren. 
Een manier om dat te doen is via het onderwijs. We gaan naar school om vaardigheden 
te leren die nodig zijn voor de productie van complexe goederen en diensten. Daarnaast 
leren we er vaardigheden die van belang zijn voor ons geluk later in het leven, zoals sociale 
 vaardigheden.
Dit doen we overigens niet alleen voor onszelf, maar ook voor anderen. We profiteren 
mogelijk van het onderwijs dat anderen hebben gehad. We kunnen bijvoorbeeld van elkaar 
leren, en we lopen minder kans om slachtoffer van een misdrijf te worden als anderen 
hoger opgeleid zijn. Dit wordt vaak aangeduid als positieve spillovers of ‘externe’ effecten.
Echter, mensen kunnen te weinig investeren in hun menselijk kapitaal. Zij kunnen onvol-
doende financiële middelen hebben voor onderwijs, kortzichtig zijn of simpelweg niet de 
waarde of het belang van onderwijs inzien. Dit schaadt niet alleen henzelf, maar ook de 
samenleving als geheel. Externe effecten, zoals hierboven beschreven, komen namelijk 
mogelijk niet tot stand. Daarnaast kan het leiden tot een grotere onderwijs- en inkomens-
ongelijkheid, als sommigen te weinig investeren in hun menselijk kapitaal maar anderen 
niet. Om deze redenen bemoeit de overheid zich met de keuzes van mensen met betrek-
king tot scholing. Anders gezegd: de overheid grijpt in op de markt voor onderwijs. Zij doet 
dit door het maken van wetgeving (bijv. Leerplicht) en door het subsidiëren van het onder-
wijs. Maar hoe grijpt de overheid nu op een effectieve manier in? Dat is een van de belang-
rijkste vragen die onderwijseconomen bestuderen.
Bij het onderzoeken van deze vraag kijken economen naar de zogenaamde produc-
tiefunctie van menselijk kapitaal. Deze functie beschrijft hoe menselijk kapitaal tot stand 
komt. Hoeveel menselijk kapitaal iemand bezit wordt gerelateerd aan factoren buiten 
school (zoals zijn genen, familieomgeving en netwerk) en aan factoren binnen school (zoals 
77 http://www.ensie.nl/definitie/Menselijk_kapitaal
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de tijd die is doorgebracht op school, de klassengrootte en de kwaliteit van de docenten). 
Voor deze onderwijsfactoren (zoals klassengrootte) is het van belang om te weten hoeveel 
zij bijdragen aan het menselijk kapitaal. Een beter begrip hiervan kan beleidsmakers name-
lijk helpen bij de besluitvorming over onderwijsmaatregelen. Leidt een klassenverkleining 
bijvoorbeeld tot betere leerprestaties? En zo ja, hoeveel beter dan? En leidt een verlenging 
van de leerplicht tot het verwerven van meer vaardigheden? Voor een beleidsmaker die 
kan kiezen uit een veelvoud aan beleidsopties, is het belangrijk de antwoorden op dit type 
vragen te weten, wil ze uiteindelijk tot beter beleid komen. Slecht beleid leidt immers tot 
verspilling van belastinggeld en mogelijk tot onderinvesteringen in menselijk kapitaal. Ken-
nis over dit soort onderwijsvraagstukken is dus zeer belangrijk.
In dit proefschrift worden vier verschillende onderwijsfactoren onderzocht die mogelijk 
bijdragen aan de productie van menselijk kapitaal. Het proefschrift onderzoekt:
1) hoe belangrijk de kwaliteit van de klas is voor de leerprestaties van leerlingen (en welke 
rol werkervaring van leerkrachten hierin speelt),
2) hoeveel er in een extra jaar onderwijstijd geleerd wordt op school,
3) wat de effecten zijn van een verlenging van de Leerplicht, en
4) hoe belangrijk schoolfaciliteiten zijn voor leerprestaties en keuzegedrag van studenten.
De belangrijkste uitdaging in dit proefschrift is het identificeren van het causale, d.w.z. 
oorzakelijke, effect van elk van deze inputfactoren (werkervaring, onderwijstijd, leerplicht, 
schoolfaciliteiten). Dit is moeilijk omdat de productiefunctie van menselijk kapitaal com-
plex in elkaar zit. Factoren buiten school hangen namelijk vaak samen met factoren binnen 
school en kunnen allemaal van invloed zijn op de hoeveelheid menselijk kapitaal. Stel dat 
bijvoorbeeld scholen die extra lestijd geven aan hun leerlingen beter presteren dan andere 
scholen, maar tegelijkertijd ook vaker leergierige leerlingen hebben. Dan kunnen deze 
betere prestaties niet zomaar worden toegeschreven aan de extra lestijd, omdat het net zo 
goed kan worden toegeschreven aan het feit dat de studenten gemotiveerder waren om 
te leren. Bovendien is het mogelijk dat leerlingen niet alleen verschillen in leergierigheid, 
maar ook nog eens in veel andere factoren. Deze factoren kunnen, net als leergierigheid, 
moeilijk te observeren zijn. Dit betekent dat simpele vergelijkingen van de leerprestaties 
van de leerlingen tussen scholen met en zonder extra lestijd niet het causale effect van 
extra lestijd zal meten, aangezien de leerlingen allesbehalve vergelijkbaar zijn. Om het cau-
sale effect van extra lestijd namelijk te achterhalen, zouden andere factoren, zoals de ver-
schillen tussen de leerlingen, moeten worden uitgesloten. Dit voorbeeld geeft dus aan dat 
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het een probleem kan zijn om een zuivere, geldige vergelijking te maken tussen leerlingen 
als men geïnteresseerd is in het effect van een inputfactor zoals extra lestijd.
Dit probleem komt overigens vaak voor in evaluaties van inputfactoren van de produc-
tiefunctie van menselijk kapitaal, en wordt ook wel het ‘endogeniteitsprobleem’ genoemd. 
In de economische literatuur is het de afgelopen twee decennia de uitdaging geweest 
oplossingen voor het endogeniteitsprobleem te vinden (Angrist en Pischke, 2010). Deze 
oplossingen worden gevonden in het gebruik van gerandomiseerde experimenten of quasi-
experimenten waarin studenten ‘exogeen’ (d.w.z. door willekeur) zijn toegewezen aan een 
controle- of behandelgroep. De studenten in een behandelgroep krijgen dan te maken met 
de onderwijsmaatregel (bijv. extra lestijd), terwijl studenten in de controlegroep daar niet 
mee te maken krijgen. Bij een gerandomiseerd experiment wordt de toewijzing dan door 
de onderzoeker zelf gedaan via een loterij. In dat geval worden studenten door toeval in 
een behandel- of controlegroep geplaatst. Bij een quasi-experiment gaat de toewijzing 
vaak via onderwijsbeleid. Het beleid is dan zo ingericht dat er door toeval behandel- en 
controlegroepen worden gecreëerd. De ‘exogene’ (d.w.z. willekeurige) manier van toewij-
zen zorgt er dan voor dat beide groepen vergelijkbaar zijn. Dit wil zeggen dat het mogelijk 
wordt om de behandelgroep op een geldige manier te vergelijken met de controlegroep. 
De literatuur die gebruik maakt van deze (quasi-)experimenten wordt vaak aangeduid als 
de experimentele literatuur.
Dit proefschrift levert een bijdrage aan deze literatuur. Er wordt onderwijsbeleid 
gebruikt om te onderzoeken wat het effect is van: 1) de werkervaring van leerkrachten, 
2) een jaar extra onderwijstijd, 3) een verlenging van de leerplicht en 4) de kwaliteit van de 
schoolfaciliteiten. De effecten worden gemeten op allerlei studentenuitkomsten die een 
benadering zijn van menselijk kapitaal, zoals de leerprestaties van de studenten. De hoofd-
stukken en onderwerpen in dit proefschrift kunnen afzonderlijk van elkaar worden gelezen 
en worden hieronder samengevat.
Hoe belangrijk de kwaliteit van de klas is voor de leerprestaties van leerlingen wordt 
besproken in hoofdstuk 2. Dit onderzoek maakt gebruik van een nieuwe strategie om cau-
sale effecten te kunnen achterhalen; er worden gegevens benut van tweelingparen die 
naar dezelfde school gaan, maar aan verschillende klassen zijn toegewezen. De toewij-
zing aan de verschillende klassen is het gevolg van onderwijsbeleid: op veel Nederlandse 
basisscholen worden tweelingen in verschillende klassen geplaatst door een (vaak infor-
mele) richtlijn die bepaalt dat tweelingen niet naar dezelfde klas mogen. De toewijzing 
van tweelingen aan de verschillende klassen kan worden gezien als een quasi- experiment, 
waarbij twee zeer vergelijkbare individuen worden blootgesteld aan verschillende klas-
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sen. Dit  quasi-experiment maakt onderzoek mogelijk naar het causale effect van de 
 klassenkwaliteit op de  leerprestaties. De toewijzing aan verschillende klassen kan namelijk 
als willekeurig worden verondersteld. Bij aanvang van het schooljaar in het eerste leerjaar 
(groep 1) hebben ouders en leerkrachten namelijk nog weinig informatie over de leerca-
paciteit van de tweeling en die van hun klasgenoten op basis waarvan ze tweelingen naar 
verschillende klassen zouden kunnen sturen. Daarnaast lijkt het onwaarschijnlijk dat kleine 
verschillen tussen tweelingen de manier zal beïnvloeden waarop ze aan verschillende klas-
sen worden toegewezen. Met behulp van deze identificatiestrategie wordt aangetoond 
dat verschillen in kwaliteit tussen klassen feitelijk neerkomt op kwaliteitsverschillen tussen 
leerkrachten, en dat deze kwaliteit ertoe doet. Het blijkt dat de kwaliteit van leerkrach-
ten deels kan worden afgemeten aan de ervaring van de leerkrachten: tweelingen die zijn 
toegewezen aan klassen met de meer ervaren leerkrachten doen het beter in termen van 
leerprestaties dan hun tweelingbroers/zussen die aan de klassen zijn toegewezen met de 
minder ervaren leerkrachten.
In hoofdstuk 3 wordt onderzocht wat het causale effect is van een jaar onderwijstijd 
op de leerprestaties van leerlingen in het basis- en voortgezet onderwijs.78 Met behulp van 
schoolinstroom regels79 wordt dit voor verschillende landen gedaan: voor elk land wordt 
bepaald wat het effect is. Dit effect kan worden gelabeld als een ‘toegevoegde waarde’ 
effect: hoeveel voegt een onderwijssysteem van een land toe aan de leerprestaties van 
de leerlingen in een jaar onderwijs. Het kan worden beschouwd als een kwaliteitsmaatstaf 
van het onderwijssysteem: hoe meer een systeem toevoegt, hoe beter het systeem. De 
resultaten laten zien dat het effect van een jaar onderwijstijd op de leerprestaties sterk 
verschilt per land. Deze ‘toegevoegde waarde’ effecten worden vervolgens gerankt: van 
het land met de hoogste toegevoegde waarde naar het land met de laagste toegevoegde 
waarde. Hierdoor ontstaat een landen ranking. Deze ranking wordt vervolgens vergele-
ken met een andere, traditionele ranking, namelijk een die gebaseerd is op de gemiddelde 
leerprestaties van een land. De gemiddelde leerprestaties van een land kan ook worden 
beschouwd als een indicator van de kwaliteit van het onderwijssysteem: hoe hoger de 
78 Er worden twee groepen leerlingen onderscheiden: 9-jarigen (groep 5/6 in het basisonderwijs) 
en 13-jarigen (klas 1/2 in het voortgezet onderwijs) 
79 Ook dit is een vorm van onderwijsbeleid. Er wordt hier niet verder ingegaan op de techniek. 
Schoolinstroom regels zijn regels die betrekking hebben op het beginnen met school. In Neder-
land is er lange tijd de 1-oktober regeling geweest: kinderen geboren voor 1 oktober mochten 
in het huidige schooljaar beginnen, terwijl kinderen geboren na 1 oktober nog een jaar moesten 
wachten. De regels zorgen ervoor dat kinderen die bijna even oud zijn (geboren rond 1 oktober) 
verschillen in de tijd doorgebracht op school. 
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gemiddelde score, hoe beter het systeem. Nu is de vraag of de twee rankingen, namelijk de 
toegevoegde waarde ranking en de ranking gebaseerd op het gemiddelde, hetzelfde beeld 
opleveren. Is het zo dat een land dat het gemiddeld goed doet ook veel toevoegt in een 
jaar onderwijs? En is het zo dat een land dat het gemiddeld slecht doet weinig toevoegt? 
Uit de analyse blijkt dat dit niet het geval is. Er zijn landen die het gemiddeld goed doen, 
maar weinig toevoegen, en andersom (landen die het gemiddeld slecht doen maar veel 
toevoegen). Anders gezegd: er wordt geen verband gevonden tussen de traditionele ran-
king, welke gebaseerd is op het gemiddelde, en de nieuwe ranking, welke gebaseerd is op 
de toegevoegde waarde. Een verklaring hiervoor is dat in tegenstelling tot het toegevoegde 
waarde effect, een hoog gemiddelde ook door andere factoren dan het onderwijssysteem 
kan worden veroorzaakt. Bijvoorbeeld als de condities buiten school gunstig zijn voor het 
opdoen van vaardigheden. Dit betekent dat de traditionele onderwijsrankings die vaak de 
kranten halen (zoals TIMMS en PISA), en welke gebaseerd zijn op het gemiddelde, moge-
lijk misleidend kunnen zijn als kwaliteitsmaatstaf voor het onderwijssysteem. Immers, de 
onderwijssystemen van de landen die in een dergelijke ranking bovenaan staan hoeven 
niet per se veel toe te voegen aan de leerprestaties van hun leerlingen.
Wat is het effect van een verhoging van de leerplicht in Nederland? Dit effect wordt 
besproken in hoofdstuk 4. In 1971 werd de leerplichtige leeftijd verhoogd van 14 naar 15 
jaar. Deze wetswijziging had als doel om meer leerlingen de mogelijkheid te geven een 
middelbaar schooldiploma te halen. De analyse in hoofdstuk 4 toont aan dat deze wijzi-
ging inderdaad geleid heeft tot een daling van het aantal voortijdig schoolverlaters van 
ongeveer 20% (d.w.z. er zijn meer diploma’s uitgereikt). Het heeft er echter niet toe geleid 
dat de leerlingen meer zijn gaan verdienen of betere kansen op de arbeidsmarkt hebben 
gekregen. In dit hoofdstuk worden verschillende verklaringen voor deze bevinding onder-
zocht. Er wordt suggestief bewijs gegeven voor een ‘skill-based’ verklaring: de leerlingen 
die een extra jaar op school hebben gezeten, hebben waarschijnlijk geen extra vaardig-
heden geleerd die relevant waren voor de arbeidsmarkt. De analyse laat dus zien dat het 
uitbreiden van de leerplicht tot een hoger opgeleide bevolking leidt (meer diploma’s) maar 
dat het daarmee niet automatisch de productiviteit (d.w.z. het inkomen) van de bevolking 
verhoogt.
In het laatste hoofdstuk wordt geëvalueerd wat de effecten zijn van een subsidiepro-
gramma gericht op het verbeteren van de schoolfaciliteiten voor biologie, natuurkunde en 
scheikunde in het voortgezet onderwijs (zoals laboratoria). Dit beleid was bedoeld om de 
instroom in bètaopleidingen in het voortgezet en hoger onderwijs te verhogen. De subsi-
die  werd toegewezen aan een bepaalde selectie van scholen. Alleen ambitieuze scholen 
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kwamen in aanmerking voor deze subsidie. De ambitie van scholen om de leerprestaties 
van leerlingen te verbeteren werd bepaald door een score. Scholen met hoge ambitie sco-
res kwamen in aanmerking voor de subsidie, terwijl scholen met iets minder hoge scores 
daar niet voor in aanmerking kwamen. Er zijn dus scholen die net wel of net niet aan een 
‘drempelwaarde’ (bepaalde ambitie score) voldeden. Deze toewijzingsprocedure kan wor-
den gebruikt in een zogeheten ‘regressie discontinuïteit analyse’ om het effect van betere 
schoolfaciliteiten op de instroom in bètaopleidingen en de leerprestaties te bepalen. In 
deze analyse worden leerlingen van scholen met scores vlak onder en boven de drempel-
waarde met elkaar vergeleken. De analyse laat zien dat de subsidie  het instroompercentage 
in bètaopleidingen in het voortgezet onderwijs heeft verhoogd met 3 procentpunten (equi-
valent aan een stijging van ongeveer 7,5%). Daarnaast laat de analyse zien dat de subsidie 
het instroompercentage in bètaopleidingen in het hoger onderwijs met ongeveer 2,5 pro-
centpunt heeft verhoogd (gelijk aan een stijging van circa 11%). De hogere instroom heeft 
daarentegen niet geleid tot een daling van de leerprestaties, zoals afgemeten aan de cijfers 
voor het centraal schriftelijk eindexamen voor biologie, natuurkunde en scheikunde. Dit 
suggereert dat het type subsidie zoals boven besproken, het aantal bètastudenten kan ver-
groten, zonder daarbij de kwaliteit van het aanbod aan bètastudenten te laten verschralen.
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